ROMA TRE

UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI

UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI ROMA TRE

Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche

Corso di Laurea Magistrale in International Studies (LM-52)

Tesi di Laurea in

International Politics

The race-migration nexus along the Global Colour Line: an empirical analysis of the European and Lebanese racialised management of migration

Candidata: Laura Morreale

Matricola: 548335

Relatrice: Correlatore:

Prof.ssa Daniela Huber   Prof. Niccolò Petrelli

A.A. 2020/2021

ABSTRACT

The Euro-Mediterranean region is generally not considered a site of analysis of institutional racism, despite its long history of colonialism. Departing from the IR research agenda that deals with the operationalisation of the Global Colour Line and developing a specific Euro-Mediterranean frame, this thesis argues that current migration policies of two political entities – the European Union and Lebanon – represent cases of institutionalised racism. Simultaneously, it outlines a new area of research that covers the role and impacts of antiracist social movements in counteracting racist hegemonic power through their discursive production. Specifically, the thesis argues that the formation and actualisation of the European border regime (encompassing bordering practices and externalisation agreements to third countries) and patterns of migrant indentured labour in Lebanon through the system of the Kafala meet at the intersection between Whiteness as a socio-political identity and structure and the development of bio- and necropolitical devices that subjugate migrants to 'bare life'. Finally, the thesis reveals the counter-hegemonic power held by European and Lebanese social movements, whose dynamism allows the creation of new social and political spaces where to challenge the inherent racism of formal institutional actors.

they have no idea what it's like
to lose home at the risk of
never finding home again
to have your entire life
split between two lands and
become the bridge between two countries

immigrant - rupi kaur

List of Contents

CHAPTER I

1.1 Introduction

During the months of May and June of 2020, the death of an African American man, George Floyd, in the United States shook a world that only a few months before had been taken to its knees by the Covid-19 pandemic. As a result, thousands of citizens in cities around the world have taken the streets to show solidarity for the African American and People of Colour (POC) communities in the United States, while increasingly starting to address the silent racism of their own countries and communities. Indeed, the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement protests challenged the racial amnesia that governs social and political institutions around the world and forced an awakening that was translated in the emergence of public debates and conversations about long seated racist beliefs and practices, including also in the European Union (King, 2020) and in countries of the "Global South" such as Lebanon (Frakes, 2020). Building on this momentum, activists and scholars gained more publicity in denouncing the presence of racism in multiple spheres of their societies, contextualising the BLM movement and reversing the trend whereby the United States was perceived as the exclusive culprit for questions and issues of systemic racism (CES, 2020; Milman et al., 2021). This research builds precisely on this momentum and examines systemic and institutional racism beyond the US, thus directly challenging the racial amnesia in other contexts, as well. By developing a peculiar Euro-Mediterranean focus, the ultimate goal is to bridge the gap between the various institutional actors and their inherent racism in the Euro-Mediterranean space which sits at the interface of the Global North and the Global South and is therefore a geographical area of particular interest for this study. Specifically, the research aims at providing empirical evidence backed by a relevant theoretical framework to analyse the race-migration nexus and assess whether current migration policies in this space are consequential to racism, while exploring the role of social movements in addressing and highlighting their essential racist nature.

In particular, this study will inquire into the migration policies of the European Union (EU) and Lebanon. Thus, one case study is from the Global North and one from the Global South, from an economically rich "highly developed" area and from an economic-crisis-ridden "developing" area of the world. The EU is composed of democracies (even though some of its member states have recently backslided to hybrid regimes, such as Hungary), whilst Lebanon is a hybrid regime. In both cases, the public discourse and civil society organisations and social movements intervening in it – which will be observed in both case studies – can operate rather freely.

More specifically, this study will focus on external migration policies in the case of the EU. The EU is a political union of states, and whilst internal migration policies remain contested, the EU has shared external migration policies in terms of border practices and externalizing practices. In the case of Lebanon – which as opposed to the EU is a state even though it is characterized by areas of limited statehood (ALS) – this study will zoom into a policy which is a shared practice across Lebanon including in ALS, that is labour migration through the kafala system.

A final consideration deals with terminology. Since this research addresses racism towards migrants of various and different origins, who are subject to varying degree of racialisation, it results difficult individuating a singular appropriate term to include all racialised subjects. Such consideration stems out of the acknowledgment of the great influence exerted by Western-related language, which has produced acronyms such as BIPOC (Black Indigenous and People of Colour) or BAME (Black Asians and Minority Ethnic). As I resorted to use neither, my motivation emerges out of fear that their use may sound inappropriate and disregard the experience of other racialised groups, especially when dealing with racism in the Global South. For such reasons, I have opted for the use of 'people of colour', hoping to engage its neutrality, and 'non-White' to signal the lack of a specific socio-political experience associated with Whiteness. I recognize this last term may sound contradictory when dealing with issues of racialised peoplehood, as it implies Whiteness is the main reference point, thus putting people of colour in the background. However, as we shall see, Whiteness constitutes indeed a fundamental racial category, whose significance cannot be ignored.

1.2 Literature review

The literature on the race-migration nexus in European academic circles has mostly been focused on the Migration Crisis of 2015, taking it as an essential point of reference for exploring the dynamics of racism, border regime and the rise of right-wing parties (Georgi, 2019), developing a critique of the 'coloniality of migration' and investigating the connection between racial capitalism and the asylum-migration nexus (Gutierrez Rodriguez, 2018), as well as analysing the various racialisation to which migrants are subjected to (Silverstein, 2005). Other research, such as that of Garner (2007) has adopted a wider historical and institutional framework, seeking to explore, through the concept of the racial state, the structural racialisation of immigration that occurred in the process of creation of a common immigration and asylum policy in the EU. A more throughout analysis of the racial assumptions at work in the European border regime is that of Nicholas De Genova (2018), who building on the slogan "Black Lives Matter", poses the question of whether black refugees and migrants' lives matter in Europe. However, his analytical focus remains that of the Migration Crisis of 2015, which has transformed the borders of Europe "into a macabre deathscape" (De Genova,

2018:1766). His aim is to disclose the racial workings with the European border regime that so often go unnoticed, seeking to remedy such gap by individuating the global colour line at work in the fortification of Europe. Building on this literature, the aim of this study is to avoid altogether the use of the 2015 Migration Crisis as an exceptional moment that produced a radical awakening of the numerous cases of racism within the European border regime; rather, I argue that a racialised management of migrants has historical continuity. The EU migration management has produced specific securitarian and humanitarian logics to be applied to the mobility of migrants, essentially denying them the right to enter, as in Frontex's operations and Libyan complicity, or restricting them within confined spaces, as in the hotspot of Lampedusa. These bio- and necropolitical devices, I argue, constitute the most striking evidence of the enactment of the global colour line in the European border regime.

For what concerns the literature related to Lebanon's kafala system, it has mainly been interested in analysing the nexus race-institution. For example, Pande (2013) has refused the exclusive focus on the abusiveness of the employer-employee relationship to concentrate on the multiple ways in which the system itself produces the conditions for the violations and abuses to which migrant domestic workers (MDWs) are subjected to. Such discourse has been taken further by Fernandez (2020), who has sought to highlight the racialised institutional humiliation that the kafala enacts in the wider Middle East region. An important work is that of Nisreen M. Kaj (2012), who has looked at race thinking, racialisation and racism in contemporary Lebanon, analysing the White-racial formation of Lebanese confessional groups and the Othering of MDWs, both through gender and racial structures. Moreover, a consistent part of the literature is composed of reports by international organisations and human rights groups who have gather empirical evidence, data and testimonies from migrant domestic workers (Amnesty International, 2019; ILO, 2016;2021). I add to this literature by linking the institution of the kafala with the colonial legacy of the country and the institutionalisation of Whiteness. Moreover, I propose an analysis of the bio- and necro-political control exerted by the employer on the migrant, whose life is thus subjected to a state of exception and commodified.

Finally, a substantial contribution will derive from the analysis of the emergence and efforts of social movements in building an antiracist discourse, both in the EU and Lebanon, which has mostly not been investigated by the academia. The research shall build on the argument made by Esperti (2020) regarding the emergence of actors engaged in the maritime rescue of people to further analyse the political motivations behind these humanitarian efforts. Furthermore and beyond humanitarian efforts, social movements raise awareness and advocate for change, either by radically challenging political spheres, enforcing a politically-charged humanitarianism or operating within the status quo,

their role is highlighted in reference to the contribution they make to the development of a discourse which serves to counteract the racist hegemonic order.

1.3 Theoretical framework

The new debate that is taking place in the field of International Relations, regarding the global colour line, as theorised by W.E.B. Du Bois, is a fruitful theoretical terrain for this research project. Indeed, IR has started to investigate issues of race and racism in relation to its main theoretical assumptions and notions, while numerous scholars have sought to analyse international phenomena under the light of the global colour line, thus individuating the multiple ways in which race and racism structure states' actions, human rights discourses, global inequalities in power and wealth and so on (Anievas et al., 2015). Most importantly, this new research agenda argues that a "confrontation with the global colour line sheds light on those global practices of boundary-making and border control that mimic in explicit detail practices of colonial cartography, based as they were on white supremacist ideals" (Ibid.:10). Thus, by positioning itself within this research agenda, the thesis contributes to the ongoing debates about the 'global colour line' by scrutinizing the transnational phenomenon of migration and assessing the nexus race-migration within institutional systems, while focusing on the social agency that seeks to address and remove racist biases. Arguing that the global colour line does not exist exclusively in the North American reality, but also reveals itself in the racial dynamics that govern the European and Lebanese formal responses to the mobility of racialised minorities, a distinct space of analysis is individuated: the Euro-Mediterranean. This has been chosen because it constitutes a place of connection between Europe and the formerly colonized areas of its empire, thus enabling the (re)discovery and study of the colonial legacy that sustains the treatment of migrants (Zapata-Barrero, 2020). This allows for the reclaiming of the importance of specific colonial power relations, directly challenging the racial amnesia that has permitted to consider the Euro-Mediterranean region as a whole as free from racial workings. The examination of migration within the Mediterranean region allows us to understand how the global colour line is formulated and operationalised through migration policies.

1.4 Methodology

This research is based on a comparative case study methodology whereby the two cases are similar on the explanandum (the race-migration nexus), whilst they are mostly different on the explanatory side (Global North/South, formerly colonizer/colonized, rich/developing etc) (George & Bennett, 2004). However, this research is not interested in such binaries, but rather into disentangling these complexities. Therefore, this study has pursued process-tracing in each case study, thus enabling the

description of political and social phenomena and the evaluation of causal claims (Collier, 2011). For this purpose, the sources used include an analysis of official and institutional documents from the EU and Lebanon, reports from international organisations, such as the International Labour Organisation and human rights groups, such as Amnesty International. A meaningful source of content and evidence has been provided by the analysis of social media, in particular Instagram and Twitter, especially for what concerns the sections dealing with social movements. Moreover, relevant insights have emerged as a result of a phone interview conducted with a Lebanese organisation activist, adding peculiar and context-specific empirical evidence to the case study.

Finally, this study has also used an extensive analysis of the academic literature which has provided the main concepts, outlining the external conceptual structure, which has been counterposed by the empirical evidence found in documents produced by the institutions, including laws, directives, and policy papers.

1.5 Chapter Overview

As far as the structure of the thesis is concerned, the contents are divided into four chapters. First and foremost, chapter 2 contextualizes this work in the emerging field of study in IR focused on the Global Colour Line. It then defines several key concepts, namely race, racism, White superiority and their connections with capitalism and nationalism. Next, it outlines the conceptual basis for a counter-hegemonic antiracist discourse to be applied in the study of social movements. Finally, it individuates the bio- and necropolitical concepts as the main framework for tracing the connection of the migration-race nexus and concludes with a conceptualisation of three migration policies: bordering, externalisation and labour migration, whose features will be analysed in conjunction with the case studies.

The third and fourth chapter provide empirical evidence in order to demonstrate the presence of racialised understandings of migrants that enable their discrimination and overall exclusion from European and Lebanese societies. Specifically, chapter 3 presents the most relevant cases of a racist management of migrants: the bordering practices of the Lampedusa's hotspot and Frontex; and the externalisation of migration control which couples the examination of asylum procedures and visa regimes with the complicity of the Libyan state in supporting the racialisation of people on the move. Then, the chapter zooms in to scrutinize the practices of social movements that react to these policies and point out their inherent racist nature, calling for radical actions or developing a politically-charged humanitarianism. Concerning chapter 4, this examines the institutionalisation of whiteness within the Lebanese state, which creates the premises for the analysis of the racialised logics that guide the

kafala system in its biopolitical control and commodification of MDWs. Finally, the chapter presents the social movements that are currently active in Lebanon, seeking to address the shortcomings of the kafala and provide remedy to its numerous abuses. In the conclusion, a comparative analysis of the case studies is presented.

2.1 Introduction

The chapter is in three parts. Firstly, it presents an overview of the current debate within IR on the role of race and racism in the analysis of modern international phenomena (such as migration). By revisiting the concept of the global colour line proposed by W.E.B. Du Bois at the dawn of the 20th century, scholars seek to demonstrate the resilience of racialised thoughts in current global affairs. This is in particular applied to geographic distinctions and the emerging colour line in the Mediterranean.

Next, the chapter presents a conceptual framework of racism (comprising definitions for race, racism, and White[1] superiority) and anti-racism in the form of social movements outlining a counter-hegemonic antiracist discourse.

Finally, the chapter zooms in on migration as an emerging field in IR, exploring the mainstream and critical literature on the phenomenon of migration and tracing the connection of the migration-race nexus by individuating the bio/necropolitical logics. This section concludes with a conceptualisation of three migration policies: bordering, externalisation and labour migration, whose features will be analysed in conjunction with the case studies in the next chapters.

2.2 Theoretical contextualization of this study

2.2.1 International Relations and the question of race

The theoretical framework for this research is rooted in the extensive analysis of a new debate that is taking place in IR, contributing to re-narrations regarding the foundational history of the discipline and to broaden the examination of international phenomena under the new light of the global colour line. In fact, notwithstanding the scarce and occasional works of IR scholars on the issue of race and racism in reaction to liberation movements, after the Second World War the field retreated into a colour-blind narrative, which has been only recently challenged. Authors have termed racial aphasia this systematic and "calculated forgetting, obstructing discourse, language, and speech" (Anievas et al., 2015:2). In this regard, Krishna (2006) argues that a systematic politics of forgetting the question of race has been effective in IR and exerted through discourses that justified, abstracted, and rationalized genocide, enslavement, and colonisation. In his account, he argues that "race serves as

---

[1] I capitalise the word White in order to refer to a specific identity that is socially constructed and has social, political and material privileges.

the crucial epistemic silence around which the discipline is written and coheres" (Krishna, 2006:93). He then proceeds to demonstrate that the critical conceptual elements of IR discourse, meaning sovereignty, property, *nationness* and international law, were consequential to the encounter of the West with the Other. In other words, rather than being inherent in the West, these concepts acquired their specific value as a consequence of the need to both differentiate and privilege Europe in contrast to its Other. After having assessed the refusal of dealing with the racially-inspired birth of the discipline, authors have sought to dismantle racial aphasia's sphere of inaction and contribute to the long-awaited rejuvenation of IR scholarship on race and racism. For example, Long and Schmidt (2005) provide a revisionist account of some of the typical assumptions about the early history of IR, pointing out the predominant role of imperialism and internationalism in the emergence of international theory debates at the beginning of the 20th century. Moving on, the research of Vitalis (2005) shows that the origins of IR were marked by the publishment of the "Journal Of Race Development" in 1910, by scholars G. Stanley Hall and George Hubbard Blakeslee. The discipline's founding journal would later be renamed the "Journal Of International Relations" in 1919 and three years later "Foreign Affairs". The scope of the journal was to provide a forum for discussing the problems arising when dealing with the "progress of races and States considered backward in their standards of civilisation… and how they may be best helped by the stronger" (Acharya, 2022:33). In his account, Vitalis defines the empire as "the process whereby the northeast consolidated its control of the southern and western states and territories and began to exert dominion over peoples and resources beyond the formal boundaries of the Republic", thus individuating the central element – the desire for domination – that guided the early scholarship. In other words, the White Western powers expanding and occupying the "*waste places of the earth*"[2] were aided by several scholars who examined the dynamics of imperialism and sought, through the use of the most progressive tools of racial science, to craft practical strategies to better administer territories and uplift "backward races" (Vitalis, 2005:163).

An influential role in the debate about race and racism has been played by scholars of feminist and post-colonialist studies, who have sought to highlight the interconnectedness of social categories. Particularly, Andersen and Collins (2016) provide an analytical framework that studies the intersectionality of race, gender, and class. They argue that these structural phenomena bring together their specific dynamic to create social structures of oppression and marginalization. Similarly, Chowdhry and Nair (2002) call for a theoretical shift in IR by providing a post-colonialist reading of international phenomena that examines the articulation of power on the global scale through the

---

[2] Anievas et al. say the term was used by IR scholars to refer to the Global South in the early years of the discipline (Anievas et al., 2)

lenses of imperialism, the intersections of race, class, and gender relations within and across national boundaries. Finally, their work is significant to understand the role of race and gender in the interplay between power, domination, and resistance in world politics.

Despite the break with racial biological determinism produced with the work of Franz Boas, famously known for having collaborated on the UNESCO Statement on Race (Anievas et al., 2015:7-8), scholars agree that racial determinism has found another realm to thrive in. Specifically, Lentin (2005) produces a critical perspective of the post-war period of anti-racism, contesting the urgency to replace all race talks in the aftermath of the Holocaust. By eliding race and denying its viability as a category, the introduction of alternative conceptual tools based on culturalized approaches produced a policy discourse that fails to see racism as the consequence of the historical development of the modern European state. Rather, racism is approached as an external source of conflict and violence in Western societies that derives from individuals who need to overcome their ignorance through education and multiculturalism (Lentin, 2005:380-2). Hobson proposes a further analysis that individuates in the post-1945 raceless discourse a *subliminal Eurocentric institutional intolerance* (Hobson, 2015:82-4). During this period, IR was dominated by a Westphilian narrative, whereby even if the supremacy of the West was virtually absent from institutional and political talks, *subliminally* the West occupied the center of universal understandings of world politics. It did so by narrating basic IR concerns through the logic of immanence: the West provided the key intellectual location for theorising world politics, as not only it self-generated but also projected "its global power outwards in a one-way process that has the scope of remaking the world in its own image" (Hobson, 2007; Sabaratnam, 2020). One of the most evident examples of subliminal Eurocentric institutionalism is Hans Morgenthau's classical realist text Politics Among Nations (1948). Here, Morgenthau eliminates any racialised and/or colonial specificities associated with imperialism, here understood as the default action of any powerful state that is not pursuing a status quo policy (Hobson, 2015:85). Moreover, Sabaratnam (2020) identifies an epistemology of ignorance in three fundamental IR authors, namely Waltz (1979), Keohane (1984) and Wendt (1999), whereby their texts obscure the racialised imperial and colonial hierarchies that are at the base of modern international politics, contributing to cover non-White subjects and to reiterate instead the White-racialised subject positioning of IR (Sabaratnam, 2020:16-22).

This is a testament to the durability and persistence of racism as a structuring principle on the international stage. Indeed, Mills (1997) postulated the existence of a racial contract that, as a social and political practice, is constantly being rewritten to create different forms of the racial polity (Mills, 1997:72). Such chameleonic nature allows for the exploration of new forms of racism, thus

recognizing the (hidden) essentially racial, racialised, marginalising and oppressive nature of many elements in world politics and in the management of issues at the global level. Anievas claims that, in order for the debate to recognize the multiple and ubiquitous modalities in which IR discourse is rooted in racialised assumptions and thoughts, the research agenda should categorically refuse any notion of a post-racial order; rather it should engage and explore the argument made by W.E.B. Du Bois about the global colour line (Anievas et al., 2015:9-10).

2.2.2 W.E. B. Du Bois in IR

William Edward Burghardt Du Bois was an African American Professor of Sociology at the Atlanta University, whose works made him an authoritative voice on the problem of race and racism in the United States. His formulation of the global colour line is embedded within the experience of being a black African American man in the United States at the end of the 19th century and having lived through the experiences of enslaved Africans and struggles for liberation (Ibid.:4). One of his first formulations of the global colour line appeared in Souls of Black Folk (1903), where he assessed:

Herein lie buried many things which if read with patience may show the strange meaning of being black here in the dawning of the twentieth century. This meaning is not without interest to you, Gentle Reader; for the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the colour-line.

(Du Bois, 1903:3).

His concern stemmed out of the numerous materials, psychological, social, economic, and political difficulties experienced by Africans in the United States and that constituted a clear separation line between Black and White peoplehood. The African American individual was included in the life of the Nation, yet repeatedly negated the possibility of completely fulfilling his, or her, self. This acknowledgment prompted Du Bois to pose an existential question in his address before the American Negro Academy in 1897: "What … am I? Am I an American or am I a Negro? Can I be both?", suggesting an irreconcilability between two seemingly opposite sides. Moreover, the theme of doubleness is found in Souls of Black Folk (1903):

After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil and gifted with second-sight in this American world – a world which yield him no true self-consciousness but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's souls by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness – an American, a negro. Two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength along keeps it from being torn asunder.

(Du Bois, 1903:8)

The reckoning that within the African American individual inhabited a divided identity found expression in the concept of the veil. The inability of the Black individual to express the "true self-consciousness" freely and fully, would lead the Black person to see him- or herself through "the revelation of the other world". In this sense, the veil signifies the lived experience of marginalisation and inequality, while at the same time being the lens through which this experience is seen and eventually discussed (Anievas et al., 2015:5-6). While the experiences that influenced his praxis were cultivated specifically in the United States, the concept of the colour line had a global breadth. In the speech "To the Nations of the World" at the dawn of the century, in 1900, Du Bois affirmed:

[…] The question as to how far differences of race […] will hereafter be made the basis of denying to over half the world the right of sharing to utmost ability the opportunities and privileges of modern civilization.

(Du Bois, 1900)

And again, in The Present Outlook for the Dark Races of Mankind (1900), Du Bois's perception was that of a world tightly encircled by the colour-line: "the colour line belts the world, and the social problem of the twentieth century is to be the relation of the civilized world to the dark races of mankind" (Du Bois in Chandler, 2015). The demarcation of differences between White and non-White people had a global reach, inasmuch as Du Bois recognized that the age of empire would continue to divide half the world in those who possessed opportunities and those who did not, along the lines of colour-coded assumptions. In other words, Du Bois presciently inscribed the rise of empires within a framework that saw racial categorisations and the emergence of White supremacy as the guiding principles for the dispossession, marginalization, and minimalization of the *primitive* individuality: "But what on earth is Whiteness that one should so desire it? […] I am given to understand that Whiteness is the ownership of the earth forever and ever" (Du Bois, 1999). His grasp of the nature of imperialism was so far-reaching that he eventually framed the causes of the Great War within the same racialised logic that constituted the greatness of Europe, meaning: "it is the expansion overseas; it is colonial aggrandizement which explains and alone adequately explains the World War" (Ibid.).

From a first glance at his texts, it appears clear that Du Bois constitutes an almost inexhaustible source of critical reflexion for all the racist infused practices that continue today to govern a color-coded world. For example, in Darkwater he advances the sense of duty that compels White people to *"spread their gift of humanity towards the inferior of the world",* which, drawing from the extensive discourse of the White Man's burden, could now easily be revisited through a critique of Western interventionism and the doctrine of humanitarianism. He posits that this sense of duty must be

accompanied by a feeling of gratitude. In other words, the Other that receives the gift of humanity and civilisation from the generous White has to fit into the categories of moral conduct that the White has chosen, otherwise he or she is unfit to receive such gifts: "When he (the black man) insists on his human right to swagger and swear and waste – then the spell is suddenly broken, and the philanthropist is ready to believe that Negroes are impudent."(Du Bois, 1999)

Overall, the utility of revisiting Du Bois's literature lays in the potentiality of constituting a rich research agenda for the examination of international relations through an episteme that recognizes that the world order is structured along the global colour line (Anievas et al., 2016:7). This research agenda aims at shedding a light on the institutionalisation of racism on a global scale and analysing the modalities in which racism visibly infiltrates multiple phenomena of IR. For example, Errol Henderson (2015) provides an insightful account of the racialised nature of many of the concepts that inform prominent IR theories, illustrating the ways in which theoretical concepts maintain and support the global colour line**.** Branwen Grufydd Jones (2015) demonstrates how the concept of 'failed state' that has guided military interventions from the end of the Cold War is infused with a racialised thought that routinely characterises the condition of African states in terms of either good governance or fragility and failure. Overall, numerous scholars aim at analysing the ways in which the discourse of humanitarianism is guided by racist precepts, the modalities in which boundary-making and border control resemble the practices of colonial cartography, and what explains the return of White supremacy ideology to mainstream politics (Ibid.:9-10). All of these phenomena are a testament to the terrifying resilience and durability of Du Bois's global colour line.

2.2.3 Geographic distinctions: the emerging colour line between Global North and Global South

In his theorisation of Orientalism, Said affirms that from the 18th century onwards the relationship between the West and the East has been marked by two central elements: a) systematic knowledge in Europe about the Orient and b) the position of strength that Europe enjoyed on political and cultural grounds (Said, 2003:39-40). These favoured the emergence of a system of knowledge that operationalised Western hegemony by producing the East discursively as the 'inferior Other'. Because of the dynamism of this system, to identify the East as the inferior Other meant to conversely recognize the West as the superior civilization. This resulted in a dichotomizing system of representations which identifies and then essentializes the identities of the East and the West, pitted one against the other through a series of stereotypes (Bakan & Dua, 2014:29). Geographically

speaking, to identify an Orient meant conversely to define a West, in an arbitrary process of geographic distinctions that operationalised the global colour line described by Du Bois. In this sense, the idea of European superiority was inscribed in a geography of the West, whereby Europe had the ideological and material willpower to define itself in opposition to the Other and define a common Western identity that spanned across the Atlantic and comprised the European dominions in the New World, especially Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States (Grovogui, 2011:177). This process, that began with the conquest of the New World, reached its peak in the 18th century, when a Eurocentric logic emerged, one that produced the rest of the world as a negative moment of European modernity (Dainotto, 2011:38). Speaking of *orientations*, Dainotto (2017) defines their arbitrariness and conventionality in relation to their power to objectivize reality, in a process of mutual dialectic formation that has defined, for centuries, the reality of European (West) *culture* against Oriental (East) *barbarism* and later, since the Industrial Revolution, of North *modernity* and South *backwardness* (Dainotto, 2017:47). Despite the re-wording, such replacement lays nonetheless on the basic distinction of inferiority and superiority. What changes is the terminology, not the content. Significantly, then, it is possible to understand Western/Northern identity only in relation to a Southern/Eastern Other, whose fundamental and permanent feature is the inferiority it experiences in the proximity of the European greatness. It is, then, of little interest, what this relation is called, what are the geographic words that express this relation – whether South/North or East/West – what is significant, instead, is the continuous, yet permanent discourse that dialectically produces the West one step ahead.

Nonetheless, to further investigate the terminology currently used in the discipline of IR is a relevant exercise for the analysis of the modern racialised distinctions and the agency that seeks to overcome these. Defining the current distinction between a Global North and South entails engaging with a wide array of perspectives that range from a mere geographical connotation to a more nuanced understanding of resistance to oppression. From a first analysis, the term Global South individuates "regions outside Europe and North America, mostly (though not all) low-income and often politically or culturally marginalized", which broadly groups together Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Oceania (Dados & Connell, 2012:12). What seems a superficial definition is, in reality, accompanied by historical, political, and economic connotations, which appear indivisible when discussing the issue. Grovogui roots the history of the concept of the Global South with the origin of the Third World terminology during the age of the Cold War. Specifically, the Bandung Conference of 1955 was pivotal in expressing the desire of the leaders of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East to decolonize international relations and refuse to side with either one of the two superpowers' spheres of influence (Grovogui, 2011:178). The term Third World represented a third modality of conducting

affairs on the world stage, but also an emerging experience of decolonisation. However, as soon as the Cold War reached an end, the world order that justified the "Third World" identity crumbled and the terminology was no longer appropriate. Contextually, the Brandt Commission reports from 1980s began to reimagine the world along North-South lines that divided countries according to economic criteria along the so-called Brandt line, which individuated "developing countries south of latitude 30° North, and henceforth labelled as being in the South" (Kloß, 2017:3). These reports were aware of the limitations of lumping together countries with different economies, nonetheless, they broadly understood North and South to be synonymous with "rich/poor" and "developed/developing". The end of the Cold War and the expansion of neoliberalism and globalisation at the beginning of the 21st century made South and Third World obsolete for two reasons: a) BRIC states fell outside common categories of countries belonging to the North/South; b) this terminology elided "the political and economic processes and historical inheritances that rendered these southern countries poor in the first place" (Ibid:4). Thus, the word 'global' was added to 'South' to signal the refusal of *mere geographical classification of the world* and contextually to recognise *unequal global power relations, imperialism, and neo-colonialism* (Ibid). Embracing the whole set of ideas, practices, and relations rooted in the experience of (anti)colonialism and the rejection of modern institutional and cultural practices of imperial disposition, a Global South is, thus, necessarily understood in relation to a Global North. The difficulty of clearly defining geographically a Global South and North stems from the acknowledgment of a myriad of political, cultural, economic, and historical processes that inevitably blur the geographical configurations (Ibid:6). In other words, since knowledge is produced in the West and in the North, the South and the East have always appeared as second class regions of the world, mistakenly grouped together as to eliminate any specificities. After all, these are all places whose daily time is marked in reference to Greenwich, although none of these countries participated in making Greenwich the point of reference (Mignolo, 2011:4). Despite the challenges posed by the geographic definitions, Kloß (2017) proposes to nuance the idea of the Global South as a process that reflects, highlights, and potentially transforms dominant and subaltern positionalities. In this sense, the Global South should not merely signify a geographical metaphor, rather, engaging with its past of subalternity and projected inferiority, it should "be considered a political consciousness, an engaged and possibly liminal practice through which global unequal power structures are actively restructured" (Ibid.:14).

The discourse on the geographic distinctions reified and made visible the colour line that runs through the Mediterranean and individuates a separation mark between two irreconcilable worlds. In this sense, the Euro-Mediterranean region constitutes the most concrete form of racial demarcation and separation, while simultaneously constituting the locus where this line is constantly challenged.

Indeed, the movement of people coming from the Global South, whatever the push-pull factors or the sociological explanations, constitutes the most tangible action that allows a re-drawing of the global colour line. In fact, Achiume (2017) argues that migration has a specific role in a decolonising project that seeks to reorder the benefits and privileges of a global order defined by the interdependence forged in the colonial era (Achiume, 2017:145). Extending this argument enables us to understand migrants' mobility as a performative act of resistance against a hegemonic order that, by means of the global colour line, is designed to deny the privileges and opportunities of the *modern civilised world.* Thus, people on the move subvert the lines of divisions, surpassing national boundaries and intermingling subjectivities, experiences, and lives. That such process is annulled by migration policies, re-establishing lines of demarcation that racially frame the Other and render her/him unwanted, will be in-depth analysed in the case studies. Firstly, the next section presents the conceptual parameters to understand and explain race and racism before delving deeper into how the global colour line is operationalised within migration studies.

2.3 Conceptualizing race and racism

This section provides the conceptual elements necessary for a throughout understanding of the socio-political relevance of race and racism in migration studies. As there are several dimensions of racism, this research presents first the micro-level, which compels a definition of race and racism that takes into consideration an intersectionality framework; then, it will move to the meso-level, which investigates the institutional logics of racism and the ways in which capitalism and race combine; finally the macro-level is here presented with reference to the role of the nation-state and the ideology of Whiteness, White supremacy, and White man's burden in IR. In particular, I focus on the conceptual pillars of race and its various intersections with structures of power such as capitalism and nationalism and Whiteness as a unifying socio-political force.

2.3.1 Defining race and racism

From the 19th century onwards, race became a permanent form in the characterization of each human being, thus immobilizing them in a spatial-temporal dimension, whereby people possessed predetermined mental and physical capacities. The emergence of a theory of scientific race defined races using biological categories and confining phenotypical characteristics to the realm of supposed intellectual and moral superiority/inferiority (The Evens Foundation, 2005:4). Major European thinkers such as Joseph Arthur de Gobineau and Immanuel Kant theorised the division of humanity into racial types, each of which was connected to a specificity of biologically and rationally defined elements; for example, it was established that the size of the cranium or the width of the forehead determined the capacity of specific groups to be civilized, criminal, intelligent, and sexual beings (Chowdhry & Nair, 2002:19). Specifically, Gobineau distinguished three categories of subhuman: a) the black; b) the yellow; c) the white. By arranging them in a scale, he associated with each one of them specific components that justified their position in the hierarchical order; exemplificative of this is the position of the "negro race", which stands at the foot of the ladder, because of its animal character and brute powerful energy. Gobineau carefully explained how this race was characterised by non-existent mental faculties and intense desires and sensations that constituted the most striking proof of its inferiority. Indeed, the feelings of the "negro man", in Gobineau's explanation, were considered erratic and inadequate to distinguish rationally between good and evil. On the contrary, the highest race, the white one, was gifted with an *energetic intelligence, perseverance, and an instinct for order* that found their utmost realisation in this race's love of liberty and attachment to life (Gobineau, 1967:205-7). Similarly, Kant theorised, in "On the Different Races of Man", a

hierarchy of four races: a) the white; b) the Negro; c) the Hunnic; d) the Hindu. According to the philosopher, skin colour was associated with an inner disposition, the talent, which ultimately determined the ability – or lack thereof – to express reason and further perfecting rational and moral qualities through education (Mills, 1997:71). In his racially organized moral order, the white race was the sole able to master the impulses of nature and conduct them to a moral and rational order, while the negro race lacked such capacity and because of this could only be subjected to slavery: "Humanity exists in its greatest perfection in the white race. […] (Native) Americans and Blacks cannot govern themselves. They thus serve only for slaves" (Kant in David McCabe, 2019:1).

By adopting an intersectional perspective, it is interesting to note how racialised hierarchies were also constructed along gendered lines: the Other was feminized in contrast to a masculinized European identity through a scientific discourse, which was the explanation for their inferiority:

It was claimed that women's low brain weight and deficient brain structures were analogous to those of the lower races, and their inferior intellectualities explained on this basis. Women, it was observed, shared with Negros a narrow, childlike and delicate skull, so different from the more robust and rounded heads characteristic of males of 'superior' races … In short, lower races represented the 'female' type of the human species, and females the 'lower race' of gender.

(Chowdhry & Nair, 2002:19)

Notwithstanding the ground-breaking research carried out in the 1950s and 1960s by UNESCO scientists, which was decisive in contradicting scientific racism's notions and asserting the lack of scientific evidence that supported the idea of pure races, the meaning of race as understood in the 19th century was ingrained in societal and political structures which persist until today. Michael Omi and Howard Winant explicate this issue:

Race is a concept that signifies and symbolizes socio-political conflicts and interests in reference to different types of human bodies. Although the concept of race appeals to biologically based human characteristics (so-called phenotypes), selection of these particular human features for the purposes of racial signification is always and necessarily a social and historical process.

(in: Anievas et al., 2015:46)

In other words, socially constructing race means implementing a process of selection of genetic, phenotypical, linguistic, and cultural differences that are imbued with social significance and starkly divide groups of people by assigning them a set of unchangeable characteristics. Such process of *racialization* is the justification for the unequal treatment of the targeted racialized group (Cashmore, 2002:310-311). Therefore, marking a difference through race means creating the premises for the emergence of racism, which is the dynamic process of designating and maintaining symbolic

boundaries between racialised categories, through multiple social, political, and economic constructions (Bakan & Dua, 2014:6). Nonetheless, aided by the scientific classifications of races by philosophers, anthropologists and thinkers of the European elite, the construction of inferior and superior races first proposed and then legitimised the hierarchisation of international society, thus setting the radical and fixed boundaries between human beings, on which races, nations and civilisations were constructed (Said, 2003:233). Such discourses calcified the higher position of the White Europeans and legitimised a global hierarchy that serviced the need of imperial expansion (Chowdhry & Nair, 2002:19).

2.3.2 Whiteness and White supremacy in IR

The extensive racial production of Whiteness was fundamental to the categorisation of races and instrumental to the expansion of European's control. The discourse of racial categorisation was so effective in producing Whiteness as synonymous with "ownership of the earth forever and ever" (Du Bois, 1999) that it was believed to be a natural consequence of possessing specific phenotypic characteristics. That this discourse was based on a fictitious lie is highlighted by Du Bois:

Everything considered, the title to the universe claimed by White Folk is faulty. It ought, at last, to look plausible. How easy, then, by emphasis and omission to make children believe that every great soul the world ever saw was a White man's soul, that every great though the world ever knew was a White man's thought, that every great deed was a White man's deed; that every great dream the world ever sang was a White man's dream.

(Du Bois, 1999)

It is clear, then, that being a White Man was consequential to the discourse of Whiteness that gravitated around theories of racial determinism. Indeed, Said (2003) compares the experience of being a White man with a specific idea and reality, meaning that "one became a White Man because one was a White Man" (Said, 2003:227). In other words, because of the reality of being born White, the White man underwent a process of social construction whereby he had to speak, behave, and think in certain ways: "A White Man was in short a very concrete manner of being in the world, a way of taking hold of reality, language and thought". According to the rules of 19th century Europe, the White man was endowed with certain values which were liberal, humane, correct and shared among other Europeans (Ibid.).

This specific thinking was undoubtedly instrumental to the emergence of an institutional form of Whiteness endowed with explicit authority that expressed, diffused, and implemented dominating

codes on the world of the non-Whites. As a structure of power, White (male heterosexual) supremacy functions by framing Whiteness as the precondition for the enjoyment of "differential distribution of material wealth and opportunities, benefits and burdens, rights, and duties" (Mills, 1997:7). Specifically, White supremacy is an oppressive social, political, and economic system that exerts control over the status quo and blocks any substantial modification that would alter its domination on all spheres of society. In other words, the privileges, benefits, and rights that have been historically developed for and by White people are continuously precluded to the remaining non-White population, positioned in a perennial situation of disadvantage (Mills, 2018:476). White supremacy is inscribed in and functions politically through the institution of a racial contract, which, by establishing a polity, a juridical system and a state informed by racial notions, individuates specific superior and subordinate civil standing for Whites and non-Whites. The purpose of this state is specifically to sustain this racial order, thus institutionalising it, in order to continually subordinate the non-White through the exploitation of their bodies, land, resources, and the denial of equal socioeconomic opportunities (Mills, 1997:142). Institutional racism develops a structure of power, indifference and inertia that regulates the affairs between the White majority and people of colour; such structure is organized in order to perpetuate institutional racism and protect the interests of those who benefit from it. This structure of power subjugates politically, economically, and socially people of colour so that they remain trapped into poor conditions (Carmichael, 1967:29). Bonds & Inwood (2016) argue that this White racial frame is the foundational logic of the modern capitalist and nationalist system rooted in heteronormative and patriarchal social relations.

2.3.3 Capitalism and race

The complex doctrine that gained its strength from geographic distinctions, the categorisation of peoples into human subsets and the consequential emergence of White supremacy as an ideology for regulating the relationships between superior and subject races, was transformed into an imperial institution, with extensive material consequences (Said, 2003:95). A major consideration for this analysis deals with the historical remnants of economic expansion through the monopoly of Western colonisation, to which racism provided the appropriate justification, as to ensure the maximum economic exploitation of those territories (Lentin, 2004:49). Indeed, colonies were a source of income for the motherland[3]; the way this income was produced, however, was indicative of the relation of

---

[3] For an analysis of how slavery and colonial companies financed the Industrial Revolution see Eric Williams (1994) Capitalism and Slavery, University of South Carolina Press

power and hierarchisation that the Western societies put in place, with slavery as the main and most explicative example. In this regard, slavery is synonymous of economic power intersected with scientific racism, thus creating an economic system founded upon international trade and capital investment, which considered slaves as commodities which could be super-exploited in slave labour as to generate extensive profits. The legitimation and regulation of the political and economic domination of colonized populations was enforced through the denial of the humanity of non-Europeans (Anievas et al., 2015:46-48). Indeed, by de-humanizing non-White populations, racism forces the individual and the collectivity into a *zone of nonbeing*, lacking social recognition, thus enabling the condition of alienation, which was instrumental to the exploitation of racialised people and their resources (Bakan & Dua, 2014:210-211). Currently, the capitalist system grants benefits along racialized lines that are the result of imperial-capitalist systems of production and labour that favour the privileged. Therefore, those in a position of privilege are better suited to either defend or enhance their status in "an already racialised structural distribution of property and economic power" (Camfield, 2016:59; Mills, 1997). Moreover, the dehumanisation, objectification and commodification of slaves had specific gendered modalities, whereby the White master used every part of the enslaved African woman because her sexuality and reproductive capacities offered added value and opportunities for forms of sexual (labour) exploitation. Similar gendered processes were enacted on men: their bodies were objectified as big, strong, and stupid, thus suitable only for hard manual labour. Finally, because of their codification as wild and violent, the Black man was made unsuitable for work until he was trained by White men and placed under their discipline and control (Collins, 2004:54-6).

2.3.4 The nation-state and race

To understand the embeddedness of nation and race it is necessary to analyse the notion of the Standard of Civilisation, a concept widely used by the English School, that individuated a political, legal, as well as cultural, gap between 'civilised' and 'uncivilised' and legitimised the claim by the former over the latter. By mandating the conditions for the admission into the international society – on issues such as law, property rights, human rights, good governance, and possession of modern technology – this concept "supported a racist taxonomy of "savage, barbarian and civilised" as a way of classifying the non-European world in relation to Europe, and gate-keeping the entry to European and later Western international society" (Buzan, 2014:577-8). Such civilisational discourses increasingly became instrumental in legitimising the presence of institutional and normative

structures for encountering, helping and containing non-European peoples, eventually expressed in the ideology of the White's Man Burden: the irrefutable necessity to transmit knowledge through a civilizing mission, so that barbaric populations could rise to civilisation. In "Political relations between backward and advanced peoples", Kerr (1916) frames this issue in terms of a political and material gap:

Where there is a sufficient difference between the political development of one people and another […] it is inevitable that sooner or later the more civilised people should be forced partly in its own interests, partly in the interests of the backward people, partly in the interests of the outside world, to assume the task of maintaining good government in the territory concerned.

(Kerr, 1916:163).

The White's Man Burden rationalised enslavement, imperial conquest, colonisation, and genocide, developing an international racial hierarchy that guided the politics of the period, so that international relations were more accurately described as interracial relations (Anievas et al., 2015:20-1). Moreover, gender entered the colonial realm as a means to forward the civilizing mission of White Europeans. For example, Lord Cromer, a representative of the British Empire in Egypt, proposed as one of the main purposes of the civilizing mission of the empire to remove the institution of the veil, considered to be an oppressive system for Egyptian women. Similarly, women philanthropist from the West set out to liberate the Third World woman from *oppressive cultural practices*, demonstrating that gender in the face of race was a less significant category in the relation with the Other (Chowdhry & Nair, 2004:20).

In other words, the concept of civilisation informed conceptions of identity of European actors and their beliefs regarding authority, obligations, and legitimate actions towards "backwards people", which ultimately would develop specific and differential patterns of political order. Specifically, Buzan argues that a concept of divided sovereignty was consequential to the authority exercised through imperialism. In fact, European expansion produced two distinct although interconnected orders: a) an intra-European order characterised by the development of the society of sovereign states, with the purpose to facilitate tolerance and coexistence among them; b) an extra-European order purposefully directed at promoting and spreading the standard of civilisation through the evolution of European empires (Buzan, 2014:579). The two processes are strictly interconnected because the intensification of the imperial projects aggravated tensions between European states, which wanted to "assure the external strength of the state in international conflict only through an internal cohesion based on racial purity" (Lentin, 2004.:47-48). In other words, the integration of race within the framework of the nation-state was driven on one hand, by the necessity to define the nation and its

citizens according to the dictates of nationalism, and on the other hand by the necessity to assert superiority in the international sphere within the optic of Western Imperialism. Both processes were determined and influenced by the canons of scientific racism, which politicized the idea of racial superiority/inferiority within and outside the borders of the newly founded nations. It results that the dictates of scientific racism and White superiority are embedded in and contribute to the formation of the European nation-states (Balibar, 1991:43). Balibar (1991) has investigated the interconnectedness of racism and nationalism, positing that their mutual, reciprocal determination is what structures the nation, insofar as racism assists in the national objective of imposing political and cultural unity over the population and territory of the nation-state. Moreover, Balibar, as Anderson (2006), recognises that any nation is based on the construction of a *fictional ethnicity,* which requires an ideological framework to unite the people under the banner of the nation. Similarly, Robert Miles (1987) defines the ideas of race and nations as two categories carrying the ability to simultaneously delineate the borders of inclusion and exclusion which separate populations into naturally defined groups. Such ideas are socially constructed, reproduced, and *imagined*. Races are imagined as well: they posit no real biological foundation, and a feeling of fellowship is forced upon the members of the racial category (Miles, 1997:26). Their relationship of interconnectedness creates a process of concurrent signification, whereby as soon as the characteristics of inclusion are defined, these create an 'us' that it is opposed to a 'them', excluded from the boundaries of belonging (Ibid.:27). Miles highlights further this connection by asserting that scientific racism theories assigned a deterministic link between biology and cultural expression, which was exploited because the identifying features of the nation were mostly cultural. As a result, it was logically possible to ground race in nation and nation in race, categorized both as legitimating sources in the rise, acceptance, and integration of nationalist and imperialist ideas (Ibid.:30). Finally, gender has interconnected with race to lend saliency to the construction of the nation and national identity, as many scholars have demonstrated how the development of the nation has been sustained by the control of female sexuality, exerted through the prohibitions to racial intermixing, with the aim to maintain the racial and national purity of the nation (Chowdhry & Nair, 2004:21).

2.4 Anti-racism

The scope of this section is to provide a conceptual framework that recognizes the ways in which social movements contradict the tenants of racism. For such an endeavour, I will firstly introduce the concept of social movement, here defined as a complex combination of social and political forces aimed at articulating socio-political change. Successively, and especially relevant for this research, such an understanding is applied to antiracism, revealing its discursive and politically charged dimension. This analysis recognizes antiracism as an expression of counter power that aims at spreading an antiracist common sense to the public at large, enabling the emergence of a non-racist social and political hegemonic order. In other words, antiracist social movements aim at understanding what attitudes and beliefs inform racist ideologies and constitute a hegemonic order, and then use this knowledge not only to pressure institutions, states, and international organisations to change their power structure and norms, but also to promote a reformed culture. Finally, the section investigates the methods by which antiracism is learned and disseminated: counter storytelling.

2.4.1 Social movements theory (including in IR)

Generally speaking, Tilly (1993) argues that the particularity of social movements is their ability to create and organize spaces of public dominion, which are separate from governing institutions, yet contribute to the transfers of power, which is an integral part of the promotion of democracy. Moreover, Tilly defines social movements as a complex form of social interaction, consisting of "a sustained challenge to powerholders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those powerholders by means of repeated public displays of that population's numbers, commitment, unity, and worthiness" (Tilly, 1993:7). In other words, social movements interact with three different populations – the powerholder, the activist, and the subject population, to articulate a series of demands. In this interaction, social movements engage with powerholders to effectively represent the *worthiness* of the subject population by exposing a considerable size of demonstrations or petitions (the *numbers*), while maximizing the readiness of supporters to fight for the cause (the *commitment*) and highlighting the *unity* of the symbolic foundation of the movement (Ibid:14-15). Finally, the structure of a social movement is articulated along four main elements: a) the aim around which activists organize, b) the political opportunity structure, c) the shared understandings created by the movement, d) the social structures of the population from which the movement draws participants and supporters (Ibid:19).

The practice of antiracism has been global in nature from its inception. In particular, antiracism has been a pervasive praxis of resistance, employed by people of colour, from the antislavery movement in the 18th and 19th centuries, passing to the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s, to the Black Lives Matter Movement of today, demonstrating the capacity of antiracism to adjust and evolve according to the specificities of the historical-political contexts (Van Dijk, 2020). Accordingly, Thomas Risse (2013) individuates the shift from a state-centred view, according to which states are the only governors in international relations (Risse, 2013:427). Indeed, the first signals of the development and emergence of modern transnational networks of human rights are located precisely in the campaign to end slavery in the United States and the international suffrage movement (Ibid.:434). The rise of transnational networks dealing with issues of discrimination and oppression has changed the ways in which local and global are linked, individuating a research area that deals with the study of the mutually constituted influences. Scholars such as Keck and Sikkink have contributed by introducing the notion of the *boomerang effect*, which explains the modalities in which domestic and transnational social movements are joined together to pressure governments into normative change. International alliances with transnational networks are understood not only as an important feature of social movements, and in particular of antiracism, but also as an effective way of pressuring States into changing norms or respecting existing ones (Ibid.:438). Furthermore, transnationalism is supported by the opportunities offered by globalisation, which through "*modern communications form[s] the basis for an international civil society of people who share interests and associations across borders*". In other words, the emerging standing of an international civil society spreads globally the principles of political democracy, thus creating a safe space for individuals, who become "*increasingly aware of their political, moral, and legal option to appeal to broader communities in the event of encroachment on their basic human rights*" (Lloyd, 2005:61-2).

2.4.2 Anti-racism as social movement

In his formulation of antiracism as a socio-political global and historical movement of resistance and solidarity, Van Dijk individuates a series of specific characteristics. This movement is a form of complex and collective *socio-political action* and *interaction*. Furthermore, he defines the *fundamentality* of this movement, dealing with fundamental problems of the human society, and its *radicalism*, as it opposes basic social inequalities, such as class, gender, race, age, sexuality, and ethnicity. Finally, he affirms that in the creation of resistance and solidarity, the movement acquires *transversality* and *intersectionality*, since it includes the exploration of the multiple causes of

oppression within different social, political, and cultural domains (Van Dijk, 2020). Defining the role of social movements, Van Dijk re-conducts the many dimensions of antiracism – resistance, protest, opposition, counterpower, antiracist ideology, normative change in laws, policies and practices of local and national governments and international organisations – to the ultimate aim of generating social change. This theorisation departs from the acknowledgment that antiracist practices are informed by antiracist discourse, by which antiracist social cognition is acquired. Social cognition is embedded in antiracist knowledge, attitudes, and ideologies. Discourse is instrumental in the antiracist practice of creating resistance and social/political change because of its transversality: discourse is employed in the internal planning and programming of the movement, while controlling the exteriorization of the movement as well, through marches, slogans, publicity and persuasive public discourse and official decision-making by parliaments and governments (Van Dijk, 2020). To develop an antiracist discourse, it is necessary to presuppose the existence of a racist discourse, which constitutes the site where ethnic prejudice is created, shared, and ultimately legitimised through discrimination. Albeit both discourse formations consist of ideological social practices that create and legitimate a binary, oppositional framework along the lines of demarcation of us versus them, their difference lies in the recognition that a racist discourse is consistently negative, and an antiracist discourse is systematically positive. The latter is an expression of a counterpower and as such it enhances the importance and necessity of the enforcement of the democratic values of justice and equality. Despite this significant difference, the ways in which they are embedded in society are more or less the same, meaning that racist and antiracist discourses are not innate features of human interactions, rather they are learned through a complex system of everyday, informal, and institutional interactions. In this sense, the possibilities of acquiring antiracism knowledge are endless, inasmuch as an antiracist discourse is continuously dispersed through meetings, debates, cultural and political education, and storytelling (Van Dijk, 2020).

2.4.3. Resistance and counter-hegemony

The final element of a theory of antiracism as social movement is political, since the very ideological basis of antiracism has important political components, which refer to power dynamics, resistance against oppression and relations between minorities groups and the state, as well as the values that motivate the antiracist social movement, meaning the search for liberty, equality, and justice. The discourse of antiracist social movements is united by the general orientation towards the fight for social justice. However, the specificities of each antiracist practice vary historically according to the

political, social, cultural, and economic context of each period. It results that antiracist discourse is best framed as ongoing redefinitions of democracy and the role of oppressed subjects within democratic, or un-democratic, spaces. According to the formulation of antiracism proposed by Van Dijk, antiracist discourse is hinged on two complementary purposes: resisting against the abuse of power that comes in racialized terms, while supporting the articulation of alternative non-racist social and political formations and policies (Van Dijk, 2020).

In line with this political component of antiracist theory as social movement, a Gramscian approach to social struggle is here proposed. Indeed, Gramsci's formulation of concepts such as hegemony and historic bloc contributes to a nuanced understanding of social class oppression under capitalist conditions. Accordingly, Gramsci emphasized the growing importance of civil society as a site distinct from state and capitalist production, where social struggles are organized and renewed socio-political identities are proposed (Carroll & Ratner, 2010:8). He identified the condition of social struggle as instrumental for the capitulation of hegemonic forces. More specifically, hegemony is acquired in historically situated economic and political societies through the control of structural, ideological, and material power, and access to these sources of power. The powerholders form a historic bloc, in which they possess both structural and superstructural domains of power (Bakan & Dua: 2014:212-213). In other words, the concept of historic bloc indicated the ways in which a class *combines the leadership of a bloc of social forces in civil society with its leadership in the sphere of production*. Furthermore, hegemony is secured and maintained through concerted efforts of organic intellectuals, whose purpose is to construct a bloc of alliances united by moralities, identities, and values (Carroll & Ratner, 2010:8). In this context, the role of civil society is that of resisting the cultural power of the hegemonic elite, through a 'war of position', which symbolizes the process of resistance and struggle that is purposefully directed at gaining 'ground'. In other words, the subaltern groups organize a moral-intellectual reform that is instrumental to the creation of a counter-hegemonic order. Consequently, counter-hegemony is understood as the space where social movements have the possibility of organizing dissent, de-constructing the framework of privilege that sustains the leadership and finally developing a counter-hegemonic order. Carroll and Ratner (2010) affirm that the Gramscian 'war of position' enables a disruption of the balance of cultural and political power, thus liberating space for the emergence of radical alternatives. Oppressed groups that engage in the struggle for the capitulation of hegemonic power and the construction of a counter-hegemony, require the creation of a shared ideology, whose role is to develop an interpretative framework that lends coherence to the politics of the movements and facilitates the individuation of the sources of injustices (Carroll & Ratner, 2010:10). Ideology is defined by Van Dijk as follows: '*the axiomatic cognitive belief system of social (ideological) groups, organized by a general schema used for the*

development of ideologies more generally'. Since ideology is a form of socially shared cognition that shapes social attitudes and personal opinions in mental models, a shared ideology among social and political groups not only creates alliances that destabilize the hegemonic order, but also contribute to the definition of the activities and interactions among those social movements (Van Dijk, 2020). Carroll and Ratner (2010) explicate the issue:

The purpose in constructing a new alignment of class and popular forces, or a counter-ideology to the hegemonic order, is to challenge the dominion of the leading class across the state institutional networks.

(Carrol & Ratner, 2010:12).

Finally, social movements' endeavour in antiracism is to create new spaces for alternative identities, perspectives and ideologies that are not informed by a racially stratified hierarchical order. The strategies they adopt to achieve this ending are popular education, consciousness-raising, community development, etc. The ultimate goal of these initiatives is to further the strategy of the social movement beyond the defensive mobilisations of protests to a counter-hegemonic generative politics that is sustained by institutional and normative changes that recognizes the integral value of human beings. This task requires a set of carefully constructed transformative politics, whose ultimate goal is to disrupt and replace the old system of powers (Ibid.:18).

2.4.4 Discursive strategies: counter story telling

As we have seen before, a theory of antiracism as a social movement gains its insight from an antiracist discourse, based upon antiracist knowledge, beliefs, values, and ideologies. First and foremost, antiracist knowledge informs the members of the movement, since an antiracist common sense seems to be a precondition for the gathering of a social movement; then, one of the aims of the movement regards sharing and dispersing antiracist knowledge among the public at large. Indeed, antiracist education and critical multiculturalism are purposefully directed towards the acquisition of antiracist knowledge. The underlining idea is that people, whatever their socio-economic and political conditions, are not born antiracist, but become racist as a result of the public discourse and education to which they are subjected. However, they have the possibility to de-learn racist attitudes, ideologies, practices etc. In these regards, antiracist movements and organisations engage in various discursive strategies to effectively aim at some form of cognitive change that eliminates any form of racist prejudice and beliefs. These strategies involve consciousness raising, providing information about Others, or influencing ideologies and values controlling racist prejudice (Van Dijk, 2020). They are part of the larger strategy of counter-storytelling, which is a discursive modality that enables the

dismantling of racially stratified mental models. By questioning the ways in which people of colour are represented in the mainstream narratives, those who have been neglected by society (re)gain their centrality and help move further the struggle for social justice. The principle is that racism and prejudice are social constructions and as such they are fallible of de-construction, through a carefully crafted set of stories and narratives, whose main aim is to begin a process of adjustment in "*our system of mental modalities by calling attention to neglected evidence and reminding readers of our common humanity*" (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001:43). Furthermore, counter-storytelling enables racialized subjectivities to come to the center stage on their own terms, thus facilitating the conditions for visibility and self-determination.

An extremely valuable resource for movements that wish to pursue a reversal of the political and social structures of oppression is the mass media, considered instrumental to the realization of counter-hegemonic strategies (Carol & Ratner, 2010:14). However, some considerations are in order, because the utilization of the mass media by social movements cannot be expected to reduce asymmetry in the movement/media relation and present positively the transformative agenda of the social movement, inasmuch as the mainstream media is generally subject to editorial control from the powerholders, who do not wish for the fall of their hegemonic system (Ibid.:16). Precisely because of this, the advent of the internet has changed the rules of the game, especially with the rise of social media, which provide a meaningful platform for unrestrained perspectives, thus constituting a viable and fruitful counter-hegemony vehicle. Social media are energetic mechanisms that bypass the dependence of social movements on mass media, because they allow an openly accessible form of interactive communication networks, at relatively low cost. Moreover, their strategic use serves a democratizing purpose, because it converts extremely large audiences into more engaged communicative agents, thus boosting a democratization of the media, which may be a crucial precondition for transformative politics in a globalized world (Ibid.). One of the most important features of social media is in their power to combat prejudicial narratives by directly presenting the voices of those who traditionally are silenced. In this context, activism assumes a new interpretation: the visibility and self-determination, crucially important for the antiracist strategy of the unseen, appear more attainable. Moreover, social media provides not only an insider's perspective into the work of organizing (and communicating) a social movement, but also allows the engagement of much more people within the social movement itself (Ray & Fuentes, 2020:236).

2.5 IR, Migration and Race

This last section is designed to bring together the conceptual parts about race and racism and anti-racist social movements, with the scope to investigate deeper their relevance in the field of migration studies. The discipline of IR is a particularly fruitful terrain for the study of (international) migration. Such relevance does not comprise solely the study of the state-led dynamics of migration control and management, infringing upon questions of sovereignty, but several other elements enter the picture as well. Scholars of IR have sought to understand the role of key international institutions dealing with different aspects of migration management; similarly, they have questioned the role of non-state actors and the intersection between migration and security. Migration is a complex and contested aspect of the international society today and as such it possesses the potentiality of being explored through multiple lenses. In this sense, the role of critical scholarship has been fundamental, as it has contributed to the expansion of IR into a broad, diverse field of research that recognises how relations of power, authority and control impact the rationale of migration and the lives of those on the move. Building on this expanded focus and interlinked with the renewed research agenda on the global colour line, the aim of this work is to shed a light on the global colour line embedded in the understanding, production, and management of migration. The purpose is to explore the migration-race nexus within the policies of border control, externalisation of migration management and labour migration. While the focus of this research is clearly at the national and supra-national level, insofar as the objective is demonstrating how these actors have internalised and institutionalised racism in the management of migration, I will try to be sensitive to agency and autonomy of the individual migrant (comprised with a particular political formation). The scope of the next section is to provide an overview of migration literature and to zoom in on the relevance of bio- and necropolitics for a throughout examination of the race-migration nexus. Finally, I present three policy areas: border policy, externalisation of migration management and labour migration.

2.5.1 Overview on the literature on migration policies

Generally speaking, the pertinence of migration studies in the discipline of IR has been developed in line with questions of states' sovereignty, as a substantial part of migration per se involves the cross-borders movement of people. After all, IR's major analytical focus has historically and orthodoxically been "relations between states that embody the collective will of the people, constituting a territorial form of sovereignty that demands no-interference on the part of other states" (Squire, 2020:291). In this sense, the concept of sovereignty has been a central preoccupation of this literature, which adopts

a statist-centric perspective to explain international migration. For example, Messina (2007) relies on the centrality of the sovereign paradigm to understand post-WWII migration to Western Europe as an interest-driven phenomenon that has been primarily shaped by sovereign national governments. Within this framework, the author contends that the evolution of migration as a policy challenge for these governments has been dominated by a political logic that has superseded economic and humanitarian imperatives whenever these conflicted with the goals and interests of politics. In other words, Messina recognises, through a realist perspective, the complete autonomy and agency that states enjoy in the regulation of migration, thus analysing their policy responses and the subsequent social and political challenges deriving from them.

A prominent role in this literature is occupied by those scholars who have studied the intersections between security and migration. Here, the work of Didier Bigo (2002) is particularly influential, as it examines why discourses of securitisation have been powerful in creating a 'truth' about the link between crime, unemployment, and migration. His argument finds that securitising the immigrant as a risk presupposes the shared conception of the state as a body or a container for the policy. The securitisation, then, is anchored in multiple dynamics that function at once and comprise the fears of politicians of losing their symbolic control over the territorial boundaries and the 'structural unease' that emerges in a 'risk society' framed by neoliberal discourses, in which freedom is always limited by danger and (in)security. Because of these dynamics, the securitisation of migration functions as a transversal political technology used as a mode of governmentality by diverse institutions to play with the unease, or to encourage it, in order to affirm and justify the state's provision of protection and security measures. Similarly, Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002) recognise that especially with the end of the bipolar order, Western societies began to witness the emergence of many existential and conceptual anxieties about their identity, security, and wellbeing. Such fears, then, converged on the figure of the migrant and the securitising policies directed towards such figure, which appears as the anchoring point that summarises the fears about the dilution of the state's identity and security.

On a different note, critical scholarship has been particularly influential in providing alternative perspectives to the study of migration that are sensitive to questions of race and racism. For example, Squire (2020) argues that migration scholarship has a fundamental role in unpacking the exclusionary dynamics that produce global challenges, thus recognising the ways in which racialised subjects are rendered precarious through processes of racialisation that are embedded in the migratory experience itself. Specifically, scholars such as Kerem Nisancioglu (2019) and E. Tendayi Achiume (2017) have challenged orthodox notions of sovereignty by re-envisioning it within a colonial and racial framework. Particularly, Nisancioglu bridges the analytical and historical separation between race

and sovereignty by offering an alternative theorisation – racial sovereignty – that considers the coarticulation of the ideas of race and sovereignty in the historical context of colonial dispossession. He argues that "in drawing together authority, territory and population as its defining components, sovereignty is a racializing practice in its capacity to affect how we understand the classifications of, relationships between, and the technologies of control over lands and peoples" (Nisancioglu, 2019:41). By demonstrating that racial sovereignty is an ongoing process with a specific racialised materiality, the author is able to connect it to racialised practices and articulations of European politics, preoccupied with the effects of immigration. Similarly, Achiume retrieves the fundamentality of the European colonial project in shaping what he calls an 'indefinite co-dependence' between colonizers and colonized that continues to structure migratory dynamics. In fact, the author presents the movement of people fleeing from severe political-economic conditions across international borders as an important step in the process of decolonisation, here understood as the pursuit of a long overdue geopolitical reordering of benefits. He concludes his work by provocatively envisaging this unauthorised movements of person as the most promising threat to the concept of the state's territorial sovereignty and the many ways in which this concept operates as a threat to safe and humane regulation of international migration.

Scholars have also critically engaged with the politics of humanitarianism, developing critiques of its effectiveness. Polly Pallister-Wilkins (2017) affirms that practices of rescue and assistance based on humanitarian concerns only serve to mask the violence and vulnerability produced through militarised and restrictive border policies. Agier (2012) argues that humanitarianism relies on a vision of humanity as unique and universal, which is put to test in the figure of the absolute (human) victim, ideally a suffering woman or child. Humanitarianism is also political, insofar as it embodies a desire to control that justifies a form of humanitarian government in which the attempt to maintain order relies on the constitution of camps as spaces to administer emergency and suffering.

A particularly interesting section of critical migration scholarship has investigated the interplay between different forms of power in the phenomenon of migration, under a biopolitical perspective. Foucault's notion of biopower is defined in relation to the authority exercised over the body and its *mechanics of life* through interventions and regulatory controls, synthetised in the formula: "foster life or disallow it to the point of death" (Foucault, 1978:138;140). Such control relies on the distribution of human species into groups, the subdivision of the population into subgroups and the establishment of a biological gap, i.e. racism. According to Mbembe (2003), Foucault defines racism as a "technology that allows the exercise of biopower by enabling the murderous mechanism of the state" (Mbembe, 2003:16-19). Accordingly, bio-power and racism shape the state by introducing a

biological distinction of 'good' and 'inferior' 'races' which heightens the competition among groups, which in turn establishes a positive causal-effect relation, whereby the rejection of the Other is instrumental to the protection and improvement of the self (Lentin, 2004:51-55).

To account for the production of expendability of certain types of life through the current migratory management framework and explain the current migration-race nexus, the notion of biopolitics seems insufficient on its own. A further layer of conceptualisation is provided by the notion of necropolitics, as developed by Achille Mbembe (2003), who explains how the sovereignty of the state is ultimately expressed through the capacity to dispose of the lives of others in order to ensure the safety of the political community. In Mbembe's words:

The perception of the existence of the Other as an attempt on my life, as a mortal threat or absolute danger whose biophysical elimination would strengthen my potential to life and security – this I suggest is one of the many imaginaries of sovereignty characteristic of both early and late modernity itself.

(Mbembe, 2003:18).

The sovereign right to kill finds full realisation in the production and management of the state's borders, which, by administering hierarchies and writing new spatial relations, are instrumental to the exercise of sovereignty (Ibid.:25-6). It is interesting to note as well that for Mbembe *colonies are similar to the frontiers,* representing the suspension of all those elements characteristic to the state, i.e. political unity, rational organisation, the embodiment of the idea of the universal and morality. Since the colonies were not organized in a state form and have not created a human world, they did not possess the controls and guarantees of the judicial order, thus constituting zones governed by war and disorder where "the violence of the state of exception is deemed to operate in the service of "civilization"" (Ibid.:24). The current production of specific social, political, and physical borders functions, then, along the same logic: to differentiate and classify populations according to their 'expendability' and worthiness. The production and safeguarding of worthy populations is justified by underlining the presence of potentially threatening/unworthy Others, whose existence is instrumental to the 'state of exception'. In this framework, citizens' rights are weakened, suspended, or removed, as citizens become 'homo sacer' and life turns into 'bare life' (Montenegro et al., 2017:143). In Agamben's work, the homo sacer refers to the figure of archaic Roman law who may be killed and yet is not sacrificed. The human life of the homo sacer is included in the juridical order solely in the form of its exclusion (that is, of the capacity to be killed), so in a state of exception (Agamben, 1998:8). It results that for Agamben, sovereignty is reproduced as a process of inclusion (politicised life) and exclusion (bare life). Those exempt from the operation of the sovereign law are consigned to what Agamben calls zones of exemption, which gain their materiality in the detention

camp (Rajaram & Grundy-Warr, 2004:34) Finally, the bare, un-politicised life that the migrant experiences within the material or abstract state of exception results from a triple loss: loss of a home, loss of rights over his or her body, and loss of political status. This triple loss is identical with absolute domination, natal alienation, and social death (Mbembe, 2003:21).

Recognizing the field of migration policy is vast, the following section introduces three specific migration policies, whose conceptualisation is instrumental to the analysis of the case studies on the European Union bordering practices and externalisation of migration management and the Lebanese kafala that regulates the entry of workers.

2.5.2 Border control policy

Borders delimit a geographical space where the state exercises the control of its sovereignty, enacting procedures that are guided by specific (sovereign) principles of exclusion/inclusion and find their tangibility in the practices associated with border control. Borders assume a productive capacity, insofar as bordering is a politically and socially charged process that reinforces the division between an imagined community and imagined outsiders. In this regard, borders are perceived as a means to ensure the national identity of the state, while reasserting sovereign power (Parmar, 2020:180). In fact, bordering functions simultaneously (and ambivalently) within two domains: a) the security domain and b) the humanitarian domain. In fact, the practice of border control is inscribed within a securitisation framework that perceives migrants as a disruptive force for the collective way of life of a community. In this sense, securitising immigration is a peculiar and ambivalent process, because it constructs and reinforces political trust, loyalty, and identity by means of instituting and dispersing existential insecurity and fear (Huysmans, 2006:46-7). By framing the political community as harmonious and endowed with 'independent identity', the resulting image is that of a unit that experiences conflict, disintegration, and violence only if external factors (migration) enter into it (Ibid.:49). Securitisation, then, applies a strategy of distancing from and/or neutralizing threats, whose most evident and immediate feature is the institution of border control, which has the purpose of rendering it difficult for migrants to enter a country (Ibid.:55). Parmar (2020) explicate this issue:

Borders serve to reflect and magnify anxieties about crime, security and the fear of difference that are present in the national body, and the focus on borders acts simultaneously as a two-way cause of and solution to these concerns.

(Parmar, 2020:176)

As far as the humanitarian domain goes, borders are increasingly perceived as spaces of humanitarianism, since state and non-state actors have recognised the need to provide rescue and assistance to people on the move along migratory routes. In this sense, the humanitarian rescue is conceived as a counter-strategy to that of sovereign border controls; yet its function has increasingly been understood as a way to mask the violence of the border that renders migrants defenceless in the first place. Moreover, practices of humanitarianism tend to conceal their intimate relationship with processes of sovereign capture more traditionally associated with border policing (Pallister-Wilkins, 2017:19). The tension associated with humanitarian practices, I argue, is not an inherent feature of humanitarianism itself, which instead has been increasingly proved crucial for saving lives; rather, humanitarian actions may involuntarily reproduce border policing because the institutional architecture requires that those migrants saved are ultimately brought under state's jurisdiction.

The technological surveillance of border policing is particularly important, since people become subjects to a range of policing practices designed to bring them under the sovereign control of the state, by making them knowable and therefore governable. These practices include border surveillance system and (biometric) identification and cataloguing (Pallister-Wilkins, 2017:21). All of the levels of analysis here presented seem most evidently encompassed within the geographical and political space of the hotspot, inhabited simultaneously by state patrols and humanitarian actors. They function as explicit border control points, whose function is to interrupt mobility and manage migrants by collecting their personal and biometric data, yet through design and necessity they have become spaces of humanitarianism that reinforce the sovereignty of the state (Wilkins, 2018: 992).

2.5.3 The Externalisation of Migration Management

The externalisation of migration management is a policy tool specifically aimed at preventing migrants from entering the state's territory. By physically extending the practices and measures associated with borders controls, the state undertakes "extraterritorial state actions to prevent migrants, including asylum seekers, from entering the legal jurisdictions or territories of destination countries or regions or making them legally inadmissible without individually considering the merits of their protection claims" (Frelick et al., 2016:193). In other words, the state extends the control of its own borders into neighbouring countries or sending nations in the Global South, equipping them with the capacity to act as deputy state patrols. Externalisation functions as an umbrella term, whereby it includes a vast array of practices formalised through unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral state agreements, as well as arrangements negotiated with private actors. The procedures associated with

externalisation include direct policies, such as the outsourcing of border controls to third countries, through visa procedures, readmission agreements or border checks; or more indirect actions, comprising the supply of security assistance or the support for migration management practices in third countries (Ibid.; Stock et al., 2019). Much has been said about the instrumentalization of development assistance programmes as a measure of externalising border control. Indeed, by promising to finance economic development aid with the purpose of addressing the 'root causes' of migration, a state is able to subtly blackmail third or transit countries to comply with policing measures. By sustaining that an improvement in the African economic situation would pre-empt the need for emigration, it figures there is a win-win situation for all parties involved, with the effect of securitising development assistance (Geiger & Pécaud, 2012:80).

The rationale that justifies the practice of externalisation is framed in cost-efficiency terms, whereby the costs associated with migration, including the political, social, and economic burden for the receiving country, are transferred to third parties. Such economic logic consequently *unburdens* receiving countries of the moral responsibility of providing for and ensuring migrants' well-being on their national territory, thus consigning such effort to the national or local actors in origin or transit countries (Stock et al., 2019: 2). This functions in a framework where the politicisation of migration policies is increasingly polarised, as externalisation is perceived either as a security imperative that prevents illegal immigration or a life-saving humanitarian effort that protects migrants from the perils of migration routes (Frelick et al., 2016:193).

When dealing with the effects of such measures, human rights violations and the reproduction of inequality are brought into the discussion. For example, the relocation of admission control to the embassies of the countries of origin acts as a filtering mechanism that divides the migrants into those who have the legal capacity to continue their mobility and those who have not. A side-effect would be that those deemed unworthy may turn into irregular migrants (Laube, 2019:2). Moreover, eternalisation policies, by redirecting migrant flows in third countries, blur the legal boundaries of which states are charged under international law with the protection of migrants' rights. By preventing migrants from coming under the jurisdiction of destination states, their capacity to seek and enjoy asylum is severely impacted (Frelick et al., 2016:196-7). Overall, measures of externalisation control are a set of social mechanisms that reflect social, cultural, political, and economic boundary-making processes that further (re)produce relations of inequality in the management of mobility between states, non-state actors and migrants (Stock et al., 2019:3).

2.5.4 Labour migration policy

Labour migration policy is a tool that receiving states use in order to oversee the admission, residence, and labour participation of foreigners, thus managing their access to social, political, and civil rights and influencing the formation of migration flows (Alvarez Tinajero, 2014). Labour migration policy could address the permanent introduction of migrant workers into the labour market of the host country or could provide only temporary access to such market. Considering the specificities associated with the kafala system, the analysis of labour migration policy will be here associated with guestworker programmes. The guestworker migration programme allows unskilled migrants to migrate to a country in the role of temporary workers, which prevents migrant workers from naturalization and discourages family reunification, thus externalising the cost of sustaining and renewing labour to the economies and states of origin. The kafala/sponsorship system of migration imposes some added restrictions especially on migrant domestic workers, which will be further analysed in the section dealing with the case study (Pande, 2013:417). Within the discourse of labour migration management, the migrant worker is understood solely in relation to the labour she/he embodies, thus representing a necessary factor of production that has to be managed and possibly optimized. In fact, labour migration management intervenes to provide a number of techniques of optimization, whose function is to govern migration and boost the economically beneficial returns for states, employers, and migrants. A key feature of such mechanism is the role that employers embody as the enforcers of migration policy, thus complementing the function of the state and often personalizing the provisions of the law in order to maintain unequal contractual relationships (Costa & Martin, 2018:8.).

Notwithstanding the benefits associated with temporary migration that the international labour migration management seeks to harness, guestworker programmes have been identified with many negative elements. In fact, the migrant workers are regularly involved in abusive and exploitative working conditions, with the very nature of the jobs they cover frequently described with the three Ds: dirty, dangerous, and demanding. The sources of exploitation are mostly related to the structure of the contract, which is typically short-term and filled with restrictions:

Employees must return to their home country when their contract is completed; they are beholden to an employer and are not permitted to seek employment elsewhere; they are not permitted to have their families accompany them; they cannot access citizenship in the country in which they work, and so on.

(Lenard & Straehle, 2010:284)

Overall, these restrictions prohibit temporary workers from integrating within the society of the host state and seek protection from the abuses of their employers, thus contributing to their vulnerability. In terms of push factors, migrants accept these jobs because the poverty and the lack of alternative options they experience in their home countries reduces their bargaining power (Ibid.:283-5). Because of their inherently exploitative nature, temporary labour migration programmes are inconsistent with international human rights norms. For example, many guestworkers are unable to join unions and workers organisations or access legal services and representation out of fear of retaliation or because of the temporary visa status (Costa & Martin, 2018:2-3).

Finally, specifically related to the kafala system is the gendered dimension of migration. Sabrina Marchetti (2018) explains that the feminisation of migration refers to the phenomenon which sees women migrating with the aim of finding work and providing economic sustenance for their households. These women fall into the 'global care chain', which refers to "a series of personal links between people across the globe based on the paid or unpaid work of caring. Such care chains may be local, national, or global (Hochschild, 2014:250). As migration enabled women to step outside traditional patriarchal roles (being subordinated to men and adapt only for reproductive functions) and participate in the labour market, such mobility and participation continues to be premised on gendered logics. In fact, women provide low-cost and flexible labour within various service sectors, especially in domestic work. Being employed mostly in households, these women see their private and work lives become intertwined (Moubarkel, 2009:12) and suffer specific forms of 'everyday bordering': "the enactment of separations between migrants and non-migrants in their everyday encounters" (Marchetti & Di Bartolomeo, 2021:304).

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has provided a theoretical framework for the study of race, racism, Whiteness, bio-/necropolitical control and antiracist discourse in the field of IR and its sub-field of migration studies, which will be employed to analyse the empirical evidence purported in the case studies. In particular, it has been demonstrated that the birth and development of a system of racial classification has pervaded multiple spheres of European societies, from capital accumulation, gender structures, to notions of national belonging, overall contributing to develop layers of oppression and marginalisation used against those who were classified as non-White. In this system, Whiteness has emerged as a privileged socio-political identity that is capable of defining the lines of inclusion/exclusion. In this sense, racial determinism has evolved, encompassing biological, cultural, political and geographical pre-assigned characteristics to predispose the racial othering of non-White bodies. A civilisation discourse has been developed, one that works by constructing stereotypes and assigning them to Global South populations racialised as non-White, politically inferior and economically underdeveloped. This is then taken to the institutional level to develop concrete lines of division that are exerted through bio and necro-political control: its function is to ensure the privileges associated with Whiteness are protected, while hindering any substantial challenge to the status quo that may derive from the rightful presence of migrants. In this context, the role of sovereign states is configured in terms of what kind of devices are produced to respect the racial, cultural, religious and political coherence of the wider population. The bio- and necro-political authority, then, confines people within specific structures to ensure their marginalisation and eventually the loss of self-worth and respect that is conducive to their overall bare life: migrants find themselves outside the canons of the dominant society, not allowed to participate while simultaneously not allowed to exit, thus resulting in a constant state of paralysis. Next, an important piece of the conceptual puzzle is the extremization of gender social categories, which contribute to the subjectification and victimisation of migrants. It results that racialised women and men are required to behave accordingly to the gender standards set by the prevailing White power, so that the intersection of race and gender creates precise layers of oppression. Finally, the chapter has presented a theorisation of antiracist social movements, informed by a Gramscian perspective and the discursive modalities presented by Van Dijk. The role of social movements is to contest the racist hegemonic order that regulates the values and beliefs at the socio-cultural level, while carving out space at the political level for the articulation of a counter-hegemony. The modalities in which these movements carry out their work are analysed vis-à-vis their presence on social media, the radical challenge they propose to hegemonic actors and their role in filling the institutional gap for assisting migrants' lives.

CHAPTER III

3.1 Introduction

The European Union is a supranational organisation, functioning through a distinctive political and economic architecture, which requires that its member states relinquish part of their sovereignty in areas of governance that are of common interest for the EU as a whole. To assess the particularity of patterns of European institutional racism, this research is situated within a distinct space of analysis: the Mediterranean. In the context of this case study, the Mediterranean is understood as a category of analysis and a specific geographic, regional, and geopolitical area that enables the study of migration under the perspective of specific combinations of geographical environments, historical and cultural connections, as well as regional building processes and geopolitical relations (Zapata-Barrero, 2020). This approach enables a renewed assessment of migration policies, sensitive to the global colour line that is intrinsic in their formation, formulation, and operationalisation. This means understanding that current forms of migration control, such as bordering and externalisation of border control, are informed by a Eurocentric conception that constantly (re)affirms European authority and hegemony, producing a Europeanisation of the Mediterranean. For example, the use of the term "Mare Nostrum" for the 2013-2014 Italian navy's operation is particularly telling: this Roman name for the Mediterranean Sea was used by Mussolini to frame fascist propaganda about the 'Italian lake' and generally indicates a possessive image of the Mediterranean as a European space of care and control (Musarò, 2018:150-151).

The chapter will be composed as follows: a brief historical rundown of how the issue of migration has been incorporated within the institutional structure of the European Union, recognizing in particular that the European integration process has deeply embedded a negative understanding of migration that has produced more and more restrictive policies. In particular, this research reveals the profound connection between securitisation and humanitarianism, with the ultimate purpose to frame these elements within a racial structure that studies and determines the racism inherent in the border regime of the European Union. In particular, institutionalisation of racism by the European Union in the management and control of migration is highlighted in three policy areas: the bordering practices of the Lampedusa's hotspot and Frontex; and the externalisation of migration control which couples the examination of asylum procedures and visa regimes with the complicity of the Libyan state in supporting the racialisation of people on the move. These practices are then counterposed with an overview of the social movements that react to these policies and point out their inherent racist nature. Especially relevant is the political activity of Abolish Frontex, a network of groups and organisations that radically challenges the existence of the European agency for the control of borders. In

conclusion, the emergence of a politically-charged humanitarianism is evident in the practices associated with sea rescue missions in the Mediterranean.

3.2 The European Integration Process and Migration between securitizing and humanitarian approaches

The creation and development of the EC was dominated by a positive view of migration, mostly considered as a powerful source for the construction of an integrated labour market. However, the 1970s and 1980s marked a significant shift in this perception, as migrants began to be conceived as an issue of public concern. In this period, an increasingly securitizing approach to the issue of migration channelled socioeconomic and cultural concerns into the easy target of the migrant, so much so that a security-migration nexus became the primary framework for understanding and dealing with the migratory phenomenon, thus legitimizing increasingly restrictive policies (Boswell, 2003:624). In fact, Huysmans (2006) points out that the political discourses of this period worked on the "(con)fusion of immigration and asylum by presenting asylum as an alternative route for economic immigration in the EU". As a result, policy debates and public perceptions increasingly framed migration negatively, arguing that unrestricted migration could damage the protection of public order and domestic stability, challenging simultaneously the welfare state and the cultural composition of the nation (Huysmans, 2006:66-8).

In this regard, the creation of the Schengen Agreement in 1985 and its incorporation into the first pillar of the European Union with the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 are two important milestones that expressed the aim to establish the Union as an "area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime" (Article 3, Treaty of the European Union, 2012). After this landmark, the institutional framework balanced the growing internal openness with the adoption and implementation of compensatory measures that would fortify the protection of the external borders of the European Union. The result has been to close the borders for those who did not classify as European citizens and to link migration and asylum with terrorism, transnational crime and border control (Huysmans, 2006:68) This fortification worked through a closer cooperation between the police, customs, and judiciary across member states and the distribution of information related to border security via the Schengen Information System (SIS) (Vaughan-Williams, 2009:25). In other words, the creation of a borderless area, hinged on the principles of freedom and security and devoted to a neoliberal market ideology, was instrumental to the development of a border regime that, from its inception, has been focused on the governance of non-European migrant mobilities and deeply embedded into the process

of formation and integration of the European Union. From a racial perspective, the European integration process functioned to construct an image of a Europe unified by whiteness, civility and informed by sovereign and capitalist principles against an external foe, whose mobility from the Global South had to be restricted. Exemplary of this is the 1973 Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity, which assessed the basis of a common European identity in terms of a neoliberal ideology, defined on political and economic basis. The Declaration, in fact, asserted the "principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice and of respect for human rights" together with "the common market, based on a customs union (…) and institutions, common policies and machinery for co-operation" as essential elements of a European identity (Declaration on European Identity, 1973). That these values and principles were destined to be the object of extensive control and protection is further enshrined within the document, as it compels the nine members of the EC to "safeguard the elements which make up the unity they have achieved so far" (Ibid.). Such discourse was inscribed within the need to "ensure the survival of the civilisation which they have in common", and despite not clearly referring to racial categories defined in terms of phenotypical characteristics, it retrieved the colonial discourse that pitted civilisation against barbarism, with the first being the innate element of the Community and the latter of African and Middle Eastern countries, which were to be the subject of aid and cooperation to establish "peace, stability and progress in the region", following a Eurocentric logic (Ibid.). On this matter, El-Tayeb (2011) argued that the effort to construct a European identity relied heavily on the trope of the non-European, so much so that the unification process created a narrative that first defined and then excluded the racialised minorities, seen as the very essence of non-Europeanness. In this sense, migration entered into the debates on who and what constituted a 'true' European, as it functioned as a way of uniting European nations against the invincible differences of race, culture, and religion of the Other (El-Tayeb, 2011:2-3). Furthermore, she argued that:

The contemporary exclusionary discourse manifests a specific European consciousness in its mobilization of images that have been central to constructing a European identity since the early Middle Ages: the racial threat of Africa and the religious and cultural threat of Islam reappear as key themes in contemporary Europe, constituting a commonality that indeed seems to transcend all national differences (it does not appear coincidental that tightened immigration policies were among the first elements of the future European legal system that the member states could agree on).

(Ibid.:4)

The Tampere European Council of 1999 further consolidated the governance of the external borders, as it posed the guidelines for the build-up of a common asylum and migration system[4] (Fontanari:2018:22). A polarisation of mobility was thus created on a global colour line that individuated citizens of Western powerful countries as able to move freely – a sort of hyper-mobility which did not have particular requirements to be fulfilled – while those who were not already situated in a Western country saw the increase of restrictions and structures that problematized their movement (Garner, 2007:79).

Finally, the securitising approach was reinforced after the Twin Tower attack. Quite tellingly, in fact, is the first meeting of the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council after the 2001 terrorist attack, which was dedicated entirely to adopt the necessary measures to maintain the highest level of security. What 9/11 produced was in fact not only a deep fear about terrorism but also an acceleration of the process of creation of the area of freedom, security and justice. The Council adopted measures related to border security that consisted in heightening the surveillance actions provided for in Article 2(3)[5] of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and recommending the utmost vigilance when issuing identity documents and residence permits. Moreover, the procedure for the issue of visas and local consular cooperation had to be revisited and the Council laid the premises for the establishment of a network of information exchange concerning the visa issued. Finally, States were encouraged to more directly participate in the SIS to provide systematic input into the system of alerts (Extraordinary Council meeting – Justice, Home Affairs and Civil Protection, 2001 September 20). The security logic increasingly evident in the management of migration intertwined with a racial one in order to clearly pinpoint a different Other, whose radically different existence was the reason for restrictive actions. This racial-security nexus is most evidently at work in the figure of the refugee or the asylum-seeker, whose entry and presence in the territory has to be severely regulated by the nation-state, through border policing, crackdowns on over-stayers and increased rates of deportation (Garner, 2007:69-70). In this sense, there has been a relentless racial construction of asylum seekers, which has associated with their bodies elements of "desperation, criminality, wanton sexuality and voracious appetites for both employment and welfare," leading to the prohibition to entry into the national territory and resulting in their deportation and confinement in detention camps (Ibid.:76-9).

---

[4] According to Léonard (2010) "it notably called for the EU 'to develop common policies on asylum and immigration, while taking into account the need for a consistent control of external borders to stop illegal immigration and to combat those who organise it and commit related international crimes' (European Council 1999). (Leonard, 2010:233-4).

[5] Art 2(3): The abolition of checks on persons at internal borders shall not affect the provisions laid down in Article 22, or the exercise of police powers throughout a Contracting Party's territory by the competent authorities under that Party's law, or the requirement to hold, carry and produce permits and documents provided for in that Party's law. (Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985)

In the last decades, a policy of humanitarianism has emerged among European state and non-state actors. It raises no doubts the fact that practices of humanitarianism have tangible, positive results as they strive to save migrant lives, which would otherwise be left to drown at sea or abandoned to death along the land borders. Critically however, humanitarianism is not devoid of tensions and contradictions. Importantly, humanitarianism relies on the presumed universality of human rights, however such claims are not neutral but are based on hierarchies and power relations that are related to the period of colonial expansion (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015:60). Moreover, the reliance on humanitarianism life-saving efforts allows governments and organisations to avoid the need to reformulate policies that are in themselves more 'humane', thus sustaining an institutional white supremacy that continues to privilege the majority of the white European population, while consistently eliminating any form of agency and self-determination to the 'victims' of migration.

Moreover, the consistent framing of migrant deaths at sea as resulting from particular 'crises' that require humanitarian intervention contributes to depict the Mediterranean as a place governed by the state of exception: migrants are reduced to bare life and their exclusion from human values, civic rights, and moral obligations has nothing to do with the structural role of European border policies in producing these conditions (Musarò, 2018:157). In this sense, the rhetoric of crisis is framed politically in terms of what the European state is able to do in order to react to the perceived loss of sovereign control, caused by the autonomy of migrants (De Genova, 2018:1778). For example, the European Agenda of Migration (2015) established a set of measures to respond to the 'crisis', including strenghtening search and rescue operations and tripling the budget for Frontex joint-operations Triton and Poseidon. The Agenda stated clearly "the immediate imperative is the duty to protect those in need", yet it introduced numerous provisions that targeted criminal smuggling networks "which exploit vulnerable migrants", thus reinforcing the connection between migration and terrorist-related security issues (European Agenda on Migration, 2015). These approaches have been coupled with politicians and media's discourses that put migrants into black boxes, either labelled in degrading securitising terms as a "swarm of people coming from across the Mediterranean, seeking a better life", yet disrupting European societies (BBC, 2015), or in humanitarian terms as the Mediterranean became the "deathbed for thousands of nameless, desperate men, women and children" (Renzi, 2015). These discourses reinvigorated a hierarchical perception of Europe as a safe, civilized, progressed haven that was being invaded by an indistinct mass of people from poorer, uncivilized countries. This trend is assisted by the increasingly racist discourses in political societies of most European states, sustained by a return of conservative and right-wing forces and chauvinist parties that contribute to generate momentum and political pressure to act more swiftly and decisively

against migrants' mobility (Georgi, 2019). The next section deals with three main practices of the border regime: Lampedusa's hotspot, Frontex operations and the externalisation regime.

3.3 The racism of European bordering policies

3.3.1 The bio/necropolitics of Lampedusa's hotspot

In the last decades, the development of hotspots responds simultaneously to two logics. First, the utilisation of the hotspot is integral to the success and efficiency of search and rescue operations that follow the humanitarian logic of saving lives at sea. Secondly, the hotspot is a filtering and ordering mechanism that concretely borders the bodies of migrants and produces the categories of 'illegal' migrant or asylum-seeker (Carastathis, 2018:34). A third logic is here presented, one that, following a racial perspective, considers the hotspot as the most striking and concrete evidence of the enforcement of the global colour line. The visibility of mobile black and brown bodies is taken as the instrument through which the concreteness of threats can be purposefully represented to the public, thus arguing that these bodies are the visual identifiers of menaces to European sovereignty. By making visible the confinement of these bodies, the EU presents itself as an authoritarian legitimate actor capable of maintaining these threats under control.

In this sense, the creation of European camps, detention centres and hotspots signals efficiently the bio-/necropolitical attempt to manage the lives (and the expendability) of the racialised Others, thus containing them to protect the sovereignty of the (white) population. As Walia (2013) points out, 'large-scale displacements and the precarious conditions into which migrants are cast are not coincidental but rather foundational to the structuring of border imperialism'. In this sense, European camps are understood to be a neo-colonial device that purports the subjugation of *disenfranchised Others* to the control of the hegemonic order[6] (Davies & Isakjee, 2019:216).

Within the Mediterranean, the hotspot of Lampedusa distinctly represents the racial assumptions at work in the European management of migration. Located 205km off the Sicilian coast, this small Italian island has been at the forefront of European political debates because of its strategic position: other than being Italy's southern border, it is a focal point in the national and supranational governance of migration (Dines et ali., 2015:2). Most importantly, the production of Lampedusa as a 'border zone' is the result of complex and interconnected networks of relations that combine a multitude of governmental (Italian, European and third country) and non-governmental actors. In this sense, Lampedusa is integral to a migration regime that has reorganized European space and citizenship, and as such should be taken as an example of the wider mechanisms that govern all European detention centres and migration policies (Ibid.:8). It is observed that:

---

[6] One example of these racialised logics of exclusion would be the Calais camp, situated in France and nicknamed 'the jungle'(Davies & Isakjee, 2019:216)

Even though the tiny Italian island receives only a small share of irregular migrants aiming for Italy, and despite the fact that these migrants will be relocated elsewhere, in recent years Lampedusa has become a paradigmatic site for looking at issues of migration and borders in Europe. The island has turned into a resonance chamber for many issues, including the management of maritime migrants, deportation and detention, hospitality and solidarity, and the intertwined interventions of local, national, and supranational institutions. It is as if Italy's sea borders were concentrated on the island of Lampedusa, a place where the ordering of bordering is constantly 'performed' as in a theatrical production.

(Bernadie-Tahir & Schmoll in Mazzara, 2019:8)

Importantly, the complex dynamics that govern the Lampedusa's hotspot produce the invisibility of migrants, who cease to be individuals with rights and aspirations, ultimately paving the way for their experience on the island as subjected to 'bare life'. A politically charged act of irregularisation starts at sea, as the migrants on boats are already characterised as being 'illegal' by default, thus constructing them as "unruly, potential criminal and threatening individuals" (Mazzara, 2019:31). For example, it is not uncommon to find news titles such as 'European NGOs rescue over 1.000 *irregular* migrants in the Mediterranean' (Seckin, 2021) or Frontex's news report that stress the exceptionality of *illegal* border crossing numbers, with the Central Mediterranean route registering the largest number of illegal crossings (Frontex, 2022). Not only this label contributes to confuse refugees, asylum seekers and economic migrants, moulding them into a singular 'irregular' category, but it also responds to a stereotypical racial characterisation that aims at presenting the non-White subject as socially, culturally, and politically alien, contributing to their public abjection and invisibility within the national space occupied by the natural citizens (Mazzara, 2019:29-31). Moreover, politicians frequently conceal their racist intentions and White supremacists logics (that find in national/racial coherence their ultimate purpose) by referring to the irregularity of migrants. For example, wishing to capitalise on migration to extend their support base, Italian centre-right parties frequently argued that immigration was a "social bomb ready to explode in Italy" and a "urgent question, because there are 600.000 migrants who don't have the right to stay" (Giuffrida, 2018). On this matter, Matteo Salvini, Italian Interior Minister in 2018-2019 increasingly depicted Lampedusa as the last bastion that had to be defended against irregular immigration. One time, refusing the entry to the MS Acquarius into Lampedusa, he argued: "France pushes people back at the border, Spain defends its frontier with weapons. From today, Italy will also start to say no to human trafficking, no to the business of illegal immigration" (Kirchgaessener et al., 2018). Signalling the necessity to regain sovereign power over the national boundaries, his rhetoric ultimately led to the confrontation with Sea Watch 3 Captain Carola Rackete during the summer months of 2019. In this occasion, Salvini depicted the Sea Watch 3 as an 'outlaw ship' that had to be stopped with 'every lawful means' (Tondo,

2019). Finally, in 2020, as leader of the League party, Salvini visited the hotspot of Lampedusa, constantly claiming the exceptionality and irregularity of the situation lived on the island:

This is not immigration but chaos. I found nearly 800 people, everywhere: on roofs, on the ground -- a few women, few children and all the others were beautiful and strong. No, this is not humanitarian immigration but a business. And this government is an accomplice of smugglers. I can't begin to imagine the sacrifices that are being made by police forces here in Lampedusa. Lampedusa must be a holiday destination and not a platform for migrants which is only useful to traffickers. It is right and sacrosanct to welcome refugees, but I didn't see any refugees here: there are only well-nourished Tunisians, strong and young who don't look to me as having a desperate face. This government should stop making fun of Italians.

(Infomigrants, 2020)

Shielding his racism with concerns related to security issues, the well-being of the island as a tourist attraction and the illicit trafficking of human individuals, he was able to re-direct the blame for these precarious conditions from the government's (in)action to the presence of these people on the island. Moulding these migrants into a singular category – that of the irregular black individual who pretends to be a desperate refugee to come to Europe – he reinforced a racist stereotyping that depicts migrants either as aggressively coming into the EU in disguise or desperate individuals needing humanitarian assistance. Ultimately, the presence of this mass of people constitutes an exceptionality that signals they are not wanted nor needed, resulting in their marginalisation.

Indeed, the bare life is visibly enforced in Lampedusa with conspicuous physical demarcations, since other than being a hotspot, the island is a tourist destination. Migrants find themselves in a strikingly different and inferior position, which is rationalised and made visible: tourists are free to roam the island and enjoy its natural beauty and tourists attractions, while migrants are *biopolitically* restrained, both physically and psychologically[7], as they are confined in specific, restricted, patrolled areas that converge in the detention centre (Mazzara, 2019:22-3). Once disembarked in Lampedusa, migrants undergo a process of identification which often has assumed violent and coercive tones, with Amnesty International reporting that the repressive elements associated with the design of the hotspot, including the prevention of onward movement and increase returns, have been implemented aggressively: the personnel employed coercive measures to force uncooperative individuals to provide their fingerprints. This process is understood as a key biopolitical tool to decrease the movement of irregular migrants to other EU member states and ensure, eventually, their returning to their country of first arrival, under the Dublin regulations. Those refugees and migrants who have

---

[7] Corso A. (2019) Live at the Border: Abandonment and Survival at the frontier of Lampedusa. In his ethnographic research conducted in Lampedusa, he explains how migrants restrained themselves from exiting the Hotspot because it implied going against the rules and risk being caught by the police. Many migrants feared the police as they had negative experiences during their journey (55).

refused to provide their fingerprints have been subjected to arbitrary detention, often prolonged outside the time limit, and to physical violence by the police (Amnesty International, 2016:5-6). In this sense, the ideology that supports and sustains the development of hotspots is not only a humanitarian thrust to saving lives but reveals a deeper mechanism that is interested in controlling the mobility of those who are racialised as unworthy to enter the gates of the EU. Ultimately, the hotspot represent the most outstanding evidence that (racialised) migrant lives are worthy as long as they are returned to a process of control and detention.

3.3.2 Frontex's racist strategies between care and control

The combination of security related strategies and the humanitarian rescuing missions is realised in the actions of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency – Frontex. The development of Frontex can be seen as the most logical consequence of the process of Europeanisation of member states' borders, while being purposefully presented as the specific solution to the problems posed by the threat of terrorism after 9/11. It results that this agency is embedded into a securitising frame geared towards the monitoring and managing of border systems (Vaughan-Williams, 2009:25-6). After being created in 2004 as one of the compensatory measures to strengthen the external borders of the Union, its main aim has been to promote and coordinate the European border management in line with EU fundamental rights chart and the concept of Integrated Border Management. Its activities include, among others, the identification of migratory patterns and cross-border criminal activities, the analysis and monitor of data and their exchange with border authorities of member states. Moreover, it coordinates and organises joint operations and rapid border interventions, including in the field of humanitarian assistance; it supports the screening, debriefing, identification and fingerprinting of migrants and assists member states in forced returns (Frontex – Origin and Tasks). Particularly, the coordination of joint border operations between the agency and various member states and Schengen Associated Countries is an almost traditional securitising approach to the issues presented by migratory flows, as these joint operations involve actors with semi-military status in their own country, such as the Guardia di Finanza in Italy (Léonard, 2010:240).

Recent investigations have proved the responsibility of Frontex in violating international norms, especially the principle of non-refoulement, which is enshrined in customary international law and codified in different international treaties, including the 1951 Refugee Convention (Art. 33) and the Convention against Torture (Art. 3) (Amnesty, 2016:47). In the EU, such principle is enshrined in Article 19 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which lays the basis for the

protection of individuals in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition. Particularly, Art. 19(2) compels states to *not* remove, expel or extradite individuals to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2000/C 364/01). Despite Frontex's Code of Conduct mandates that participants in its activities promote, in full compliance with the principle of non-refoulement, that persons seeking international protection are recognised, receive adequate assistance and are informed about their rights and relevant procedures (Art. 5), multiple accusations of illegal pushbacks have been directed at the European agency, such as the joint operation with Greek authorities in 2016 which returned refugees to Turkey (Alarmphone, 2016) and the increasing number of pushbacks (at least 40.000 asylum seekers in 2020) attributed to cooperation between EU member states and Frontex (Tondo, 2021). Interestingly, evidence of Frontex's complicity with the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG) has been recently discovered. While the official narrative maintains that the EU is investing in Libya's capacity to manage its own waters and perform search and rescue operations, the reality on the ground reveals the development of a proxy force in the Central Mediterranean geared towards curbing the flows of migrants and shielding the agency from any legal responsibility deriving from the violation of international laws. An investigation of Lighthouse Report cross-referenced the data collected from NGOs incident reports, shipping and flight tracking data, developing an interactive map that was used to track the proximity of commercial ships to migrant crossings and distress calls, thus identifying 94 attempted crossings. The Libyan Coast Guard was involved in 56 of these, intercepting and eventually bringing the asylum seekers under their territorial jurisdiction. Moreover, a Frontex aircraft was flying in the vicinity of boats in distress in 20 of these cases, while in a dozen cases it is possible to assume that Frontex was the first actor to detect the asylum seeker's boats. The pattern emerging from this data shows that as boats in distress are spotted, Frontex communicates immediately with the Libyan Coast Guard, while omitting to inform commercial ships or NGOs vessels that may be in proximity to urgent situations. Furthermore, another analysis shows that if Frontex flies in the direct vicinity of a boat in distress, a LCG vessel arrives after a significant time lag and the people are returned to Libyan shores (Lighthouse, 2022). Such pattern is consistent with the discovery of informal back channels, namely WhatsApp chats, that Frontex uses to exchange information and informal updates regarding migrants' vessels to Libyan captains of the Coast Guard, whose technological equipment would otherwise be insufficient to monitor and track vessels in their own waters (Creta et ali. 2021).

```
00000024-AUDIO-2021-05-27-09-51-11.opus>
[27/05/2021, Text Removed - Sensitive Operational Information] Text Removed - Reporting Tools: Dear sir,
We have four sightings:
Text Removed - Sensitive Operational Information
Text Removed - Sensitive Operational Information
Text Removed - Sensitive Operational Information
Text Removed - Sensitive Operational Information
```

Corroborating such argument, Tamino Böhm of the Sea Watch claims:

The Libyan coast guard never patrols the sea. They never leave port unless there is a boat to head to for a pullback. This means the information they have comes from the surveillance flights of Italy, Frontex and the EU.

(Howden et al., 2019)

In one of these chats, Frontex shares a photo of a boat in distress, calling for immediate action by the LCG , signalling not only a well-established complicity but also a complete disregard for the lives of people crossing the Mediterranean, as Frontex prefers they return to a situation of human rights violations rather than rescuing and bringing them onto European shores.

```
We have a boat adrift pos Text Removed - Sensitive Operational Information. Boat adrift. People poring water.
Please acknowledge this message.
[14/06/2021, Text Removed - Sensitive Operational Information] Text Removed - Reporting Tools: <attached:
00000065-PHOTO-2021-06-14-07-09-23.jpg>
```

As these actions show the willingness of Frontex to ensure that fewer migrants reach European shores, the agency has been able to shield from criticism by adopting a humanitarian approach, which emphasises the need to save migrant lives, so that officers are partly required to perform their jobs as humanitarian agents (Musarò, 2018:149). In its Code of Conduct, Frontex ensures the respect of international law, European law and the national law of the host member state (Art. 3); moreover, it asserts the promotion and respect of fundamental rights, regardless of sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief (Art. 4); it mandates participants to act with fairness and impartiality when dealing with individuals, avoiding all forms of victimisation and discrimination (Art. 10). These humanitarian concerns are expressed as well in its Risk Analysis for 2021, whereby border and coast guards are required to identify vulnerable persons and persons in need of international protection and in some cases save them from being exploited by traffickers or smugglers (Risk Analysis, 2021:9). In particular, Frontex argues that criminal smuggling networks perceive migrants as commodities, thus often putting their lives at risk for the purpose of maximising profits. In addition, traffickers frequently use violence against migrants and law enforcement officers (Risk Analysis, 2021:19). Simultaneously, the report stresses the aggressiveness and adaptiveness of criminal smugglers: their flexibility and smartness has enabled them to shift modi operandi despite the increased challenges associated with the pandemic, therefore highlighting how an enhanced role

for the agency is utterly important to contrast these criminal trends (Risk Analysis, 2021:18). Moreover, Frontex argues that in 2020 there has been a decrease in the share of vulnerable groups (women and children) in migration flows, with an overall fall in female arrivals from 23% in 2019 to around 8% in 2020 and minors arrivals from 23% in 2019 to 11% in 2020. Instead, male arrivals have increased substantially in 2020, with a higher rate of arrivals than in 2019, notwithstanding the difficulties associated with the pandemic. By citing the nationalities that have contributed to this rising trend, namely Tunisians, Algerians and Moroccans, Frontex contributes to combine specific nationalities arriving from the Global South with a rhetoric that sees their exceptional numbers as invading the EU (Ibid.:14). On the one hand, this seems to suggest that migrants are acceptable as long as they are passive, feminized and exploited victims of the human trafficking network that Frontex is required to save. On the other hand, the higher arrival of male irregular migrants justifies exceptional securitising measures to contrast such rise (Stachowitsch & Sachseder, 2019:112-3). Combining this discourse with the rhetoric that individuates Islamist extremism as the "foremost terror threat to the EU", contributes to racist stereotyping according to which all migrants are Muslims and all Muslism are terrorists, thus justifying increasing security devices to stop the flows of migrants (Risk Analysis, 2021:32). Finally, there is a geographical racialisation that individuates the roots of the crisis that Europe has to deal within the overall inferior countries of the Global South. The Risk Analysis seems to suggest that migratory issues originate exclusively in other countries:

Migratory pressure on the Central and Western Mediterranean routes remains a function of the developments and migration management efforts in the main origin, host and last departure countries in the West and North Africa and the Horn of Africa.

(Risk Analysis, 2021:21).

Within this framework, the economic fallout resulting from the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, the expected growth of the Sub-Saharan populations, together with security issues affecting vast regions of Africa suggest a future increase in (economic) migrants' arrivals (Ibid.). As this is commonly perceived as a problem for the stability of European societies, politically, economically and socially, Frontex purports a narrative that sheds the agency of any responsibility for legitimately reacting to problematic trends, thus stopping migratory flows. Such discourse is visually reified by a map that depicts the European continent as under attack at its frontiers, thus portraying migration as inherently bad for the European population, as long as it comes from countries of the Global South.

Origins of migrants recorded on indicated route for IBC in 2020
(only values higher than 100 are stipulated)

Source: FRAN data as of 15 February 2021

Western Mediterranean

Central Mediterranean

Western African

Unspecified sub-Saharan nationals

Morocco

Tunisia

Algeria

Libya

Egypt

Mali

Senegal

Gambia

Burkina Faso

Guinea

Chad

Sudan

Eritrea

Nigeria

Somalia

Sierra Leone

Côte d'Ivoire

Ghana

Cameroon

(Risk Analysis, 2021:21)

3.4 The Racism in European Externalisation Policies

The externalisation of migration policies responds to racialised logics and contributes to the implementation of the global colour line by transferring the management of migrants' mobilities outside the European Union. The trend of exporting security approaches to third countries has been underway since the 1990s, via various agreements such as European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Global Approach To Migration And Mobility (GAMM), and the broader external dimension of Justice and Home Affairs (Andersson, 2016:9). The rationale that sustains all of these policy tools, agreements and initiatives is ambivalent. The rhetoric suggests openness to development and cooperation, reinforcing feelings of mutual solidarity and friendship, as Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission in 2003, when first articulating the idea of the European Neighbourhood Policy called for 'EU'ropean engagement with a 'circle of friends', with whom the values and principles of the EU could be shared (Collyer, 2016:608). At the same time, their practical implementation reveals not only an anxiety about the movement of people from the Global South towards the Mediterranean (McMahon & Sigona, 2018:505), but also a practice of boundary-making that establishes and reinforces a strategic division between 'us' European members and 'them' neighbouring countries. This dynamic of inclusion/exclusion works by hinting at a sense of belonging to a political community, while maintaining a distance that is significative of the inequality of relations of power (Scott, 2012:89-90). In this sense, Europe creates categories of (non)belonging that serve to reinforce its leading position in the management of migratory issues, resulting in the prioritization of its key interests. Such a Eurocentric framework is the result of established colonial networks around the Mediterranean, which have contributed to shape this region as a pre-given and natural territory where the EU's strategic interests could be pursued (Collyer, 2016:607).

3.4.1 Asylum externalisation and visa regimes

A critical element of the projection of European norms and standards into its 'neighbourhood' is asylum externalisation, which is described as a "set of policies and governmental practices based on bilateral or inter-governmental agreements between single European countries and third-neighbour countries or origin countries" (Fontanari, 2018:25). The idea purported in asylum externalisation is to individuate 'safe countries', whose job is to unburden the EU asylum system. According to Article 30 of the 2005 Asylum Procedures Directive (2005/85/E), member states can designate a safe country for the purpose of examining applications of asylum as long as people there are not subjected to persecution, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Moreover, the idea of safe

country implies the examination of the application of the rule of law and the general political circumstances of a given country (Art 30, Council Directive 2005/85/EC, 2005). By classifying a country as 'safe', the EU is able to decide whether, in a given origin or transit country, the individual could be subjected to persecution[8], in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Since such classification allows the EU to reject those migrants who have moved across 'safe' origin or transit countries, this practice appears to be in contradiction with the right of asylum as established by the Geneva Convention, because of the arbitrariness of the decision taken by member states about the safeness of a particular country. The concept of safeness is rather arbitrary and politically charged, as a Eurocentric conception of safe country could easily banish and prohibit the movement of people from racialised countries of the Global South, according to criteria of civilisation, human rights and so on. Moreover, the right of asylum concerns the individual experience of persecution of the person, so that the general situation of the third or origin country not only should not influence the decision but also could not be enough to decide whether a person has been subjected to persecution or not. Finally, such externalisation process blurs the legal boundaries of the right of asylum, as this is generally given only if the person arrives directly in an EU country, and since this is not possible within these provisions, it results that the possibility to apply for asylum is severely impacted (Fontanari, 2018:26).

Overall, the externalisation of asylum procedures directly creates objects to be governed through restrictions, management devices and administrative categories that purposefully render it difficult and costly to access the European Union. For example, Amnesty reports that in 2016 Italian officials targeted particular nationalities when conducting the identification process, with Christopher Hein from the Italian Refugee Council saying: "Now they are going by nationality, we are very worried. The police says 'You are from Gambia? You are not a refugee…'" (Amnesty, 2016:35). Moreover, Amnesty recounts the experience of two Sudanese men from Darfur who were repatriated in Sudan as a result of the provisions contained in the Memorandum of Understanding signed by Italian and Sudanese police authorities. Yaqoob, a 23-years old man from Darfur said: "The police asked us about our nationality, when they found that we were Sudanese they shackled us and took us to a police station". As the judge was not interested in knowing the personal experience of the man and/or granting him the right to asylum, he signed the repatriation order, thus putting his life at risk. In fact, individuals repatriated to Sudan, especially if they come from regions in conflict such as Darfur, are

---

[8] The notion of persecution in is defined in Article 9 of the Council Directive 2004/83/EC, which qualifies acts of persecution as "sufficiently serious by their nature or repetition as to constitute a severe violation of basic human rights (…) or be an accumulation of various measures, including violations of human rights which is sufficiently severe as to affect an individual in a similar manner" (Art. 9, Council Directive 2004/83/EC, 2004).

more exposed to abuses by security services upon their repatriation (Ibid.:44-5). The result is a hierarchisation and racialisation of populations according to their nationality (thus reinstating the link between nation and race) that affirms a 'coloniality of immigration' and conceives the Other as radically inadmissible (Gutiérrez Rodriguez, 2018:24). Rodriguez (2018) says:

Even if current EU migration and asylum policies do not operate explicitly within a framework of racial or ethnic difference, by coupling nationality and the right to asylum, they construct hierarchies in the recognition or rejection of asylum in terms of nationalities. This places people in zones of recognition or rejection of the human right to liveability.

(Gutiérrez Rodriguez, 2018:24)

A further problematisation of movement is established by means of visa regimes. Despite the fact that the European Union currently does not ban the entry of nationals of any country or specifically excludes people by racial group, the analysis of visa regimes reveals that the selection processes limit documented flows from particular regions of the world and are particularly stringent for nationals of the poorer countries (Garner, 2007:63-64). Analysing the visa statistics for consulates of 2020, which shows the complete set of visa statistics for all States fully applying the Schengen acquis and their consulates in third countries, such stringent patterns are visible. The analysis shows that consulates of European member states located in countries of the Global North, such as Ukraine, the United Kingdom or the Russian Federation issued uniform visas for the almost totality of the applicants. For example, in the UK, 77.341 uniform visas applications have been lodged, of which 70.431 have been granted, thus establishing an 8.1 per cent rate of uniform visas not issued. Similarly, the Russian Federation has applied for 653.764 visas, of which 635.271 have been granted, with a 2.6 per cent rate of uniform visas not issued. On the opposite side, when looking at countries from the Global South, the number of applications is less while the rate of uniform visas not issued is higher. For example, in Morocco 180.442 visas applications have been lodged, of which 135.475 visas have been granted, with a not issued rate for uniform visas at 23.6 per cent. The rate goes higher looking at countries like Tunisia (29%), Algeria (38%), Senegal (52.2%), Nigeria (51%), Pakistan (43.5%), Ghana (47.9%), Bangladesh (44.6%), Iraq (37.8%). In countries like South Sudan and Syria, fewer people apply for a uniform visa, probably as they know the possibilities of getting one are limited. So, in 2020 Syria has applied for 157 visas, of which 84 have been granted. While in Sudan, 2.432 people have applied while 1.210 have been refused, with a 48.6 per cent rate of visas not issued (Visa Statistics for Consulates, 2020). These numbers seem to confirm that there exists a regulatory framework whose underlining logic is the intersection between race, gender and class. First of all, Article 21(1) of the Schengen Visa Code postulates the examination of "whether the applicant presents a risk of illegal immigration or a risk to the security of Member States and whether the applicant intends to leave the territory of the Member States before the expiry of the visa applied for".

Furthermore, the wannabe-migrant is required to possess sufficient means of livelihood for the duration of the intended stay and for the return to his/her country of origin or residence (Article 21, Schengen Visa Code, 2009). The EU Visa Handbook explicitly refers to applicants' socio-economic position, citing relevant factors such as the employment situation, the regularity and level of income and his/her social status. Gender and race enter the picture as soon as the lower socio-economic status of women globally and the weak socio-economic position of black people in South Africa and the Maghreb is taken into consideration, thus problematising their ability to be accepted for a visa (Spijkerboer, 2018:457-8). As a result, visa policies are quite effective in externalising border control, as their highly restrictive and selective nature allows the EU to dismiss the burdens and risks associated with migrants' mobilities to third countries.

By developing visa policies that act as a filtering mechanism, the EU has contributed to the creation of global inequality in the possibility of safe travel and access to countries, mostly based on nationality. This has been achieved by means of harmonization between Schengen states, who have agreed to a binding list of countries whose citizens must apply for a visa before entering the EU (Laube, 2019:2). This full harmonization of the Schengen visa policy has been implemented through the Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 of the European Parliament and of the Council, which establishes in Annex I the third countries whose nationals are required to be in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the member states. Such harmonization produces a situation whereby third countries either are on the 'white list' for all states fully implementing the Schengen agreement or find themselves fully excluded from visa-free travel to this region, thus increasing the inequality of mobility options (Ibid.:7). Overall, European visa regimes seem to be governed by an ambiguous logic that pre-emptively illegalise and problematise the mobility of people from countries of the Global South, which quite tellingly are also formerly colonized countries[9]. The map below shows that the almost majority of countries from the Global South in the immediate proximity of Schengen States are required to apply for a visa to enter legally into the EU.

---

[9] The Annex I lists, for example, Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, Mali, Rwanda, Tunisia, South Sudan, Syria. According to Amnesty International, South Sudan and Syria were among the five origin countries of two-thirds of refugees in 2019.

(Visa Policy, Migration and Home Affairs)

Blue: Schengen Area. **Green**: no visa requirements. **Red**: visa requirements. **Burgundy**: visa and airport visa transit (AVT) requirements by all Schengen States.

Since most of the citizens of these countries are unable to meet the criteria and qualify for visas, both labour migrants and refugees are compelled to arrive on European territory as 'illegal' migrants, subjected to perilous routes, smuggling networks, violence, and brutal conditions. Indeed, the chart below shows the irregular border crossings by nationality in 2021; quite tellingly, these nationalities mostly coincide with the countries with the highest refusal rate of visas in 2020, as we have seen before.

Irregular border crossings by nationality in 2021 – Statistics on migration to Europe

By denying legal/legitimate access to the European Union by the various means of visa regimes, asylum externalisation and border policing, the result is the fortification and reinforcement of a cultural, racial division along a global colour line (De Genova:1766). Such exclusion is premised on the idea that specific populations would be more 'problematic' than others because of the cultural distance that hinders their capacity to assimilate into European norms (Garner, 2007:63-64).

3.4.2 Libyan complicity in the externalisation of management migration

The role of Libya as the 'main gendarme of the EU external borders' (Fontanari, 2018:37) has been under construction for years. An important step in that direction was the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation[10] signed by the governments of Berlusconi and Gaddafi and hailed as an institutional project whose function was to address the abuses that Italy inflicted upon Libyans during the colonial rule. However, its ultimate purpose was to curb the arrival of undocumented migrants onto the shores of the EU by developing a border device whose consequences were macabre: the absence of asylum procedures, coupled with human rights violations and forced returns, made Libya the most effective, and deadliest, border patrol of the EU (De Cesari, 2012:318). The Treaty led to the development of a push-back policy, which violated the principle of non-refoulement, as it

---

[10] It issued a package of five billion euro as reparations to be used for construction projects, student grants and pensions for Libyan soldiers who served with Italian forces during the Second World War. Moreover, the Italian government provided helicopters, maritime surveillance aircraft, naval patrol vessels and training for pilots and operators (Bialasiewicz, 2012:853; 859)

allowed Italians to interdict boat migrants and transfer them to a militarized Libyan system of detention, conducive to labour exploitation and abuse (Mazzara, 2019:34). Under the guise of a politics of colonial reparations and closure, the Treaty constituted a neo-colonial instrument that (re)instated a rhetoric of economically beneficial and morally correct European/Italian goodness, reminiscent of the colonial discourse around 'Italiani brava gente,' to be devoted to a friendly, although inferior, neighbour. Strikingly, in 2010 Libyan ruler Gaddafi threatened to "turn Europe black" and, building on racialised tropes, he assured the demise of "white and Christian Europeans faced with this influx of starving and ignorant Africans". He understood well his role as patroller of European borders that was implemented with externalisation agreements with the EU and used this advantage to pressure European politicians to pay him 5bn euros a year to stop illegal African immigration (BBC, 2010).

After the fall of the Gaddafi regime, the Italian government showed no second-thought on renewing its cooperation with his successors, de facto making itself complicit in fuelling a brutal system of detention, extortion, and forced labour. Particularly relevant is the 2017 Memorandum of Understanding between Italian Prime Minister Gentiloni and Libyan Prime Minister al-Serraj, which was eventually endorsed by the EU. By bounding together in a securitising framework all the issues related to irregular migration, the fight against terrorism and human trafficking, the two countries recognized their willingness to cooperate to stop the influx of (irregular) migrants. Within this framework, migration is, regardless of its nature, constructed as a dangerous challenge that coming from Africa seeks to disrupt the peace and stability of the wider Mediterranean region. Moreover, the Memorandum almost signals an equal footing between Italy and Libya, claiming the "common historical and cultural heritage and the strong bond of friendship" as the basis for cooperation. However, Libya is on an inferior position, as it is destined to be the recipient of economic aid geared towards financing development programmes (Art. 1B) and providing technical and technological support to the Libyan institutions competent on the issue of illegal migration, namely the Defence Ministry Border Guard, the Libyan Coast Guard and the Interior Ministry (Art. 1C). Moreover, under this agreement, Italy pledged to finance, together with funds from the EU, Libyan hosting centres and to train its personnel (Art. 2). In particular, since 2017 Italy has provided the Libyan Coast Guard with funds amounting to €32.6 million (MSF, 2022). At the same time, under the EU Trust Fund For Africa, the EU has financed €46 million destined to strengthen the fleets of the Libyan coast guard and enhancing its surveillance capacities both at sea and land borders (EUTF, 2017). Both of these actors have de facto made themselves complicit in Libyan policy of interception and return of migrants and their inhumane treatment in Libyan detention centres.

The abuses to which refugees and migrants are subjected both in official and unofficial places of detention have been extensively investigated. Those who find themselves in Libyan detention centres are subjected to a state of exception: women and men are detained indefinitely, without any legal support, and subjected to physical and psychological violence, torture, rape, malnutrition, sexual abuse, racial and religious discrimination. With regards to forced detention, it has been documented that arbitrary imprisonment is a systemic issue, happening both in official detention facilities and in places of captivity run by non-state armed individuals or groups (ECCHR et al., 2021:23). Even if Libyan law criminalises "illegal entry, stay or exit", providing a basis for the imprisonment and deportation of 'illegal migrants', legal provisions are rarely invoked in the arrest and detention of migrants and refugees. Rather, these are carried out in an arbitrary way either by state or non-state actors in the absence of judicial oversight. Moreover, as migrants have no resources to proceed legally in order to challenge their detention, their deprivation of liberty and rights amounts to a crime against humanity (Ibid.:25). Amnesty International reports that refugees and migrants are subjected to indefinite detention unless they are repatriated through IOM's return programme, are taken care by UNHCR, or deported by Libyan authorities to neighbouring countries (Amnesty, 2017:25).

Such imprisonment is conducive to migrants' exploitation, as the duration of their detention is often dependent upon their ability to pay ramson money (generally between 1,000-7,500 Libyan dinars) to detention's chiefs and guards (Ibid.:26). Such actions are in line with the common perception that migrants are a property to be disposed of, thus subjecting them to a process of commodification. The increasing evidence of migrants and refugees, with a predominance of black men, sold to the highest bidder in slave auctions is concerning. CNN has discovered these auctions in an investigation conducted in Libya in the Summer of 2017 and even interviewed a man in a detention centre who was sold at a similar auction (CNN, 2017). The account of a Sudanese woman who witness one of these auctions in Zawiya recalls seeing "a black man who... had a chain on his head, on his hands, on his feet, because he was strong... they were making an auction of how much they want to pay. And I saw first time the trade. The price started 3,000 dinars until they reached 7,000 dinars." (ECCHR et ali., 2021:26). Commodification of racialised migrants and refugees happens by means of forced labour as well. Those who are in fact unable to raise the money necessary for their release are often forced to work without receiving payment and against their will, both in official and unofficial detention centres (Ibid.:26). There are three cases of forced labour: a) the operator of the detention facility needs labour for his own projects; b) sponsors from Libya offer money to the operator in return for detainees to work for him, with the promise that they will be returned to the centre; c) sexual slavery. Generally, migrants are forced to work in construction, manufacturing, cleaning, maintenance and farming. Migrants' accounts highlight being threatened with guns or beaten with

sticks, metal bars and gun butts to force them to work. For example, Idris, an asylum seeker from Eritrea, said: "Anyone needing workers would come and take us and pay the prison – I know they paid the prison because once the man said (when we were slow leaving) that we had to be quick because he had paid money for us." In narrating the kind of work he was forced to perform, he said: "The labour was heavy, including carrying metal and stones. I think we were building houses, although I never saw them finished. The people who took us out to work guarded us closely. When they thought that we were speaking to each other, they would beat us. This happened every day." In the case of gender violence, traffickers of sexual slaves often lure women with the promise of going to Italy, but then selling them for prostitution or imprisoning them inside captors' homes for sexual activities (Ibid.:26-27).

Numerous abuses have also been reported, with inhumane conditions being unfortunately common in these detention centres. Overcrowding, lack of proper ventilation and bedding, with migrants being forced to sleep on the floor or using filthy mattresses, absence of proper sanitation facilities and clean water, scarcity of potable water and sporadic rations of food: these are some of the mistreatments to which men, women and children are subjected to, often leading to severe weight loss, malnutrition, spread of infectious diseases and skin infections (Amnesty, 2017:27-28). Moreover, these abuses often include torture, as detainees are beaten with water pipes, hoses and metal rods, given electric shocks and forced to stay in direct sunlight for hours. Samuel told Amnesty International that violence by guards was very common: "The guards beat you with metal pipes until you might get a concussion. It is not human." (Ibid.:29). These forms of violence are often associated with racism, as Amnesty International tells of frequent use of racist language to refer to Black refugees and migrants (Ibid.:43). An account of a 23-years-old Eritrean woman recounts the experience of being subjected to a worser treatment because of her skin colour:

I was in the foreign room with 100 women from Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. In front of us there was another room for Libyans. We could see that the room was better. The women over there had three meals, better drinking water and access to toilets while we had food once a day, the water they gave us for drinking was salty and the toilets were clogged.

(Xchange, no date found)

3.5 Social movements' roles and strategies

Finally, the research presents an analysis of the role of social movements. Particularly, these movements build on a discursive framework of antiracism to point out the racist nature of the European border regime, ultimately seeking to construct a counter-hegemonic order that brings about socio-political changes through their initiatives. I begin my examination with an overview of the 2020 summer of protests guided by the Black Lives Matter mobilisations, analysing how these interacted with pre-existing European issues. Moreover, I individuate two social movements divisions: a political line that mostly focuses on disputing the operations of Frontex; a humanitarian line that challenges, through its concrete humanitarian activities, the institutional setting that allows for the expendability of migrant lives at sea.

3.5.1 The EU and the Black Lives Matter Movement

In June 2020, the latest spectacular mass mobilisations that swept European cities were the result of the reinvigoration of the Black Lives Matter Movement (BLM) worldwide. As the case of police brutality directed at African American George Floyd ignited these protests in the United States, these quickly spread to Europe. While they started as a movement of solidarity for the North American long-standing problem of institutional racism and police brutality, they quickly translated core BLM claims to national specificities, encountering different, yet interconnected, issues of post-colonialism, anti-fascism, securitisation of migration and discrimination of ethnic and racialised minorities (Milman et al., 2021:3). In particular, in Italy the BLM protests quickly built upon a fertile social and cultural terrain for the exploration of institutional racism within migration policies that was generated by the security decrees[11] issued by Head of Lega and Interior Minister (2018-2019) Matteo Salvini. Relying on the anti-Lega coalition, the Fridays for Future activists, the LGBT+ and feminists groups, the BLM protests were able to bridge experiences of oppression and discrimination and create a unified voice for anti-racism (Ibid.:13). The immigration component was visible since the beginning, as individual migrants, migrant organisations, and second-generation immigrants were at the forefront of these protests, either as participants or organisers. Using the open-microphone present at

---

[11] These introduced amendments in qualification and reception provisions, abolished the humanitarian protection status and restricted access to accommodation in the SPRAR (Protection System for Refugees and Asylum Seekers) facilities. Moreover, they included provisions that made expulsion of aliens and citizenship revocation easier. Finally, they criminalised NGOs ships involved in SAR activities.
European council on refugees and exiles, (2018, November 16) *Salvini Decree Approved by Italian Senate, Amid Citizen's Protests and Institutional Criticism*

these gatherings, they were able to create a personal social and political space to denounce their own experiences of racist attitudes in Italy and the impact of Italian laws institutionalizing racism. Moreover, the volunteers of the social movement 'Le Sardine' painted a giant mural reading "Human Black Migrant Lives Matter" on Piazza Gramsci, in Milan, with the aim to denounce the Italian discriminatory and racialised migration and citizenship policies (Ibid.:4).

La Repubblica (2020, July 13)

Other countries, such as Germany, Denmark and Poland similarly localized the BLM core claims to their national contexts, with rather different outcomes, yet united by the common desire for an anti-racist knowledge to be spread across social, cultural, and political infrastructures. Overall, the wave of protests and mobilisations contributed to develop an intense public debate, compelling the academia, journalists, activists, and the larger public to discuss sensitive issues that were generally hidden. For example, the racial profiling, the structural racism, the continuous discrimination to which all racialised minorities are subjected on a daily basis and the colonial legacy of many European societies were hot topics during the summer months of 2020. Especially the last issue, the European colonial legacy, took the concrete form of taking down statues and monuments of European

colonizers, from Britain to Belgium and Italy[12]. The rationale for these radical actions has been premised on the need to oppose a counter-narrative to the mainstream naturalisation of glorification of colonial figures in street and square names, tunnels, statues and so on. Therefore, people's engagement has taken various forms, from smearing red paint all over, removing the hands of the statues, to the artistic installation of an ice sculpture of the statue of Leopold II, made by Laura Nsengiyumva, an artist of Rwandan descent (Gilroy & Rutazibwa, 2020). Whether their forms, these acts constitute revolutionary strategies that tease people's minds and propel widespread discussions on the kind of national narrative that the state and the society want to embody. Since monuments constitute a visible practice of constructing ideas within a society, as they express a particular national narrative through cultural representations and images, it is fundamental that this constructive process entails a reflection on what histories are absent and how they should be included. These actions respond exactly to this demand. For example, in Belgium, responding to this activist ferment, people have worked to develop a toolkit for local governments on how they can engage their own citizens and communities in the conversation of the figures put onto streets, in parks and so on (Ibid.). In other words, these are discursive strategies that are conducive to public and institutional discussions and work to dismantle colonial heritage and racist assumptions.

At the larger European institutional level, the impact of the BLM protests is visible in EU Parliament Resolution of 19 June 2020: it recognized their role in shedding a light on Europe's colonial past and its complicity in the transatlantic slave trade, the structural racism that emerges in socio-economic inequality and encompasses the labour market, housing, and education all around the EU. While acknowledging that the fight against racism is a horizontal issue and as such should be taken into account in all areas of the Union policy, the Resolution, nonetheless, failed to clearly connect the issue of racism with the migration policies put into place, especially the border practices and the externalisation of migration control. It called for "the EU and the Member States to develop policies and measures to tackle discrimination and to end racial or ethnic profiling in all forms in criminal law enforcement, counter-terrorism measures and immigration controls" (EU Resolution 19 June 2020). In other words, it focused on the racial or ethnic profiling within immigration control but failed to link those racist practices with the inherent nature of migration policies. Similarly, the adoption of the Anti-Racist Action Plan 2020-2025 by the EU Commission as a result of mass mobilisations appears disappointing when looking for a clear outlining of a racism-migration nexus. Indeed, it "sets

---

[12] In Italy, the statue of Indro Montanelli, a famous Italian journalist and colonizer of Abyssinia, was targeted by a group of activists, I Sentinelli, who asked Milan Mayor, Giuseppe Sala, to remove it, in light of Montanelli's colonial experience. However, the Mayor refused to comply with the request, stating that 'lives should be judged in their totality'. Pozzi L. (2020, September 24), *Black Lives Matter and the Removal of Indro Montanelli's Statue*

out a series of measures to step up action, to help lift the voices of people with a minority racial or ethnic background, and to bring together actors at all levels in a common endeavour to address racism more effectively" (European Commission, 2020:2), yet it fails to engage directly with the multiple frameworks of oppression that the EU implements in migration management and bordering practices. Müller argues that:

The lack of measures that aim at the reorganization of different areas of life reverberates the exclusionary strategies typical of the European migration regime and its violent practices in outsourced border control points and refugee camps. The anti-racist interventions proposed to law enforcement agencies via the new action plan can, therefore, only be understood as a strategy to ensure temporary survival.

(Müller, 2021:15).

In the end these protests and mobilisations are a sign that anti-racism is increasingly becoming a central component of social, cultural, and political European life, yet their overall failure to address the racialisation of migration policies is disconcerting.

3.5.2 Social movements against Frontex

In the last decades, a growing network of movements, protesters and organisations related to migrants and refugees has increasingly emerged, either in solidarity with their needs, or openly challenging the discriminatory practices of the EU border regime. These anti-racist, pro-migrant networks have engaged in radical thinking and revolutionary practices, challenging the institutional set-up that favours inhumane treatment along European borders. Already in 2013, a network of 19 associations, researchers and individuals from civil society launched the Frontexit Campaign, under the coordination of Migreurop and EuroMed Rights. This trans-Mediterranean network, encompassing activists both the North and the South of the Mediterranean, recognized the contradictory nature of Frontex operations and proposed a binary path that would first inform a wide audience about the consequences of Frontex operations on the protection of human rights and then expose such impacts to the political representatives directly involved. This objective was, thus, informed by the need to create a shared understanding about the abuses operated by Frontex official plans and consequently oppose the agency's mandate. The ultimate strategy to achieve this aim was to concretely investigate human rights abuses and then raise awareness and advocate for: a) transparency surrounding mandates, responsibilities, and actions of Frontex; b) the suspension of Frontex activities violating human rights; c) the cancellation of regulations creating Frontex if it was proven that the agency's mandate was incompatible with respect of fundamental rights (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum,

2014:301). In its website (http://www.frontexit.org/en/), the collective pointed out the "exclusively security-oriented approach" implemented by the EU on matters related to migration policies with its restrictive visa regimes, the construction of walls, the externalisation of migration management and the militarisation of border control. They denounced the securitisation implemented by the EU through Frontex by highlighting that Europe is a war with an *imaginary enemy* – the migrant. By denouncing the increasingly important role (and budget) of Frontex in terms of decision-making, deployment capacity, and autonomy, they recognized the European institutional leadership as led by the priority to hinder the right to mobility of migrants. The development of a shared understanding regarding the abusive conduct of the agency has been crafted through visual and written materials. Particularly, the Campaign has created several guides[13] that aimed at informing the reader and propelling her/his active role in society, by spreading awareness about Frontex operations and lack of transparency. The ultimate aim was to advocate for an increment of the agency's accountability at the institutional level.

Recently, in 2021 the European Commission decided to expand the mandate of Frontex, in order to equip it with enhanced powers that would support EU member states "in all stages of the voluntary return and reintegration process, including pre-return counselling, post-arrival support and monitoring the effectiveness of reintegration assistance" (Liboreiro, 2021). Not only its mandate, but also the agency's budget has been subjected to a positive revision, overall securing a €5.6bn budget until 2027, with plans to increase its armed border patrols and equipment (such as ships, helicopters, and drones) (Tondo, 2021). Furthermore, the expansion regards the role of Frontex in third countries; in fact, the EU is considering establishing status agreements with African countries to enable Frontex to support border management and deploy liaison officers (ECRE, 2022). In light of these new developments, a decentralised and autonomous network of groups, organisations, and individuals has launched the campaign #AbolishFrontex, whose aim is rather clear: eliminate altogether the European agency for border control by targeting the policies and the system that sustain it. The radical nature of this movement is evident in its *vision*, which calls for dismantling the border-industrial complex and building a society informed by the principles of social justice, freedom of movement, equality, anti-racism, and decolonisation. Particularly relevant is the fact that they clearly point out the racialisation to which migrants are subjected to because of these abusive and discriminatory policies. In fact, they highlight that the securitisation of migration, implemented concretely through Frontex,

---

[13] On the site, the section 'Texts and Analysis' presents: "True/False Frontexit Mythbuster (2017)"; "Brief on Frontex by Migreurop: Frontex, the armed wing of European migration policies (2015)"; "Training manual – Frontex (2013)"; "Complaint form for violation of rights during Frontex operations/ involving Frontex agents". However, these texts do not seem to be available anymore.

serves to depict the mobility of people as a fundamental threat to European societies, thus reinforcing "the rise of nationalism, racism, xenophobia and Islamophobia" (Abolish Frontex Manifesto, 2021:1). Their list of demands is fundamentally hinged on the priority to abolish Frontex, thus ending all operations and redirecting its spending on border protection towards services and resources for migrants, social services, welfare, health, education and transitioning towards a low-carbon economy (Ibid.:3). Moreover, among other aims, it calls for stopping deportations, ending detention, putting an end to the militarisation of borders (and the subsequent military industrial complex that derives from it), empowering solidarity and stopping EU's role in forcing people to move. These objectives are sustained by a throughout understanding of the rampant racism that informs and sustains the border regime and its militarisation. In calling for the regularisation of migrants, in fact, the ultimate aim is to develop a society that is premised on a truly universal right to livelihood that doesn't privilege people based on their citizenship status or class: "it is fundamentally racist and unjust to deny people legal standing and the right livelihood" (Ibid.:4). Similarly, they aim at stopping the surveillance of people on the move and acknowledge that the EU's several biometric databases, including Eurodac, VIS (Visa Information System), SIS II (Schengen Information System), EES (Entry/Exit Scheme) and ETIAS (European Travel Information and Authorisation System), are part and parcel of the border regime that ultimately monitors people's movements and facilitates the identifying, stopping, and expulsion of migrants. Consistently with their functions, these surveillance systems contribute to the creation of a border apartheid that distinguishes between non-threatening bodies, who may easily pass, and those who are subjected to stringent controls following generalised threat assessments based on biometrics and features, not in the least skin colour (Ibid.:8).

In an open letter addressed to EU institutions, #AbolishFrontex has remarked that the policies that guide the agency's actions are conducive to the dangerousness of migrant routes, the thousands of deaths at EU's sea and land borders, the rise of far-right nationalisms and ultimately the reinforcement of racism. By building on centuries of colonialism, oppression and exploitation, the EU border regime continues to fortify and institutionalise this racialised violence, injustice, and inequality. Since Frontex has been "both avid promoter and key enforcer of Europe's violent policies against people on the move", activists demand its dismantlement in favour of a system that guarantees justice, safety, and freedom of movement for all. They propose a counter hegemonic order that aims at constructing an alternative framework for the management of people's mobility from the Global South. Such framework is constructed on a shared understanding of the equality of humanity as a whole and seeks to develop a European society that strives for "justice and [is] committed to repairing damages inflicted on the Global South in a mindset of white supremacy" (Tondo, 2021). Concretely, the actions taken by the activists of #AbolishFrontex have ranged from creating written resources that analyse in

depth the inadequacy of Frontex activities and their lack of respect for human rights, to supporting the "No Frontex Referendum" in Switzerland, to organising sit-ins and protests across Europe and North Africa (@abolishfrontex, 2021). Particularly, the "No Frontex Referendum" that is going to take place on May 15 in Switzerland is a key moment: it allows for a public discussion regarding the deadly bordering practices and if successful, Switzerland may be the first European country that actively defunds and possibly withdraw from Frontex. Finally, the next planned initiative is the Abolish Frontex Actions Days from 22 to 24 April. On their Instagram page, the campaign has launched some ideas for actions to be implemented in order to exert political and social pressure on the national governments and ultimately the EU. These include the creation of informative materials to be handed out about the country's contribution to Frontex, arranging demonstrations in front of key places, such as Swiss embassies, government buildings or crucial locations connected to Frontex activities (i.e. a ministry, naval base, or arms company). Finally, they suggest writing letters or emails to national authorities to inform them of Frontex' involvement in human rights violations and demand an end to the country's support for Frontex (@abolishfrontex, 2022).

Concluding this section, Stop the Border Violence, a European Citizens' Initiative under Regulation (EU) 2019/788 is presented. Its aim is to unite citizens of the European Union in a common political action that addresses the violations of fundamental rights, torture and abuses to which migrants are subjected because of the militarisation and externalisation of internal and external borders. By recalling the fundamentality of Art. 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which says "No one can be subjected to torture, or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment", the ultimate aim is to pressure the EU to adopt adequate legislative instruments to ensure its actual application. Furthermore, they formulate a lists of demands that would ensure the protection of migrants and asylum seekers, including establishing monitoring mechanisms that detect and stop the violations of fundamental rights within and at the borders of the EU; withdrawing from international agreements on the control of migration flows with third countries that violate human rights; creating minimum standards of reception applicable for the entire period of residence of people to all member states and finally sanctions to be implemented in the event of a breach of EU rules (Stop the Border violence Manifesto, 2022). Such project seems to be at its early stages, but it is interesting to note that it calls for direct citizens' participation, as it intends launching a European-wide petition.

3.5.3 Humanitarianism as a social movement

During the last decades, the emergence of various forms of citizens' engagement in response to the issues raised by consistent flows of refugees has the potentiality of being framed as a humanitarian social movement. By defying the classic understanding of humanitarianism as guided by principles of neutrality and impartiality, both individuals citizens and organisations of various sorts have responded to an institutional void and created political meanings around their actions. For example, in 2015 countless citizens organised unofficial shuttle services with their own personal vehicles to transport refugees from Hungary to Germany, they designed smartphone apps to provide train schedules or the location of the nearest hospitals, and they distributed medicine and meals (Rea et al., 2019:23). Moreover, the work of activists organisations in Greece, such as Queer Solidarity and LGBT Support is exemplary of the combination of political aims and humanitarian assistance. In fact, when providing material assistance and solidarity to displaced persons, they frame these actions neither as an apolitical duty or a humanitarian response to human rights abuses, rather as a core component of an alternative world-building processes (Reda & Proudfoot, 2020:3). Those volunteers that are involved in these organisations do not recognise themselves as humanitarian service providers, but rather as political activists (Ibid.:7).

Moving further, the European citizens' initiatives in the last years have actively intervened in the Central Mediterranean by arranging rescue operations of migrants navigating the dangerous maritime routes. Building on the argument made by Esperti (2020), such networks, I argue, constitute a social movement that openly defies the European formal security-informed responses at the borders (Esperti, 2020:437). Indeed, their rapid emergence and widespread diffusion signals a new space for social movements: the Mediterranean is becoming the locus of new social and political meanings associated with the humanitarian effort of saving lives at sea. Indeed, by their presence and action, these actors question European policies concerning the maritime border management and its human costs and present a counter-narrative that emphasises a true universality of human rights (Ibid.:444). Moreover, their engagement associates the humanitarian action to other socio-political activities, including advocating for safe and legal routes, sensitizing public opinion about migrants' stories, witnessing and denouncing human rights violations, pressuring European governments, and institutions on the issue of deaths at the EU's southern maritime borders (Ibid.:445).

One of these actors is Sea Watch, which was born in 2014 out of an initiative of volunteers, who committed themselves to sea rescue. On their website (https://sea-watch.org/en/), their stated efforts respond to the need and priority to "fill the gap of an institutionalised, comprehensive sea rescue with a clear mandate […] We consider this to be our humanitarian duty". Sea Watch has been protagonist of an open political and legal dispute: as Sea Watch Captain Carola Rackete openly defied European

and national norms regulating the search and rescue at sea, she has laid the basis for a (humanitarian) resistance of oppressive power dynamics. Recently, Sea Watch has filed a lawsuit against Frontex before the General Court of the European Union (ECG) in Luxembourg. The case regards a pullback that took place on July 30, 2021, and that was witnessed by Seabird, the Sea Watch reconnaissance aircraft. In this instance, despite Sea Watch 3 being the closest vessel with rescue capacity it was not informed by any authority about the presence of a boat in distress within the Maltese search and rescue zone, with the result of the boat being intercepted by the Libyan Coast Guard and brought back to Libya. Regarding Frontex, one of its drones was repeatedly spotted on scene and in the vicinity of the distress case, yet as it avoided sharing useful information it should be held accountable for the violation of international law. Moreover, Frontex refused to release information requested under the Freedom of Information Regulation. For this reason, Sea Watch, with the cooperation of the pro-transparency group FragDenStaat, has filed a lawsuit to obtain the withheld information to prove that the agency was complicit in human rights violation in the central Mediterranean. This action is a fundamental step in holding Frontex accountable for its operations in the Mediterranean and if successful it could signal a powerful shift towards more transparency and perhaps a more appropriate management of the Central Mediterranean route. Finally, their engagement on social media platform constitutes a key element in their practices of awareness-raising, which takes on multiple forms: creating informative material about their jobs at sea, sharing photos and videos of migrants and refugees rescued on board of their ships, and providing a platform for migrants themselves to speak up. All of these social media strategies ultimately create a socio-political space that allows the development of not only a public debate about the European border regime but also of the concept of humanitarian action as a form of political struggle and resistance.

3.6 Conclusion

The literature has individuated the 2015 migration crisis as an exceptional moment that reveals the racism of the European border regime (Georgi, 2019; De Genova, 2018); however, my examination reveals an institutionalisation of racism that dates before the 2015 Long Summer of Migration and that is indicative of a longer and more established trend within the political and institutional setting of the European Union. A trend that finds its roots in the colonial legacy and the emergence of a framework of white supremacy, interested in preserving the privileges of the majority of white citizens and thus geared towards a racial exclusion of "foreigners". The lack of a clear period of reference is voluntary and instrumental to the examination of an institutionalisation of racism that retrieves the coloniality of power relations and understands them as constantly shaping migration technologies and devices. The examination reveals this and focuses on showing how these specific devices create an exclusionary framework that is guided by racist precepts and produces the expendability of the Other. Specifically, this chapter has presented the European Union as a case study for the institutionalisation of racism in migration policies. In particular, the research has been premised on the priority to adapt the global colour line to the specificity of the Mediterranean, here taken as a specific locus of analysis. The examination started from the analysis of the process of EU integration, based on a racialised exclusion of foreigners which was instrumental to the fortification of external borders. Such process was assisted by a securitisation framework that individuated the 'foreign enemy' as a menace to the economic well-being, the cultural and national coherence of these societies. From a racial perspective, the result has been to keep out those who did not classify as potentially acceptable EU citizens, leading to the exclusion of people of different skin colour, religion, culture, etc. A global colour line was thus created and progressively enforced, simultaneously by means of bordering strategies and externalisation policies. As regards to bordering strategies, the chapter presented the practices associated with the hotspot of Lampedusa and the European Board and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex. These bio-/necro-political structures respond to a double logic informed by the humanitarian thrust of saving lives and the securitising logic of filtering unwanted migrants, both premised on racist bias. For example, as the hotspot of Lampedusa visibly contains racialised bodies and prevents them from entering and participating fully as citizens of the (white) polity, it contributes to their invisibility and subjection. Similarly, Frontex constructs its activities as a benevolent saviour, whose role is to strengthen and protect the fragile EU borders (consequently institutions and values) against a hyper-masculine racialised enemy. In the realm of the externalisation of migration management, the shift between a fictitious benevolent discourse of friendship and assistance to third African countries and a boundary-making, security-related, process establishes a strategic division that responds to the inequality of relations. Between the externalisation

of asylum procedures and the development of visa regimes, the result is the hierarchisation of populations, with those from the Global South suffering a severe restriction to move. Finally, the role of Libya as the main gendarme of Europe is analysed, presenting the complicity of European and Italian institutions in the creation and sustainment of inhumane conditions in Libyan detention centres. On a last note, the chapter has presented an examination of European social movements. The analysis of BLM protests of June 2020 has defined their key role in propelling interesting debates about the value and importance of antiracism as a practice and the colonial legacy that still exists within European societies. Yet, they failed to produce institutional outcomes that clearly and definitely addressed the structural racism behind migration policies. Moreover, the radical political demands of #AbolishFrontex have been presented, as they specifically build on the tradition of anti-racism and decolonisation. Due to this movement being at its infancy stage, it results impossible to ascertain its impacts at the EU institutional and socio-cultural level; however, this research individuates further room for a throughout examination of its activities in future years. Finally, the emergence of a politically-charged social movement of humanitarianism, whose actions openly defy European institutional policies of migration, is a noteworthy development which has the potential of being further explored by social movements research agenda.

CHAPTER IV

4.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the institutionalisation of racism that takes place in Lebanon through the kafala system. Particularly, the kafala is here taken as exemplary of the gendered and racialised relationship of power that is implemented in this Middle Eastern country. Continuing with the specific Mediterranean frame, Lebanon is chosen because it provides a fertile and peculiar ground for the exploration of questions of race and racism. Indeed, not only has Lebanon been under colonial rule, but it is also considered a country of the Global South, thus allowing the comparison between a political entity of the Global North with one in the Global South, analysing their differences and similarities in the incorporation of racism within their socio-political contexts. Nevertheless, the aim of this chapter is to explore how the global colour line also runs through the Global South and responds to divisions and hierarchies associated with colonialism and patriarchy. Within the kafala, the most prominent elements are race and gender, whose intersection creates, in the case of migrant domestic workers (MDWs hereinafter) in Lebanon, the premises for exploitation, marginalisation, and oppression. The chapter presents an examination of the origin of the kafala and its transformation into its current form. Then, the institutional frameworks of the Lebanese state, together with its colonial legacy and the institutionalisation of Whiteness are examined, leading then to the analysis of the racialised logics that guide the kafala system in its bio- and necropolitical control and commodification of MDWs. Finally, the chapter presents the social movements that are currently active in Lebanon, seeking to address the shortcomings of the kafala and provide remedy to its numerous abuses.

4.2 The origin of the Kafala

According to Bina Fernandez (2021), the genealogy of the term 'kafala' intertwines different interpretations, histories, and traditions. From a linguistic perspective, 'kafala' is an Arabic term that derives from the three-lettered verb kaf – fa – lam (ك, ف, ل) which means to "feed or support, to provide bail or guarantee, and to sponsor or be the legal guardian" (Fernandez, 2021:4346). Its origin lies within the Islamic tradition, as Jureidini and Hassan (2020) assert that the Islamic law defines kafala with moral, social, and business connotations. In particular, Muslim jurists dealing with family law, designate the kafala as a formal agreement that organises a legal guardianship for an orphaned child until adulthood (however, it does not comprise adoption or confer inheritance rights). Moving towards a business perspective, the Islamic kafala constitutes a business contract where one party formally guarantees that the second party will deliver goods or carry financial responsibilities. More

generally, the kafala individuates a framework of social solidarity that regulates people's interactions according to the principles of trust and cooperation (Jureidini & Hassan, 2020:93). Whether its main connotation, the kafala originally established a relationship between the guarantor – kafīl – and the guaranteed person – makfūl; in this relationship, on account of the responsibilities taken by the guarantor as representative of the guaranteed in front of the state and other institutions, she/he was answerable for any breach of law on the part of the guaranteed (Ibid.:94). Within the Islamic law tradition, however, the diverse types of contracts do not mention the kafala as a system of employment. Such specific usage in relation to labour is traced back to the patterns of indentured labour in the Arab Gulf states, especially with regards to the business of pearls. Damir-Geilsdorf and Pelican (2019) explain that:

At the start of the pearling season, boat captains or boat-owner merchants used to give families of divers a loan to live on during the divers' absence. The diver was supposed to pay off the debt at the end of the season, when profits were distributed among the crew, but at least from the 1930s onwards, most divers could not bring home any money, and so had to pledge to work for the same merchant or captain in the following season. These divers usually worked as sailors outside the pearl season and were also tied closely to their other employers who had to give written permission to the pearl boat owners to use the service of their sailors.

(Damir-Geilsdorf and Pelican, 2019:157)

Al-Shehabi (2019) expands this argument by asserting that the kafala as a sponsorship system originated during the British colonial rule of the Gulf states, especially citing Bahrain and Kuwait in the period spanning from the 1920s to the 1970s. Under British rule, foreigners who came to work on these territories were perceived both as a problem to be regulated and a resource to be exploited. As a result, British officials governed these flows of migrant labourers by means of laws and procedures, such as the sponsorship system, which constituted an ingenious method of delegating legal responsibility from the state unto a private individual. As these sponsorship requirements were successfully implemented in the pearling industry, in the following years, they started to be applied in the oil sector as well (Al-Shehabi, 2019:4; Damir-Geilsdorf & Pelican, 2019:157). In fact, from the 1930s onwards, as oil companies could not extract workers from the relatively small populations of the Gulf countries, they started to bring temporary foreign workers during periods of booming growth and increased production. Initially, such system attracted Arab workers from neighbouring countries, but because of the oil boom and the political developments of the 1970s, employers started to prefer non-Arab workers. This preference was motivated by two reasons: not only non-Arab workers, mostly coming from South Asia, were cheaper, but they were also alien to the political and ideological workings of the Arab world, so there was no risk that they could spread

a pan-Arab ideology that could have undermined the tight control of the Gulf monarchies (Robinson, 2021).

Overall, as the Islamic kafala evolved into a labour-oriented system of sponsorship its characteristics dramatically changed, so much so that current Muslim jurists may define this system as unlawful according to Islamic principles[14]. Jureidini and Hassan (2020) assert that the similarities between these two systems mostly refer to the linguistic sphere, as the use of the term 'kafala' adds an aura of legitimacy to the employment of migrant labourers. Moreover, the type of relationship that ties the kafīl and the makfūl is another similarity, as the kafīl acts as guarantor (or sponsor) for the legal residency and the well behaviour of the foreigner, who has to abide by the rules of a contract and the laws of the country (Jureidini & Hassan 2020:94). Elisabeth Franz observes that:

If the current use of the kafala system for migrant labour did descend from these earlier forms, it diverged dramatically in the context of nation states and neoliberal market forces and transformed into a system whereby non-nationals are bound to nationals for the purposes of work or business.

(in Jureidini and Hassan, 2020:95)

In other words, the sponsorship as a system of employment (and one of labour migration) may have started as an offspring of the Islamic tradition and retain its basic structure that legally binds together a guarantor with her/his guarantee, but soon developed into a structure that employers could implement to gain and maximize their profits in an exploitative relationship. While recognizing that the kafala employs several types of workers, even highly skilled ones, particularly relevant for this research is the exploitative relation implemented in the case of migrant domestic workers. The sponsorship system in its current form as a mechanism of labour is prevalent in Gulf states and has made its entrance in other countries of the Middle East, especially Iraq, Jordan, Yemen, and finally Lebanon, which will be the focus of this chapter (Fernandez, 2021:4346).

4.2.1 The Lebanese historical context

The Lebanese domestic service in the 20th century was regulated by means of arrangements between poor members of local villages and wealthy families. According to these agreements, rural families

---

[14] Traditionally, kafala means to transfer the duties of the makfūl to the kafīl. Thus, if the makfūl has to pay money or to deliver a certain commodity, the kafīl stands in for the makfūl and becomes responsible for the delivery of the money, the commodity, or the person. This kafīl-makfūl relationship is not a business-based contract, rather a voluntary cooperation that should not grant any benefit to the kafīl. This principle has a significant impact on the Islamic legal discussion of contemporary forms of kafala, since many fatwas show clearly that any request or expectation of compensation is not Islamically permissible (Jureidini & Hassan, 2020:105).

from Mount Lebanon sent their daughters to work as housemaids in upscale and rich households; here, the girls would be educated and socialized into the elite, often elevating their status through marriage. Following the Lebanese independence from French colonial rule in 1943, neighbouring countries started sending their women to what was perceived as the Lebanese economic haven. Here, Palestinians from refugee camps coexisted with Egyptians, Kurdish, and other Arab women until the Lebanese civil war, extending from 1975 to 1990 (Kassamali, 2021:102). Indeed, during these years, the political tensions among the various religious factions within the Lebanese population, as well as the conflictual relations between the Syrians, Palestinians, and the local people became extremely intense; eventually, Lebanese families decided to stop employing Syrians and Palestinians, as well as Lebanese Shiites (Moukarbel, 2009:30). In this context, those Palestinians who were unable to flee were increasingly subjected to suspicion and distrust. Kassamali (2021) cites an account of an elderly Lebanese woman, who said: "During the civil war the Palestinians became so strong, we stopped asking them to come for housework because we were afraid of them" (Kassamali, 2021:102). These developments, combined with the decision of the Egyptian government to stop the emigration of its women to Lebanon because of the social stigma attached to the occupation and the mass emigration of 40 per cent of the resident population, contributed to the demand for foreign workers (Moukarbel, 2009:30). The replacement of domestic workers with foreigners that occurred in the sector of domestic service is explained not only by looking at internal factors, as those mentioned above, but also by factoring in external developments. In fact, the global economic crises of the 1970s induced several Asian countries, especially the Philippines and Sri Lanka, to boost the exportation of their female labour force, introducing policies tailored to propel this sector with the ultimate aim to reduce unemployment and increase national remittances (Ibid.). What contributed to this was the considerable advantage of these women working for lower wages and being perceived to be more submissive, thus adapt for in-house labour. Finally, their unfamiliarity with Arab politics was particularly convenient after years of hostilities: by bringing non-Arab women into the households, the sponsors could avoid any risk and/or tension. As a result, the employment of housemaids from Asia and Africa developed a new type of temporary migrant worker, replacing local and foreign Arab women in Lebanon (Ibid.:31).

4.2.2 The current sponsorship system in Lebanon

In its current form, the defining feature of the kafala consists in the delegation of responsibilities from the state to the kafīl, who, acting as an employer, guarantees both the employment of the migrant and

her/his residence permit in the country (Fernandez, 2021:4347). The responsibilities of the sponsor towards the migrant refer to the legal and economic spheres, and the repatriation of the migrant domestic worker at the end of the contract period (Pande, 2013:418).

A general look into the procedure reveals that the kafala has various steps that both the sponsor and the migrant need to undertake in order to successfully start the labour contract. Currently, to enter Lebanon for work, a MDW has to be officially sponsored by a Lebanese agency or individual employer. As a first step, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs accords a pre-work authorisation to the sponsor, which enables the movement of the migrant domestic worker from her country of origin to Lebanon. At this stage, the sponsor is required to deposit a refundable sum of $1,000 at the Banque de l'Habitat, which serves as a deposit for the payment of government taxes and of an airline ticket to fly the migrant back home at the end of the contract. Once the Ministry of Labour has accepted the file, the General Security Department grants the future housemaid a residency visa of the duration of three months. During this time, the worker's skills and capabilities are evaluated, while the sponsor eventually presents the required documentation to extend the working visa for two or three years and obtain a renewable one-year residency visa (Moukarbel, 2009:33). The full documentation comprises a) the passport of the migrant worker with the stamp of the port of entry; b) an insurance for foreigners issued via an insurance company; c) health certificate following a medical check-up taken in Lebanon to ensure the worker is in good health (including tests for AIDS, hepatitis, STD, tuberculosis, and pregnancy); d) the contract signed by the worker in front of a notary public (Fernandez, 2021:4347).

The data show that the totality of the countries of origin of migrant domestic workers belong to the Global South, with a prevalence of women coming from Ethiopia. Particularly, Lebanon's population is estimated at around six million people, while the number of foreign domestic workers is around 250.000 (with the vast majority of it being women), but it may be higher due to many of them coming illegally into the country (Amnesty, 2019:9). The following chart shows clearly the statistics made public by the Ministry of Labour under the request of Amnesty International, as of November 2018.

WOMEN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS HOLDING NEW OR RENEWED WORK PERMITS ISSUED TO THEM BY THE MINISTRY OF LABOUR AS OF NOVEMBER 2018	
NATIONALITY	NUMBER
ETHIOPIA	144,986
THE PHILIPPINES	17,882
BANGLADESH	10,734
SRI LANKA	4,982
GHANA	1,384
OTHER	6,461
TOTAL	186,429

(Amnesty, 2019:9)

The preponderance of women of colour is of paramount importance for understanding the various racialised, classists and gendered connotations associated with the kafīl-makfūl relationship in the contemporary form of the kafala. Specifically, we shall look at how the kafala produces and reinforces a system of racial and gendered hierarchies, premised on a white racial framework, whose consequences are the bio/necro political control and the expendability of the migrant domestic workers, together with the commodification of the racialised female body.

4.3 Colonial legacy: whiteness and citizenship

For an in-depth description and understanding of the mechanisms of the current system of the kafala, it is noteworthy to delve thoroughly into the colonial history of Lebanon, thus appreciating the legacies that continuously shape its modernity. The French colonial rule, known as French Mandate for Syria and Lebanon, lasted from 1920 to 1943 and was a decisive period as it distinctly defined Lebanon's political organisation. Particularly relevant for this research is the examination of the conjunction between citizenship and Whiteness that was produced during the colonial era. Resulting from the French domination over these territories (and populations) was, in fact, not only a political entity but also a strong process of self-racialisation as White. According to Ringrose and Stubberud (2019), the distinctive feature of the Lebanese population is its strong identification with the state, notwithstanding the numerous and diverse political and confessional groups. Therefore, the Lebanese citizenship is the most significant and important common element that binds these groups together. The idea of a complete identification with the state was sustained and unified by a process of creation of Whiteness as a specific social and political identity (Ringrose and Stubberud, 2019:4). Nasreen Kaj (2012) expands this argument by tracing the history of the processes of self-racialisation common to the three main Lebanese confessional groups: the Maronite, the Shiites, and the Sunnis. By directly identifying with the French colonialists in terms of culture, religion, and civilisation, the Maronites increasingly saw themselves as more Europeans than Arabs (Kaj, 2012:5; Hage, 2005:185). Seeking to prove their racially-determined difference from their Arab counterparts, numerous Christian intellectuals provided testament to the whiteness of this group, such as Farjallah Hayek, who asserted "the Lebanese are white, white to the bones, of an unalterable white, authentic, that leads to no ambiguity; a fanatical white in opposition to the Moroccan, the Algerian or the Senegalese". As he added: "We owe a lot to our brothers of the black and yellow race. We regret being superior to them. Nature might be unjust but what can we do about it" (In Hage, 2005:197), he solidified the hierarchy of races as the most resilient legacy of the colonial period. Meanwhile, the Whiteness of the Lebanese Shiites was constructed through the internalisation of the French colonial discourse during the slave trade of the late 19th century, during which they acted as middlemen on behalf of the French in West Africa. As they redeployed the colonial and racial discourse against Black Africans, they saw the chance to "remove themselves from the lowest rungs of Lebanese social hierarchy by placing another group in that position". In other words, with the advent of the French colonialists, the Lebanese Shiites were able to gain upward mobility by integrating Africa into Lebanese cultural hierarchies and conversely identifying themselves as racially different and superior from Black people (Kaj, 2012:5). Finally, the Sunnis' Whiteness was "a centric identity that was not racially seen and named and was just a human norm". Acting silently and relying on the evident Sunni's dominant position, it

constituted the most powerful benchmark for the measurement of all the other identities, thus positioning them as hierarchically inferior in terms of intelligence, morals, and values (Ibid.:6). One last element for a comprehensive framework of the colonialist racial discourses in Lebanon refers to the racialised image of Senegalese soldiers, who were being used by the French army to pacify Lebanese and Syrian revolt. As they were targeted with racialised images of blacks as animalistic and dirty savages, whose bestiality might violate the pure Lebanese women, they undoubtedly contributed to the (re)affirmation of the Whiteness of the Lebanese population (Ibid.8).

19. *"For the Sake of France"*
Earlier in 1943, *al-Dabbur* had printed another cartoon featuring a captive Marianne: She was embraced— or kidnapped—by a leering Senegalese soldier carrying a gun.
Source: *al-Dabbur* 21
(April 26, 1943) p. 19.

(Thompson, 2000, Illustration 19)

Overall, Whiteness as a social and political identity, functioning as a unifying structure, reified the Lebanese society as a whole as a W*hite nation*, thus becoming an intrinsic part of the self, the group and of national identification, from colonial to post-colonial eras (Ibid.:7). In contemporary times, this institutional Whiteness constitutes the essential structure that allows the exploitation, marginalisation, and overall control of racialised and gendered migrant bodies. This has been achieved not only by formal means, as we shall see in the next paragraphs, but also via a cultural discourse that reified the association between migrant workers coming from Africa and Asia and their commodification and subjectification. Exemplary of this is a popular Lebanese candy which used to be known as 'the slave's head' (Ras el-Abed in Arabic), until the company, Gandour, decided to change its name[15]. Another example, way more indicative in our examination, is a cleaning product

---

[15] Yet, controversially, a 2020 YouTube recipe video showing how to create these candies at home is still titled 'Ras el-abed recipe', showing that changing the name of a product after many years does not equate with a radical awakening, on part of the population, of the racist nature of such name.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KAhMJJagyhw

called 'Negro' and consisting of a steel wool for kitchen and house cleaning. Its subtle, intrinsic, purpose is to (re)affirm a close tie between the feminised nature of housework and the non-white person. In other words, it guarantees that those who are best suited to perform house chores are racialised women, thus reifying the marginalisation and commodification of migrant women as exclusively adapt for domestic services. A similar racialisation process is captured in the usage of the term *Srilankiyye,* Arabic for 'female Sri Lankan', to describe migrant domestic workers of *all* countries of origin (Kassamali, 2021:103). The term contributes to mould into a singular image the specificities of these women coming from often very culturally different countries.

Taken from Twitter https://twitter.com/alphonsovm/status/640210256686018560

4.3.1 Oppressive institutional frameworks

Perhaps the most evident colonial legacy in the institutional realm is the Lebanese Nationality Law of 1925. Issued during the French-mandate era, this nationality law accords citizenship by means of the principle of *ius sanguinis*, meaning that exclusively children born to a Lebanese father have the right to citizenship. Such an arrangement reproduces and intersects colonial discourses of racial hierarchy and patriarchal structure, as it denies citizenship rights to women of foreign nationality who are not married to Lebanese men. Likewise, a Lebanese woman does not hold any institutional power to recognize her foreign spouse and/or children as citizens of Lebanon. Consequently, children who are born and raised in Lebanon have no chances of being naturalised as Lebanese citizens if they are

not the offspring of a Lebanese man. Some exceptions to this rule are provided, as the Head of the State may grant Lebanese citizenship if the foreigner is able to prove she/he has been living in the Lebanese territories for five consecutive years, or if a foreigner offers to Lebanon highly significant services (Nationality Law 1925). Undoubtedly, these provisions particularly exclude migrant women who perform their jobs as domestic workers: the lack of legal means, except marrying a Lebanese man, and the tight relationship with the kafīl, to whom they are subjected for their residency, problematise their ability to acquire the status of citizens. Moreover, some accounts of MDWs stress the strict restrictions on marriage and reproduction: an employer threatened a MDW to replace her if she decided to get married and others highlighted being forced to choose illegal status in the event of marriage or pregnancy (Pande, 2014:42-3). As a result, the Lebanese (White) polity is able, by means of citizenship regulations and the system of the kafala, to police the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, therefore developing an institutionalisation of racist exclusionary dynamics that works to (re)affirm its Whiteness. Citizenship, as a political and legal tool, and Whiteness, as an identity, intertwine to create specific exclusionary frameworks that continuously protect the Whiteness of Lebanon through the othering of migrant domestic workers and Palestinian and Syrian refugees[16] who are non-White. This makes citizenship and the identification with the Lebanese state more important than another basis of identification (Ringrose and Stubberud, 2019:408-410).

Continuing in the realm of institutional patterns, the Foreigner Law reaffirms again the tight bond between nationality and citizenship, as it declares that any person who is not of Lebanese nationality is to be considered a foreign national, whose entry, transit and residency is subjected to the provisions of the law and the scrutiny of the General Service. In particular, for the employment of foreign nationals in Lebanon, Article 25 makes reference to the fact that the worker needs a permit by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs to work in Lebanon (Foreigner Law, 1962).

Another institutional boundary for migrant domestic workers is implemented by means of the Code of Labour of 1946, which lays the provisions related to the worker's sphere, including the contract, the working hours and holidays, the minimum wage, the conditions of dismissal, the organisation of work and the creation of trade unions. However, such arrangements clearly exclude domestic workers from the scope of application of this law, precisely under Article 7. As a result, migrant domestic workers have no guarantees and protections under Lebanese national labour law and are left on their own. In fact, the inability to form trade unions, whose organisation and management is disciplined under Title IV, does not enable them to group together MDWs who may experience violence and

---

[16] Racial discrimination is a major issue for refugees from African countries, such as Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia. Janmyr M. (2022, January 17) *Refugees and racial hierarchies in Lebanon* https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/refugees-and-racial-hierarchies-in-lebanon/

mistreatment in their households with the intention to protect and promote their professional interests against an abusive kafīl. Not only Article 7 already excludes and denies migrant workers the possibility to enjoy basic labour rights under the Lebanese institutional framework, but also Article 91 clearly states that the number one condition the person who wishes to join a trade union needs to have is to be of Lebanese nationality and enjoy unrestricted rights, thus adding another layer of exclusion (Code of Labour, 1946). These restrictions are in flagrant violation of Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Lebanon has ratified, which stipulated that "everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests." (Amnesty, 2019:13).

A final layer of systemic exclusion is added when analysing the standard unified contract[17], drafted in Arabic and English, that MDW are required to sign in front of a notary. This document has been introduced by the Ministry of Labour in 2009 in order to outline the rights and obligations of domestic workers and their employers within the system of the kafala. The language barrier is especially important, as people coming from a multitude of countries may have no knowledge of either Arabic or English, therefore signing it without reading or understanding its content. The provisions included within the contract form a sort of protection for the worker, as they require the employer to pay the full monthly salary to the employee at the end of each working month (Art. 6), to guarantee medical care and to obtain an insurance policy (Art. 9), restricting the working hours to a maximum of ten non-consecutive hours a day and including at least 8 continuous hours of rest (Art. 11). Moreover, it provides the worker with a period of weekly rest of not less than 24 hours and an annual leave comprising six days (Art. 12) and it allows the employee to receive phone calls and correspondence (Art. 14). The domestic worker is allowed to terminate the contract if the employer does not provide payment for a period of three consecutive months and/or if there has been a sexually abusive relationship, which however has to be established by means of medical reports by a forensic physician and investigation records (Art. 17). Although the law somehow establishes the terms of protection for migrant domestic workers, the lack of state control and enforcement creates a gap between the terms of the contract and the actual employment experience (Fernandez, 2021:4355-6). As it is, the system of the kafala, relying on other oppressive institutional frameworks, is built to inherently create the conditions for the racism that MDWs experience in their daily lives, exploit workers and leave them susceptible to both physical and psychological abuses.

---

[17] Annex I

4.3.2 Biopolitical control: abuses and violence towards MDW

The structure of the kafala is designed to hand over the burdens associated with the migrant worker, in terms of labour rights, protection and welfare, from the state to the individual citizen. By enabling the state to shrug off its responsibilities, it empowers the employer to step in and establish a tight surveillance of the foreign individual (Pande, 2013:417). Such biopolitical control of the racialised and gendered bodies of MDW assumes a peculiar importance when looking at the specific forms of authority and violence that result from an unbalanced relationship. In fact, by affirming and constantly reinforcing the strong affiliation that is configured both in legal and economic terms, the sponsor has the ability to dispose of the life of her worker.

Particularly, a first step in the development of this tight surveillance is made at the airport: upon her arrival, the MDW is forced to leave her passport with the Lebanese General Security, whose duty is to process the papers for her legal residency in the country. In this situation, most MDWs do not speak Arabic and have no knowledge regarding basic information, such as contacting the agency or the employer. Sometimes, they end up waiting for hours or even days at the airport's waiting room, exposed to psychological and sexual violence (Pande, 2013:424). The sponsor is encouraged to retain the worker's passport by the recruitment agency, which goes as far as to suggest numerous ways of strenghtening such paternal relationship, as it advises them against letting the worker interact with other MDWs, restricting her mobility, controlling her days off and monitoring her communication with other people (Ibid.:425). Some employers' accounts highlight the fact that this is *customary practice*: "When she arrived at the airport, General Security handed me her passport. I kept it with me. The recruitment agency told me not to give her passport because she might run away and cause me trouble" (Amnesty, 2019:18). The confiscation of the passport enables the employer to exert a tight control over the worker, who is perceived as less than a human being and more as a property: "They keep the passport to blackmail (us) … they treat you like property. You either are for me or I send you back home because I buy you" (Ibid.). Specific forms of commodification of the human bodies of the MDWs will be further analysed in the next section, as for now, this account helps us to understand the multifaceted and complex nature of the tie that binds together these individuals. Since the employer possesses her passport, she/he is able to deny the worker any possibility to either flee the country or change employers, thus concretely shaping and influencing her status of (il)legality (Pande, 2013:419). In fact, women often tolerate severe violations at the hands of their employers and harsh working conditions because of this dependence for getting their 'papers fixed' (Ibid.:429).

A specific and related pattern of exploitation is the restriction on the migrant's mobility, which often result in her physical confinement at home. The restriction and organisation of the private space of the home is instrumental to the mechanism of control, as specifically in the case of live-in domestic workers, the delimitation and restriction on the use of space is symbolic of the (racial) hierarchies. The stories of those who lived these unbearable conditions clearly describe the situation: left without a personal bedroom, these women are forced to sleep on the balcony, the kitchen or the children's bedroom. Estelle, a MDW from Cameroon, recalls her living space:

In the first house there was a little balcony that was shut, where they had put the washing machine. And there was a folding bed that you had to put down to sleep because there was no space. That means that [at the end of the day] if you [were] tired, even if you [felt] dizzy, you don't have the right to lie down. In the morning you have to fold it [she slaps her hands], so there is space to put the clothes in the machine [and] at night unfold [it again to] sleep. But in the second [house] I didn't even have a balcony to call my own. I was using the sofa [in] the living room.

(Pande, 2014:32)

That these experiences are guided by racism and racial stereotypes of black people coming from the Global South goes without any doubt when looking at the motives behind such actions. The sponsor's racism is subtly expressed by means of 'fears of contamination', which rely on the strong association between racialised bodies coming from 'black countries' and contagious diseases, building on the ideas that these countries are extremely poor, uncivilised, and thus un-sanitised. One MDW reported that her employer made her sleep in a toilet room for a whole week until she underwent the standard medical tests required to obtain the work permit, thus ensuring she was not carrying any contagious diseases (Amnesty, 2019:20). Similarly, Sebastian, a MDW from Cote d'Ivoire, speaks of long working hours with no rest. Even if she wanted to pause, she was not allowed to sit on the couch, as the employer told her she would pass on her bacteria (Amnesty, 2019:17). Moreover, the control of migrant's self-determination applies to her daily chores within the house, as for example, Kanshena, a 39 years-old woman from Sri Lanka, argue that her Madam dictated to her a list of humiliating and discriminatory house rules: "you keep your plate and cup away from the family's cutlery. When mister comes, you stay in the kitchen. And you never sit on any couch" (Amnesty, 2019, 21). These acts carry with them a strong racial connotation that permeates the employer's behaviours towards the MDW and that constantly expresses the inferiority of these housemaids, by purchasing mediocre brand of sanitary pads or feeding them only leftovers: "They feed me what is left in their plates. If I eat something else, she (employer) beats me" (Ibid.:19). One MDW reported being banned from using the bathroom or shower: "I used to shower when I saw she was drunk. Or when she went to sleep, I would open the door slowly and go outside put water, cold water, and shower from the balcony outside". Moreover, she cited being called racist slurs by her employer and the family members, such

as "caca" or "gorilla", once more recuperating a racist stereotypical imaginary (Alberti & Sousa, 2022). Similar slurs and terms are quite often mentioned in the women's accounts, with some remembering being called 'slave' "because I am African" (Rasmussen, 2020) or being humiliated and treated worser than dogs and cats ("they value dogs and cats more than us") (BBC News, 2021).

The gendered nature of the abuse to which MDWs are subjected is evident not only in the nature of the housework they are required to perform, but also in the kind of abuses and coercion they are subjected to. Specific gendered forms of harassment are unfortunately not uncommon among women migrant workers, who are subjected to physical sexual assault, rape, sexual exploitation, and sex trafficking. An ILO Study of 2016 found that out the 1.541 migrant domestic workers interviewed in Beirut and Mount Lebanon governorates, 29 had been sexually abused. However, the report acknowledged that the number of cases might have been much higher as abuses tend to be underreported (Amnesty, 2019:21). Similarly, a 2014 study analysing 730 complaints at the Caritas Lebanon Migrant Centre found that at least 70 women were subjected to sexual violence. The pandemic and the subsequent financial crisis have exacerbated the risks and severity of sexual and gender-based violence; in this regard, a 2020 report of Médecins Sans Frontière found that 42 per cent of women seeking mental health care at the facility were survivors of physical and/or sexual violence, several of whom were found naked on the street in psychological distress (ILO, 2021:6-7).

Testimonies of racial oppression faced by MDWs in the public sphere are described in terms of restrictions, such as being unable to freely walk on the streets or take a taxi because "the men laugh, point or even touch . . . Yanih (that is), but the women are no good either . . . I can control my feeling, but I don't have freedom, cannot walk on Lebanese street[s], you know, because of my colour". These restrictions come from racist ideas that associate non-White people with animalistic intentions and primitive behaviours: "They think we are like animals, [as if] we live in a tree or something. At the airport, already they don't touch you, because they don't know where you [came] from, you [might] have diseases" (Pande, 2014:34-5).

Poor working and living conditions, intimidation, violence, and all sorts of abuses strongly influence the emotional and psychological conditions of these women, who are reduced to bare life. The loss of home, rights over their bodies, and loss of political status create the conditions according to which workers enter into a pattern of self-expendability. Mary, a domestic worker from Ethiopia, was locked in her employer's home for one year. The physical and psychological burnout that was consequential to her working conditions and violent mistreatment led her to attempt suicide three times.

I stayed in this house for one year. I was crying every day. I tried to kill myself three times that year. Their house is my prison. I lost parts of my mind after this. I can't remember many things.

These suicidal patterns are not exceptional, as Human Rights Watch published a report in 2008, documenting that MDWs in Lebanon were dying at a rate of more than one per week from suicide or in botched escapes (Human Rights Watch, 2008). After all, they suffer extreme marginalisation, resulting in loss of privacy, dignity, and self-worth – "we found ourselves as nobody" – that makes them question their own lives, leading them to believe that the only solution to their problems is suicide (Vice News, 2020). For Human Rights Watch Lebanon Researcher Aya Majzoub, the harms experienced by these women are not the result of particularly violent individual employers, rather they are legitimised and supported by the inherently racist system of the kafala, which normalises the discourse on owning, confining, and exploiting these women (Sky news, 2020).

4.3.3 The commodification of racialised female migrants

The bio-political control that is exerted by employers is often justified in economic terms, as these women are perceived as a 'financial investment' that has to be regulated, controlled, and ultimately possessed. Denying breaks during the working day, refusing to pay, or curtailing the salary because of additional expenses or as a form of recovering the initial disbursement of money are all perceived as legitimate actions that the sponsor implements to render her/his financial investment secure and protected (Amnesty, 2019:16-7). This paternalistic discourse, in fact, relies on the belief that the migrant who comes to work in Lebanon is a commodity the sponsor purchases and can dispose of, as she/he desires. The rationale that sustains this system involves the economic profitability of recruiting, selling, and exploiting migrant domestic workers, which is also one of the main reasons for its durability. The inability to reform the kafala stems out of the strong opposition coming out of the numerous stakeholders that profit from it. In 2020, a reformed standard unified contract was proposed, comprising fundamental labour securities, including 48-hours work week, a weekly rest day, overtime pay, sick pay, annual leave, and the national minimum wage. However, its approval has suffered a major blow from the Syndicate of Owners of Recruitment Agencies Lebanon (SORAL), which firmly opposed any reform arguing that the new contract would negatively impact the industry of domestic workers recruitment in Lebanon (Human Rights Watch, 2020). In fact, the commercial interests within the migrant worker value chain are a powerful source of lucrative profits for many public and private stakeholders, especially the recruitment agencies (Dagher & ali., 2020:2). As an initial injection of funds into the kafala value chain, the recruitment fee paid by the employer to the Lebanese agency secures the payment of the recruiting team operating in the country of origin

(comprising their brokers and sub-agents) and all travel-related costs, but it is defined as a 'black box' because it consequentially contributes to the human trafficking network (Ibid.:6). In fact, because of the lack of transparency of the invoices issued by local recruitment agencies, the payments cannot be broken down or audited, thus resulting in the injection of financial investment in the foreign black market. More profits come from the extraction of additional money from the worker herself, who disburses payments to foreign agents and sub-agents in her home country, who supposedly facilitate the process of applying for a work permit, by organising her documents; furthermore, she bears the payment of fees for undertaking medical tests and compulsory training (Ibid.:7). Workers that are recruited through agencies either pay a fee to the agency of sign away the first 3 months of salary or in some cases both. In addition, the worker has to deposit $1,000 in a Lebanese bank as a safety net. As it is, the system ensures that the migrant is in debt even before departure, thus increasing the co-dependency with her employer and giving the employer another reason to think of her as a property (Pande, 2013:422). Overall, the stakeholders of the public and private sector have produced in 2019 $105.6 million in revenues from the system of the kafala, below broken down by specific actors.

(Dagher & ali., 2020:5)

The lack of a minimum national wage for these women allows the development of a "scale of salary" that follows the logics of nationality and colour, rather than individual skill or experience (Dagher et ali., 2020:4). As the salary ranges from less than 200 to more than $300, nationality, colour and a

discourse of racist stereotypes determine the 'price' of these women. Racist stereotypes function to absorb certain characteristics into women of particular skin colour, religion, and nationality, resulting in a *common knowledge* that often guides the employer's choice:

Filipinas are strong but heartless, Sri Lankans are stupid ('they are more clever, the Filipinas, then come the Ethiopians then these ones [Sri Lankans]… Those are completely out of it, taltamis (stupid) especially if they are not coming from the capital but the village. If they come from outside the capital they turn off the stove with their mouth, they blow on it'). Ethiopians are stubborn, they are good with babies, but they cannot be trusted because they are 'hot', etc.

(Moukarbel, 2009:148)

According to an ILO study (2016), women coming from the Philippines receive the highest salary, $300 or more per month: they are deemed to be better educated, more likely to speak English and have a reputation for being cleaner and more trustworthy (Moukarbel, 2009:32). Most of the women coming from Bangladesh, Indonesia and Ethiopia received the lowest salaries, with less than $200 per month. Significantly, the majority of workers in the category 'other nationality' mostly come from African countries and earn monthly salaries in the range of $200-$299 (ILO, 2016:28).

FIGURE 19. Salary paid by nationality of MDW

(ILO, 2016:28)

The commodification of these women functions to extract extensive profits from their labour, while enforcing situations of oppression and alienation, within a pattern that could be easily identified as modern day slavery. In this regard, an Ethiopian domestic worker has sued her former employer and recruitment agency with criminal charges of slavery, slave trading and forced labour. By bringing the MDW into a situation of extreme mistreatment, commodification, and lack of knowledge regarding the true conditions of her employment, the legal team has argued that she was reduced to a "situation of slavery" (Christou, 2022). The economic exploitation and commodification of migrant labour increasingly happens via social media, such as Facebook. It is significant, in this instance, the case of

a Nigerian woman who was put for sale for $1.000 on Facebook Marketplace. The advertisement read "Domestic worker of African nationality (Nigeria) for sale with renewed residency permit and complete legal documents. Age 30 years old very active and clean"[18] (Thomas-Johnson, 2020).

By also providing a photo of her passport, the wannabe-seller re-asserted his complete legal dominance over the body of this woman, which became nothing more than a property to sell in an open and public marketplace. Such act is a testament to the naturalisation of racial, gender and class hierarchies that rely on a complete de-humanisation of these bodies.

---

[18] My translation from the original.

4.4 Social Movements

Finally, the research presents the role of social movements in Lebanon in advocating for reforming, or abolishing altogether, the kafala. Building on a discursive framework of antiracism, these movements draw attention to its racial logic and to the inhumane treatment of migrant domestic workers. Firstly, I propose an examination of the June 2020 BLM protests and their impacts on the Lebanese social and political context, then I trace the contents and actions of the Anti-Racism Movement. Finally, I examine the peculiarities of *Egna Legna Besidet* and *This is Lebanon*, both of which have been founded by former migrant domestic workers.

4.4.1 BLM impact

In June 2020, the demonstrations that flooded the Lebanese capital mostly referred to the country's financial and sanitary crises, drawing on months of numerous protests in that regard. Activists, influenced by the BLM movement that had taken over the world in that period, adapted its main slogan (Black Lives Matter) to the Lebanese context, showing banners that read "Lebanese Lives Matter" to highlight the difficulties experienced in the last months by Lebanese people (Euronews, 2020). Moreover, the demonstration that was scheduled in front of the American embassy in Awkar in order to show support for the BLM movement and to condemn US interference in Lebanon's internal affairs was cancelled because of the sectarian clashes that agitated the country in the preceding days (Middle East Monitor, 2020). Therefore, the social and political context was already particularly challenging for the development of a discussion regarding the racism at work in Lebanon. The connection between the negative impacts of the institutionalisation of racism in the US society and the racial hierarchies that are alive and well in Lebanon under the kafala system was denounced by activists and social movements on social media. Particularly, Joey Ayoub, a journalist and researcher, argued on Twitter that those Lebanese that showed solidarity with the BLM abroad should have been more aware of the "widespread institutionalised racism and slavery in Lebanon that is called the Kafala system" (Ayoub, 2020). Similarly, Salma Houerbi, a researcher at the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre advocacy group, urged to talk about the Kafala as "an exploitative system used to monitor migrant workers' entry and participation in the labour market". Calling for and inciting interests for local forms of racism inside Lebanon, she argued that "these issues are very much systemic and engrained in racist rhetoric and perceptions toward other nationalities in our own countries" (Barkawi, 2020). Likewise, the non-profit organisation "This is Lebanon", emphasised the hypocrisy of marching in solidarity with the BLM cause while disregarding any interests for local

forms of racism inside Lebanon, with the kafala as the most exemplary. Seeking to remedy this lack of attention, they started to juxtapose the hashtags #blacklivesmatter and #endkafala on Twitter to highlight the plight of migrant domestic workers subjected to racism in their daily lives. Their aim was to draw attention to the same racialised logics that govern the Lebanese context and are applied in the system that overworks migrant domestic workers but mostly goes unnoticed and unquestioned, finally claiming "Lebanon is the largest slave prison on earth" (This is Lebanon, 2020a). Moreover, the organisation continued to use the visibility of the BLM movement as an echo-chamber to describe the specific forms of racial hierarchies in force in Lebanon. On June 2, they posted a comic that purposefully contextualised the catchphrase "I can't breathe", symbol of the BLM movement, to represent the experiences of violence, marginalisation, and oppression to which MDWs are subjected inside the households. With this tweet, the organisation drew attention to the story of Faustina[19], a migrant domestic worker, who supposedly committed suicide (This is Lebanon, 2020b).

This Is Lebanon @ThisIsLebanonLB · Jun 2, 2020
Do black lives matter in Lebanon? Two domestic workers die every week. All black and disposable. Faustina: "I'm very weak, I feel so weak. My body is swollen, I can barely stand for five minutes. I don't want to die."
thisislebanon.info/case-of-kafala…

---

[19] For the complete story see: https://thisislebanon.work/case-of-kafala-abuse/the-tragic-death-of-faustina-tay-chronicles-of-hussein-dia-and-family/

Finally, their discursive actions on Twitter were all geared towards spreading awareness the "Lebanese George Floyds", whose murder suffered invisibility and lack of legal consequences (This is Lebanon, 2020c).

When interviewing one of This is Lebanon activists, however, asking whether the momentum generated by the BLM had positively impacted their work, allowing them to reach and engage a wider audience, the answer has mostly been negative. In particular, she explained to me that even if they tried to capitalise on this momentum and to frame the racism of the kafala within the bigger picture, the amount of attention they have been able to raise through the BLM movement was minimum. This assessment takes into considerations two main factors: a) an already challenging social and political situation; b) the implementation of a movement that comes from mainly white Western countries within a Global South nation has many limitations. Indeed, she explained to me:

We can convince Europeans or Americans through the BLM that indeed the kafala is a form of institutionalised racism, but at the end of the day it [the BLM movement] does not really help in changing the policy, other than raising awareness. There is a gap there: the people that would be interested in the BLM movement are not necessarily the same that we have to deal with in our everyday work. So the momentum created it may have given us a slight increase in social media support, but it has not created sustainable change.

As the issue is ingrained within Lebanese legal, political and social system (which is already suffering several crises), it results that despite the attempts to capitalise on an external source of supposed change or awareness raising, the resonance greatly differs depending on the context. Overall, it seems

that not only sustainable change has to be intersectional and deal with multiple crises, but also it needs to come from inside the country, as she argued: "We have a long way to go for the concept of BLM to be implemented in Lebanon, as there is no space here for this concept right now with all the crises and the ongoing difficulties. Lebanese are way too concerned with themselves to consider the humanity of the other, which is very painful reality". Moreover, she added that racism within Lebanese society does not refer merely to the kafala system, but it is a widespread element even in cultural and social domains: "when walking with a black woman (one of our beneficiaries) on the street, everyone will just ask me if she's for sale or how much I bought her or where they can get her, no one will assume she's my friend".

4.4.2 Anti-racism as a practice in Lebanon

The Lebanese society is rife with civil society organisations that seek to address the inherent racism of the Kafala system, engaging in the discursive production of counter-story telling and in legal means to either reform or eradicate this system.

One of the most engaged groups is the Anti-Racist Movement (ARM), which was launched in 2010 as a grassroots collective by young Lebanese feminist activists in collaboration with migrant workers and migrant domestic workers. The premises for the creation of this group are to be found in a racist incident that happened at a private beach resort of Beirut, where the administration was caught on camera displaying racist acts of discrimination and segregation towards people of colour. As the movement grew, it registered as an NGO in 2012 and became an active developer of numerous projects, such as the Migrant Community Centres (MCCs). These are particularly noteworthy, as their rationale builds on a feminist sentiment that engages women as leaders of change, overall seeking to improve the quality of life and the capacity to self-advocate of migrant domestic workers. These centres contribute to the creation and the spreading of a counter-hegemony that, by addressing the loss of agency and self-determination that these women have suffered as a result of the Kafala, seeks to improve their life conditions. Specifically, the actions and discursive production of ARM operate to shift the positionality of the migrant community from victims, beneficiaries, and recipients of aid to leaders and agent of change of their own. In this sense, they become empowered to call for racial, social, economic and gender justice in Lebanon and to (re)claim their space within the Lebanese society at large. These centres function as a productive hub where migrant workers can meet, learn new skills, work together, access information, resources, and assistance. Free classes on languages, computer, and health awareness, together with educational, social, and capacity-building activities,

are offered. Simultaneously, ARM has responded to the needs of the migrant community during the health and economic crises in Lebanon by implementing a humanitarian response that included the distribution of hygiene and food supplies and interventions for housing security and informal sheltering (Ohanes, 2020). The main mission of ARM is to abolish the Kafala system by means of advocacy. In this sense, it collaborates with migrant community groups, local activists groups and international rights organisation to denounce and dismantle racist policies and practices, on institutional and social levels. Their 2019 annual report highlights that their advocacy efforts were focused on exposing the falsity of the populist narrative that framed refugees and migrant workers as the main reasons for the lack of economic justice and worker's rights in Lebanon. Their efforts ranged from publishing informative videos on social media, to organise public talks and write position papers on pressing issues, compiling reports on racist incidents and rights violations, publishing testimonies, and denouncing exploitative practices of governmental institutions and other organisations (ARM, 2019:8). Although their 2020 report is not available, their website presents their advocacy efforts for the year, such as the "End their Lockdown" campaign that aimed at empowering individuals to ask for the radical abolishment of the kafala system. Finally, on their Instagram page, they recently launched the Racism Monitor, whose aim is to document and counter all forms of racist violations and sentiments targeting migrants and refugees in Lebanon (ARM Lebanon, 2022a). In particular, by calling individuals and 'followers' to actively contribute to this Monitor by sending details of racist incidents and media reports, they aim at spreading awareness regarding racist incidents and "mysterious" deaths that generally go unnoticed in the media (ARM Lebanon, 2022b).

4.4.3 Experiences of MDW led organisations

A peculiar organisation is *Egna Legna Besidet*, a community-based, feminist collective of activists that deals with migrant domestic worker's issues both in Lebanon and Ethiopia. It prides itself with being the first organisation based in Beirut run by Ethiopian domestic workers, as it is visible in the name, which is Amharic that translates "from us migrants to us migrants". The founder, Banchi Yimer, was herself a former domestic worker: having worked in Lebanon for six months she wanted to give her fellow Ethiopian women a voice (Delacloche, 2022). In fact, the rationale that supported the development of this group was the excessive presence of Ethiopian community groups led by men (or the Ethiopian Embassy) that worked solely on service provision. Seeking to complement their work, they developed the first feminist group in the Ethiopian community in Lebanon that seeks to raise awareness and build solidarity (Rootslabglobal, 2017). In particular, it builds on the experiences

of its founders and members to provide a safe space that addresses the specific challenges faced by the Ethiopian community, such as the inability to talk about body parts because of a very strict religious upbringing that hinders many women's capacity to talk about sexual harassment (Delacloche, 2022). *Egna Legna Besidet* works to address these specificities by raising awareness, informing workers about their rights, teaching vital life skills, counselling victims of rape, and organising multiple workshops on fundamental topics such as financial management, legal rights, sexual harassment, sexual and reproductive health, and rights (Rootslabglobal, 2017). Furthermore, they provide a variety of skill-based trainings to prepare women for their return in Ethiopia, such as the soap teaching course that demonstrates how to prepare fourteen different types of organic soaps from different spices (Egna Legna, 2021b). Such approach is fundamental for uplifting and equipping women with skills and capacities to be able to make it on their own. Moreover, they facilitate discussions in Amharic, which allows women to share their experience more easily, thus building community solidarity and strenghtening their visibility. Overall, such an approach is useful for migrant domestic workers' self-determination and agency since they are able to speak up for themselves, rather than letting other people talking on their behalf (Rootslabglobal, 2017). Amharic has also been used to make a series of six educational videos to address the issues of concern to the organisation, i.e. MDWs rights, racism, financial management and social media bullying, visible on their Facebook page.

A substantial part of the organisation's work are the repatriation programs, which helped more than six hundred women return to Addis Ababa. In this instance, their work is to establish a contact with the MDW who wishes to return home, seeking to secure her repatriation with the help of a lawyer that goes through her files, clear the bogus complains or negotiate a settlement with the former employer. Moreover, they support these women by covering all legal and travel expenses and provide them with clothes and basic necessities to travel with (Egna Legna, 2021a).

Following the health and financial crises of the last years, they developed a GoFundMe page to provide food and medicine for kafala victims in Lebanon. They recognize that the pandemic has problematize the already dire situations of migrant domestic workers, whose vulnerability has increased: many of them have been left on the streets without money, food, or basic necessities. The organisation itself was seriously hit by the economic crisis and was forced to turn to other NGOs to fund its activities. Before the pandemic and the financial crises, they used to demonstrate and lobby to abolish kafala (Delacloche, 2022). It seems they are slowly returning to normality as they recently announced an 8 day campaign calling for migrant domestic worker's inclusion in the Lebanese Labour Law (Egna Legna, 2022).

A similar organisation, founded and led by former domestic workers Dipendra Uprety and Priya Subedi is *This is Lebanon*. Active from 2017, its work consists in advocating for change and amplifying the voices of those most affected by the kafala. A major effort of this organisation consists in showing the cases of kafala abuse in Lebanon on their social media platform and website. When contacted by an abused MDW, the organisation tries to privately settle the matter, generally asking the employer to pay the salary of the MDW or to release the worker and send her home. If they refuse, the organisation proceeds to publish the names and contact details, including telephone, email, and social media profiles, of the employer, thus putting her/his mistreatment to the public display and damaging her/his reputation. Moreover, their work exposes, through videos or audios, the types of abuses the worker had to suffer. Significantly, by providing the MDW with a large social platform they enable her to tell her story and regain her agency. The latest case displayed on Instagram regards Adel Houmani, a Lebanese lawyer, who was recorded while beating and humiliating her worker, calling her 'animal' and refusing to pay her salary. Rachel, the MDW, recalls being threatened with a gun to sign a note which discharged Houmani of any financial responsibility and then being dropped on the side of the road. *This is Lebanon* asked Houmani to pay Rachel's salary, however as he did not respond, the organisation published his violent behaviour on their social media (This is Lebanon 2022).

Finally, their advocacy work takes place mostly online, through campaigns, petitions, sending out emails to politicians and ministries. As This is Lebanon currently has no official presence in Lebanon and operates underground, because of the numerous legal cases against them, they are unable to organise lobby meetings or take the risk of searching for officials to represent them politically. Currently, they support other organisations, such as ARM, which is investing in advocacy efforts[20], and provide as much information as they can to media and journalists. Moreover, they are planning on expanding their research efforts. In this regard, a first step of research will be focused on analysing the data and the thousands of testimonies from MDWs in order to make a substantial and clear overview of what has been happening, which can be used to raise awareness and advocacy. The second step of the research will be focused on the role of sending countries and embassies, as they have an ambivalent function. Eventually, the aim is to publish research that sheds light on the different stakeholders and parties involved in the kafala in order to be able to make a stronger advocacy case and gain more support for the campaigns.

---

[20] On the phone interview with This is Lebanon, she explained to me that ARM is currently interested in widening the scope of their organisation to all migrant workers, including Syrians and Palestinians who face horrible racism despite being perceived white.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has traced the origin of the current form of the kafala system within the Islamic legal tradition that established a tight relationship between the kafīl and the makfūl and that consequentially evolved into an exclusively labour-oriented relation, as a result of the colonial presence in the MENA region. As the structure that binds together employer and worker grew stronger, the kafala became a fertile ground for the emigration of foreign workers and their exploitation. Having described the legacies of its colonial past, we found that Lebanon constitutes, in this regard, a crucial point of examination inside the Arab world of the racialised, gendered and classist logics that govern the current institutional system of the kafala. Drawing on a framework that recognises the intersectionality at work, the chapter has further examined the several ways in which the kafala creates a society of highly expendable non-white women. From cultural discourses that reify the image of non-white people as exclusively adapt for housework, to institutional frameworks that reinforce the division of the Lebanese population according to a colour line, migrant domestic workers increasingly find themselves completely excluded from Lebanon's (white) society. This exclusion is further administered by means of a bio-political control exerted by the employer on 'her/his' MDW. The surveillance implemented by the sponsor takes numerous forms, all hinged on the necessity to obsessively control the worker in her daily life, as she is commodified as a property to be secured, regulated, and managed as the employer wishes. Such an approach is often taken to its extremes, as many accounts of MDWs recall being forced inside the home, with no possibility of getting out if not by means of suicide. In fact, these women, after being reduced to bare life, often engage in patterns of self-expendability: throwing themselves from balconies or finding other harmful ways of ending such unbearable living conditions. The enforcement of the global colour line, in these cases, implements a mechanism of division within the home itself, here understood as the exclusionary and oppressive locus par excellence. Such assessment is a peculiar addition to the literature on the global colour line, as it individuates racial lines of exclusions within a post-colonial context. Finally, the chapter has presented an overview of the practices of social movements that seek to address the challenges posed by the kafala. For what concerns the impact of the BLM summer of protests in Lebanon, an interview with This is Lebanon, an organisation which has used the momentum caused by the death of George Floyd to frame its cause against the kafala, has revealed that such framing has not particularly helped its cause. Indeed, the use of an external source, the advocacy movement born in the US in this instance, has not advanced substantially their efforts to reveal the racist structures that govern the kafala. The reason for this is to be found in the presence of an already challenging socio-political context and in the limitations of using an external Western movement in a Global South country. Next, the section presented the efforts of three organisations: Anti-racism Lebanon,

Egna Legna Besidet and This is Lebanon. While all these organisations are consistently working to raise awareness regarding the shortcomings of the kafala and provide MDWs with concrete tools to regain their agency, only ARM Lebanon seems to engage more in advocacy work to pressure political groups to abolish the kafala. Indeed, Egna Legna Besidet and This is Lebanon, being founded by former migrant workers, focus mostly on concrete activities, such as providing courses, legal counselling or organising the repatriation programs. Finally, the efforts of the three organisations are consistently showed and described on their social media platforms (Instagram and Twitter mostly), constituting a powerful instrument for their purposes of counter-storytelling that seeks to educate a wider audience about the perils of the kafala system. I argue their impact is rather limited on the political front as the extremely complex institutional setting does not allow radical substantial actions to dispute the status quo. For what concerns the socio-cultural front, their extensive presence online yields positive results, as in the case of This is Lebanon the threat of posting the employer's contact details online has stopped in many cases abusive practices. Finally, their role as humanitarian agents, protecting women in safe houses, covering their legal expenses and providing them a team to go through their legal papers is extremely important and produces extensive benefits.

CONCLUSION

This thesis aimed at exploring the issue of race and racism within a Euro-Mediterranean frame to challenge the notion that structural racism is a North American exclusivity. Two main theoretical lines have been sketched and subsequently interpreted vis-à-vis empirical investigation: on the one hand, the research aimed at assessing the presence of structural racism behind the efforts and actions of two institutional actors, the European Union and Lebanon, in the context of migration policies; on the other hand, this investigation examined the role of social movements in developing an antiracist counter-hegemonic discourse to address the inherent racism of these policies and advocating for substantial change. The choice to compare a country of the Global North with one of the Global South was instrumental to widen the IR research agenda that deals with the operationalisation of racism through the global colour line. As this "belts the world", such was Du Bois's claim, the intention was to provide evidence that countries, regardless of their socio-economic and political status, have not shed away their colonial legacies despite claims of a post-colonial or post-racial order. Rather, as the BLM movement has demonstrated by going global in the summer of 2020, there is a strong necessity to extend the debate on race, racism and the discrimination, oppression and inequality they create. Based on the empirical analysis of numerous official documents, reports, policy, and social media, it can be concluded that current European and Lebanese migration policies show patterns of race and racism as important factors that inform and shape these institutional acts. Moreover, the findings on the social actors constitute an original contribution and a potential research agenda. The scope of this conclusion is to draw a comparative framework for the analysis of these findings.

Despite the clear differences in the process of creation of a sovereign national state and of a supranational organisation, the empirical evidence has demonstrated that Whiteness constitutes an analogous logic for their evolutions. Indeed, it has been established that the Lebanese state coupled White identity with citizenship, thus determining the notion of (non-)belonging to the nation in racial terms. That this happened during the French colonial occupation adds another layer of complexity to the matter: as we have seen, in colonial times the notions of scientific race were widely accepted, so much so that the influence they exerted was so substantial as to pressure Lebanese confessional groups to adopt the same racialised logics to justify their social position within the nation. The result: a hierarchy of races with White on top. As Whiteness became a socio-political identity that carried numerous benefits, rights, and privileges, it developed into the dominant framework for conducting the affairs of the White majority in a post-colonial state. Similarly, in the EU, the development of an area of freedom of movement for all persons qualifying as Europeans signalled the most striking racial approach to the question of European (non-)belonging. Indeed, the process fortified internal

racial, national, cultural and religious coherence through the trope of the 'foreign enemy', whose existence constituted a menace to the very foundations of European societies. From a racial perspective, the result has been to identify racial lines of exclusion, i.e. a global colour line that separated people of the Global North from those of different skin colour, religion, culture, etc. coming from the Global South.

To acknowledge that Whiteness became the fundamental episteme around which the identification to and with the respective polities cohered means simultaneously recognizing the emergence of a racial contract that assigned peculiar privileges to the majority of the White population. The legitimisation of Whiteness as a dominating authority capable of expressing and implementing the lines of inclusions and exclusions meant the administration of the non-White population by means of bio- and necro-political devices auxiliary to the protection of White supremacy. Here we find a conspicuous difference between the two case studies: the emergence and strenghtening of a securitising approach sustaining the European border regime and the lack thereof behind patterns of migrant indentured labour in Lebanon. In the first instance, a securitising discourse that constructed migrants coming from the Global South as inherently aggressive, violent and uncivilised, whose scope was the demise of European societies further legitimised the operationalisation of the global colour line by means of externalisation agreements and bordering practices, which responded to the logic of filtering unwanted migrants of colour or visibly containing their bodies. Overall, it is reasonable to assert that migrants are turned into invisible subjects, experiencing bare life in the suspension of their rights and possibilities of determination precisely because of these institutional mechanisms. The ideology that supported and sustained the development of a broad border regime responded to the thrust of controlling the mobility of those who are racialised as unworthy to enter into the European Union out of fear that their full participation as citizens may dilute the coherence of the White polity, ultimately causing its demise. In the second case, while the Lebanese state fails to implement a securitising framework that outlines the arrival of MDWs as a peril for society, the institutional setting of the Kafala still allows patterns of surveillance and control. Indeed, the employer assumes, on behalf of the state, the sovereign right to govern *her/his* MDW which is informed by a perceived sense of property over her body. The enforcement of the global colour line, in these cases, implements a mechanism of division within the home itself, which becomes an exclusionary and oppressive locus where the migrant experiences the complete loss of rights over her own life, subjected to degrading and humiliating treatment. It raises no doubt that the two logics of domination are informed by the similar necessity to ensure migrants remain entrapped in a condition of 'alienness' within the nation.

A further similarity that has emerged through empirical evidence is the lack of any clear reference to race as a biological category inside institutional and official documents of various state actors. Indeed, race has found subtler ways to infiltrate institutional discourses, thus disguising itself as to not raise any suspicion. The examples range from Frontex's risk assessments that frame migration in terms of clashes against 'good' and 'bad' for the protection of the 'victims' of criminal smuggling networks or individuate the causes of migratory push factors solely in the socio-economic conditions of Global South countries – so that the EU is merely reacting to these phenomena – to some politicians' rhetoric that put people of colour into black boxes labelled either in degrading or suffering terms; to cultural discourses that bind the image of non-White MDWs with housework to employers' justifications for the unequal and discriminatory treatment of their domestic workers because of their racial and national origins, which is associated with poor hygiene, inferior educational programmes and poor and miserable living conditions. These are all the European and Lebanese cultural and institutional discourses that retrieve colonial ideology and reify it in stereotypes of easy consumption.

Backed by substantial empirical documentation, patterns of commodification of migrants are found in both case studies. Such commodification is a testament to the complex layers of oppression that the intersection between race, capitalism and gender creates and purports the idea of the non – or sub-humanity of people of colour which enables their exploitation in slave-like labour or trade in emerging slave markets. Whilst in the European context commodification is implemented in Libyan detention centres (with the complicity of European institutional spheres), this pattern in Lebanon seems to assume a greater role in the management of migrants, also vis-à-vis their gender: women from the Global South are hired because of the specific function associated with their gender, i.e. housework. Moreover, the migrant is perceived as a financial investment, thus reinstating the connection between capital accumulation, race and gender.

The analysis of social movements' role has been divided into two lines of inquiry, researching a) the impact of Black Lives Matter movement in the summer of 2020 on social and institutional actors b) antiracist social movements impacts.

For what concerns the BLM Summer of 2020, the thesis has sought to define its key role in propelling an acknowledgment of the structural racism inside Euro-Mediterranean societies. Specifically, within the European context, this movement crafted an intersectional antiracist discourse that led to the cooperation between multiple social movements groups (feminist, LGBT+ rights, etc.) that ultimately produced a fertile ground for the exploration of the structural racism intrinsic to (former colonial) European societies. The contextualisation of slogans and powerful statements regarding systemic racism, racial profiling, police violence and colonial legacy produced an antiracist discursive

framework to debate the values that European societies should embody. Activists recognised and sought to dismantle the hegemonic meaning of statues of former colonialists, thus concretely paving the way for a counter-hegemonic order that refuses the influence of colonial and imperial legacy and instead supports the values associated with antiracism – justice and equality. It may be noted that the localisation of BLM claims in each specific national context may have diluted its impact to produce a compelling and comprehensive case of all the various cases of institutional racism, so that at the institutional level its outcomes have been feeble: the EU recognized the systematic oppression of people of colour in numerous spheres of society, yet it failed to address the systemic racism behind migration policies.

Comparatively speaking, the impact of BLM in Lebanon yielded short-lived results: it was successful in developing a space (on social media) where to discuss the Kafala as yet another example of systemic racism, however such discursive production was not substantiated with concrete achievements. As the interview with one of This is Lebanon activists highlighted, such 'failure' is due to the combination of a suffering socio-political and economic system and the 'alienness' of the movement to the Lebanese context. Indeed, the thesis acknowledges the limitations of localising a Western-born movement in a country of the Global South: it comes as no surprise that a nation that perceives itself as different from a Western one and has naturalised the commodification and subjectification of MDWs may experience some reluctance in accepting and engaging with a movement that addresses specifically Western structural racism. As the interview emphasised, the antiracist discourse that was briefly implemented has been more successful in convincing American and European societies that there is a problem of systemic racism in Lebanon as well. However, socio-political change necessitates a local frame in order to yield effective results: in this sense, the efforts of antiracist social movements need to be backed by a consistent and widespread antiracist discourse endorsed simultaneously by state actors and media production (thus creating a wider antiracist counter-hegemonic effort) or they run the risk of falling on deaf ears.

For what concerns the European Union, the emergence of social movements clearly building on antiracist discourse to advocate for safer and more humane treatment of migrants constitutes a powerful instrument of antiracism. Their discursive production on social media coupled with the political initiatives they create has the potential to pressure European institutional actors to remedy the shortcomings of the European border regime. Furthermore, the research has highlighted the emergence and actions of a politically-charged humanitarianism that aims at filling an institutional gap regarding maritime search and rescue operations. Their disregard for the impartiality and neutrality traditionally associated with the humanitarian logic is a politically motivated action that

challenges the very same institutions that create the conditions of expendability of migrants' lives. While the formal impacts of all these movements and initiatives are hard to assess, as they are still at their infancy, there is a wide area for future research that deals with if and how they have been able to create sustained political change.

ANNEX I

Work Contract for Migrant Domestic Workers*

The Republic of Lebanon
Ministry of Labour

WORK CONTRACT FOR MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS

Signed between:

The First Party: (Employer): Full Name: .... Nationality: ....

Born in: .... Having his/her place of residence at: ....

Family Status: .... Location of Register: ....

ID, Individual Registration Certificate: ....

Address: .... Telephone: ....

And

The Second Party: (Employee): Full Name: .... Nationality: ....

Passport no.: .... Date of issue: .... Date of expiration: ....

Born in: .... Family Status: ....

Having his/her place of residence at address: ....

Whereas the First Party wishes to employ a person who enjoys competence, experience and skill to work for him/her in the capacity of a domestic worker.

Whereas the Second Party enjoys the aforementioned characteristics.

Therefore, both Parties mutually agreed on the following:

1) The introduction to this Contract shall be an integral part thereof.

2) The First Party agreed that the Second Party works for him/her as a worker in his/her house. The Second Party consented to the aforesaid capacity in accordance with the terms and conditions stated under the present Contract.

3) The First Party shall undertake not to employ the Second Party in any other work or place that is different from the place of residence of the First Party.

4) The duration of this Contract shall be defined by one (1) year renewable.

5) This Contract shall enter into force as of the date on which it is concluded by both Parties before the Notary Public, including the probationary period of three months.

*As per Unified Contract Decree No. 19/1 dated 31/12/2009.

6) The First Party shall pledge to pay to the Second Party by the end of each working month his/her full monthly salary, which is agreed upon in the amount of ...., without unjustified delay. The salary shall be disbursed in cash directly to the Second Party, in pursuance of a written receipt to be signed by both Parties or in pursuance of a bank transfer with a written receipt to be signed by both Parties as well.

7) The Second Party shall pledge to perform his/her work in a serious and sincere manner and to comply with the instructions of the First Party, taking into consideration the work rules, customs and ethics and the privacy of the house.

8) The First Party shall pledge to meet the requirements and conditions of decent work and fulfil the Second Party's needs, including food, clothing and accommodations with which his/her dignity and right to privacy are respected.

9) The First Party shall pledge to guarantee medical care for the Second Party and to obtain an insurance policy from an insurance company recognised in Lebanon in accordance with the conditions prescribed by the Ministry of Labour.

10) The First Party shall pledge to obtain a work permit and authorisation of residence for the Second Party in due form at his/her own and full expense. He/she shall also pledge to renew them as long as the Second Party works for him/her.

11) The First Party shall fix the working hours for the Second Party at an average of ten (10) non-consecutive hours a day at most, including at least eight (8) continuous hours of rest at night.

12) The First Party shall pledge to grant the Second Party a period of weekly rest of not less than twenty four (24) continuous hours, the conditions of the use of which shall be defined by agreement between both Parties. The Second Party shall also be entitled to benefit from an annual leave of a period of (6) six days. Both Parties shall define its timing and the conditions of its use.

13) The First Party shall secure at his/her expense a ticket for the departure of the Second Party and his/her return to his/her country, except in the cases agreed upon in Article (16) of this contract.

14) The First Party shall undertake to allow the Second Party to receive telephone calls and correspondence intended to the latter as well as to permit the Second Party to communicate with his/her parents once per month on the expense of the First Party, and otherwise the Second Party shall bear the cost.

15) If the Second Party has a sickness other than that derived from his/her services and work-related injuries, she or he has the right to a sick leave based on a medical report for half a month with pay and half a month with half pay.

16) The First Party shall be entitled to terminate the present Contract in the following cases:

   A. In case the Second Party commits a deliberate mistake, neglect, assault or threat, or causes any damage to the interests of the First Party or a member of his/her family.

   B. In case the Second Party has committed an act that is punishable by the Lebanese laws in force in accordance with a court judgement.

   C. In these cases, the Second Party shall be obliged to leave Lebanon and to pay the price of the return ticket home from her/his own money.

17) The Second Party shall be entitled to terminate the Contract with the First Party taking full responsibility in the following cases:

   A. In case the First Party does not honour the payment of the salary of the Second Party for a period of (3) three consecutive months.

International Labour Organisation, 2016, Intertwined: A study of employers of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abolish Frontex (@abolishfrontex). Instagram

- (2021, June 12) "A compilation of different actions across 8 different countries, calling to #AbolishFrontex!" (Video) https://www.instagram.com/p/CQAw6JwnvJM/
- (2022, April 12) "How to take actions against Frontex?" (Photo) https://www.instagram.com/p/CcQfztUsa5Y/

Acharya A. (2022). Race and racism in the founding of the modern world order. *International affairs,* 98(1), 23-43. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab198

Achiume, E. T. (2017). Reimagining International Law for Global Migration: Migration as Decolonization? *AJIL Unbound*, *111*, 142–146. https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2017.48

Agamben G. (1998). *Homo sacer: sovereign power and bare life.* Stanford University Press.

Agier M. (2010). Humanity as an Identity and Its Political Effects (A Note on Camps and Humanitarian Government). *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development*, *1*(1), 29–45. https://doi.org/10.1353/hum.2010.0005

Alarmphone, (2016, June 15) *WatchTheMed Alarm phone denounces illegal push-backs operation in Frontex presence* https://alarmphone.org/en/2016/06/15/watchthemed-alarm-phone-denounces-illegal-push-back-operation-with-frontex-present/

Alvarez Tinajero S. P. (2014). Chapter 2. Labour migration management: Neoliberal calculations, human implementation. In *Migration Management? Accounts of agricultural and domestic migrant workers in Ragusa (Sicilly).* Geneve: Graduate Institute Publications. Doi: 10.4000/books.iheid.1729

Amnesty International:

- (2017). *Between life and death: refugees and migrants trapped in Libya's cycle of abuse.*
- (2019). *Their house is my prison: exploitation of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon.*

Andersen M. L., & Hill Collins P. (2015). *Race, Class & Gender: An Anthology. 9th edition,* Cengage Learning, Boston.

Anderson, B. (2006). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism.* Verso.

Andersson, R. (2016). Europe's failed 'fight' against irregular migration: Ethnographic notes on a counterproductive industry. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *42*(7), 1055–1075. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2016.1139446

Anievas, A., Manchanda, N., & Shilliam, R. (2015). *Race and Racism in International Relations*. Routledge.

Anti-Racism Movement—Lebanon. https://armlebanon.org/

Anti-racism Movement (2019). *Annual report.*

Anti-Racism Movement (@armlebanon) Instagram:
- a(2022, April 4) "Issue 1 will include Racist Highlights form the past year and a half. Contribute to the Racism Monitor by reporting racist incidents and reports you come across to us" (Photo). https://www.instagram.com/p/Cb7sSHvs9IR/
- b(2022, April 5) "Since April 2020, we have documented the unfortunate deaths of 18 #migrant women in #Lebanon. Most of these deaths were barely covered in the media and most of the women remained anonymous to this day." (Photo) https://www.instagram.com/p/Cb9zhLfMj7i/

Bakan, A. B., & Dua, E. (2014). *Theorizing anti-racism: Linkages in Marxism and critical race theories*. University of Toronto Press.

Balibar, É., & Wallerstein, I. M. (1991). *Race, nation, class: Ambiguous identities*. Verso.

BBC News:
- (2015, 30 July) *David Cameron: Swarm of migrants crossing Mediterranean.* https://www.bbc.com/news/av/uk-politics-33714282
- (2021, February 28) *Maid in Lebanon: «My employer treats me like a slave».* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrWGm0q01CA
- (2010, August 31) *Gaddafi wants EU cash to stop African migrants.* https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11139345

Bialasiewicz, L. (2012). Off-shoring and Out-sourcing the Borders of EUrope: Libya and EU Border Work in the Mediterranean. *Geopolitics*, *17*(4), 843–866. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2012.660579

Bigo, D. (2002). Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, *27*, 63–92. https://doi.org/10.1177/03043754020270S105

Bonds A. & Inwood J. (2016). Beyond White privilege: geographies of White supremacy and settler colonialism. *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 40(6) 715-733, Sage. DOI: 10.1177/0309132515613166

Boswell, C. (2003). The 'external dimension' of EU immigration and asylum policy. *International Affairs*, *79*(3), 619–638. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00326

Buzan B. (2014). The 'Standard of Civilisation' as an English School Concept. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*. Vol. 42(3), 576-594, Sage. DOI: 10.1177/0305829814528265

Camfield, D. (2016). Elements of a Historical-Materialist Theory of Racism. *Historical Materialism,* Vol. 24, No. 1, 31–70. https://doi.org/10.1163/1569206X-12341453

Carmichael, S., & Hamilton, C. V. (1992). *Black power: The politics of liberation in America*, Vintage Books

Carroll, K. W., & Ratner R. S. (2010). Social Movement and Counter-Hegemony: lessons from the field. *New proposals: journal of Marxism and interdisciplinary inquiry*, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 7-22

Cashmore, E. (2002). *Dictionary of Race and Ethnic Relations*, 4th edition, Routledge

Ceyhan, A., & Tsoukala, A. (2002). The Securitization of Migration in Western Societies: Ambivalent Discourses and Policies. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, *27*, 21–39. https://doi.org/10.1177/03043754020270S103

Chowdhry G. & Nair S. (2002). *Power, Postcolonialism, and International Relations: reading race, gender, and class*. Routledge

Christou W. (2022, February 10). *Suing Kafala: Lebanon's modern-slavery system goes on trial*. https://english.alaraby.co.uk/features/suing-kafala-lebanons-modern-slavery-system-goes-trial

Collier D. (2011). Understanding Process Tracing. *Political Science and Politics* 44, No. 4:823-30

Collyer, M. (2016). Geopolitics as a migration governance strategy: European Union bilateral relations with Southern Mediterranean countries. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *42*(4), 606–624. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2015.1106111

CNN (2017) *Migrants being sold as slaves.* https://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2017/11/13/libya-migrant-slave-auction-lon-orig-md-ejk.cnn

Council for European Studies (CES) (2020, June 15) *Do Black lives matter in Europe?* https://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/do-black-lives-matter-in-europe/Costa, D., & Martin, P. (2018) Temporary labour migration programs. *Report Economic Policy Institute*

Council on Foreign Relations (2021, March 23) *What Is the Kafala System?* https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-kafala-system

Dados, N. & Connell, R. (2021). The Global South. *Contexts*, 11(1), 12-13. https://doi.org/10.1177/1536504212436479

Dagher J. & al. (2020). *Cleaning up: the shady industries that exploit Lebanon's kafala workers.* Triangle. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

Dainotto R.:

- (2011). Does Europe Have a South? An Essay on Borders. *The Global South*, 5(1), 37. https://doi.org/10.2979/globalsouth.5.1.37

- (2017). South by Chance: Southern Questions on the Global South. *The Global South,* 11(2), 39. https://doi.org/10.2979/globalsouth.11.2.03

Damir-Geilsdorf, S., & Pelican, M. (2019). Between regular and irregular employment: Subverting the *kafala* system in the GCC countries. *Migration and Development*, *8*(2), 155–175. https://doi.org/10.1080/21632324.2018.1479215

Davies, T., & Isakjee, A. (2019). Ruins of Empire: Refugees, race, and the postcolonial geographies of European migrant camps. *Geoforum*, *102*, 214–217. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2018.09.031

De Cesari, C. (2012). The paradoxes of colonial reparation: Foreclosing memory and the 2008 Italy–Libya Friendship Treaty. *Memory Studies*, *5*(3), 316–326. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698012443888

De Genova, N. (2018). The "migrant crisis" as racial crisis: Do *Black Lives Matter* in Europe? *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *41*(10), 1765–1782. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1361543

Declaration On European Identity, 14 December 1973.

Delacloche L. (2022, January 7), *Domestic Workers in Lebanon Are Making a Dramatic Escape.* https://reasonstobecheerful.world/ethiopian-domestic-workers-lebanon-escape/

Delgado R., & Stefancic J. (2001). *Critical Race Theory: An Introduction,* New York University Press

Du Bois W. E. B.:
- (1900) *To the Nations of the World.* https://www.blackpast.org/african-american-history/1900-w-e-b-du-bois-nations-world/
- (1999) *Darkwater: Voices from within the Veil*. Dover Publications. EPUB.
- (2007) *The Souls of Black Folk*. Oxford University Press
- Chandler D. N. edited by (2015) W.E.B. Du Bois. *The Problems of the colour line at the turn of the twentieth century: the essential early essays*. Fordham University Press. EPUB.

Egna Legna (@egnalegna) Instagram:
- a(2021, August 9) "On Friday, Egna Legna Besidet saw off another twenty of our sisters who boarded a flight from Beirut to Addis Ababa Ethiopia." (Photo) https://www.instagram.com/p/CSXe1z1JtDm/
- b(2021, December 6) "To prepare our migrant domestic worker sisters for the challenges that await them upon returning home from Lebanon, Egna Legna Besidet has been offering a variety of different skills and courses training programs." (Photo) https://www.instagram.com/p/CXJOAplLsRJ/
- (2022, May 2) "Calling for our inclusion in Lebanon's labour law – 8 day campaign". (Photo)

https://www.instagram.com/p/CdA42aGud9R/

Egna Legna Besidet. https://egnalegna.org/

El-Tayeb F. (2006). European Others: Queering Ethnicity in Post-national Europe. University of Minnesota Press

Esperti, M. (2020). Rescuing Migrants in the Central Mediterranean: The Emergence of a New Civil Humanitarianism at the Maritime Border. *American Behavioral Scientist*, *64*(4), 436–455. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764219882976

European Agenda on Migration, 2015

European Centre for constitutional and human rights, Fidh & Lawyers for Justice in Libya (2021). *No way out: migrants and refugees trapped in Libya face crimes against humanity*

European Council on Refugees and Exiles (2022, February 11) *Frontex: EU Border Control in Africa Set to Expand, Commission Floats Political Oversight, Switzerland to Vote on Frontex Funding, Belgium Plans Scrutiny Hearing.* https://ecre.org/frontex-eu-border-control-in-africa-set-to-expand-commission-floats-political-oversight-switzerland-to-vote-on-frontex-funding-belgium-plans-scrutiny-hearing/

European Council on Refugees and Exiles (2018, November 16) *Salvini Decree Approved by Italian Senate, Amid Citizen's Protests and Institutional Criticism.* https://ecre.org/salvini-decree-approved-by-italian-senate-amid-citizens-protests-and-institutional-criticism/

EU emergency trust fund for Africa (2017, July 7) https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/north-africa/libya/support-integrated-border-and-migration-management-libya-first-phase_en

Euronews (2021, April 27) *EU plans to boost power of border agency Frontex raise eyebrows.* https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2021/04/27/eu-plans-to-boost-power-of-border-agency-frontex-raise-eyebrows

European Union Parliament (2020, June 19) *The Anti-racism protests following the death of George Floyd.* https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2020-0173_EN.html

Extraordinary Council meeting – Justice, Home Affairs and Civil Protection, (2001, September 20).

Fernandez, B. (2021). Racialised institutional humiliation through the *Kafala*. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *47*(19), 4344–4361. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2021.1876555

Fernandez, B., & De Regt, M. (2014). *Migrant domestic workers in the Middle East: The home and the world.* Palgrave Macmillan.

Ferrer-Gallardo, .X., & van Houtum, H. (2014). The Deadly EU Border Control. *ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies*, *13*(2), 295-304. Retrieved from https://acme-journal.org/index.php/acme/article/view/1008

Fontanari, E. (2018). *Lives in Transit: An Ethnographic Study of Refugees' Subjectivity across European Borders* (1ª ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351234061

Foucault M. (1978). *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction.* Random House

FragDenStaat (2021) *WhatApp-Nachrichten an die libysche Künstenwache.* https://fragdenstaat.de/anfrage/whatsapp-nachrichten-an-die-libysche-kustenwache/#nachricht-635362

Frakes N. (2020 June 5) *George Floyd vigil shines a light on racism in Lebanon.* https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2020/06/05/George-Floyd-vigil-shines-a-light-on-racism-in-LebanonFrelick, B., Kysel, I. M., & Podkul, J. (2016). The Impact of Externalization of Migration Controls on the Rights of Asylum Seekers and Other Migrants. *Journal on Migration and Human Security*, 31.

Frontex Code of Conduct for all Persons Participating in Frontex Activities

Frontex News (2021, October 15) *Migratory situation at EE's borders in September: increase on the Central Mediterranean and Western Balkan routes.* https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/migratory-situation-at-eu-s-borders-in-september-increase-on-the-central-mediterranean-and-western-balkan-routes-RZRnEH

Frontex Risk Analysis For 2021

Frontexit. http://www.frontexit.org/en/

Garner S. (2007). The European Union and the Racialization of Immigration, 1985-2006. *Race/Ethnicity: Multidisciplinary Global Contexts*, Vol. 1(1), pp. 61-87

George A. L. & Bennett A. (2004). *The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison* – Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, MIT Press

Gilroy P. (Host) (2020, October 13) *In conversation with Olivia U. Rutazibwa* | Sarah Parker Remond Centre—UCL – University College London. [podcast episode] https://www.ucl.ac.uk/racism-racialisation/transcript-conversation-olivia-u-rutazibwa

Giuffrida A. (2018, February 5) *Berlusconi pledges to deport 600.000 illegal immigrants from Italy.* https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/05/berlusconi-pledges-to-deport-600000-illegal-immigrants-italy-election

Gobineau A. (1967). *The inequality of human races*.

GoFundMe (2020, August 15) *Food and medicine for kafala victims in Lebanon*. https://www.gofundme.com/f/seh4y7-food-and-medicine-for-kafala-victims-in-lebanon

Grovogui S. (2011). A Revolution Nonetheless: The Global South in International Relations. *The Global South*, 5(1), 175. https://doi.org/10.2979/globalsouth.5.1.175

Gutiérrez Rodríguez, E. (2018). The Coloniality of Migration and the "Refugee Crisis": On the

Asylum-Migration Nexus, the Transatlantic White European Settler Colonialism-Migration and Racial Capitalism. *Refuge*, *34*(1). https://doi.org/10.7202/1050851ar

Hage, G. (2005). White Self-racialization as Identity Fetishism: Capitalism and the Experience of Colonial Whiteness. *Racialisation: Studies in Theory and Practice*, (1), pp. 185-206. Oxford University Press

Hill Collins, P. (2004). *Black sexual politics: African Americans, gender, and the new racism*. Routledge.

Hobson J. M. (2007). Is critical theory always for the White West and Western imperialism? Beyond Westphilian towards a post-racist critical IR. *Review of International Studies*, April 2007, Vol. 33 pp. 91-116

Hobson J. M. (2012). Re-embedding the global colour line within post-1945 international theory. In Anievas A. et ali. *Race and Racism in International Relations: confronting the global colour line.* Routledge

Hochschild R. A. (2014). *Global Care Chains and Emotional Surplus Value* in Engster, D. & Metz T. (2014). *Justice, politics, and the family*. Taylor & Francis

Howden et al. (2019, August 4) *Once migrants on Mediterranean were saved by naval patrols. Now they have to watch as drones fly over.* https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/04/drones-replace-patrol-ships-mediterranean-fears-more-migrant-deaths-eu

Human Rights Watch:
- (2020, October 30) *Lebanon: Blow to Migrant Domestic Worker Rights.* https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/30/lebanon-blow-migrant-domestic-worker-rights
- (2008, August 26) *Lebanon: Migrant Domestic Workers Dying Every Week..* https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/08/26/lebanon-migrant-domestic-workers-dying-every-week

Huysmans, J. (2006). *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203008690

Infomigrants (2020, July 27) *Salvini blasts governments as migrant 'smugglers accomplice'.* https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/26248/salvini-blasts-government-as-migrant-smugglers-accomplice

International Labour Organisation:
- (2016). *Intertwined: a study of employers of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon*
- Mehzer Z. & al. (2021). *Women migrant domestic workers in Lebanon: a gender perspective.*

Irregular border crossings by nationality in 2021 – Statistics on migration to Europe

https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_en#asylum

Italy-Libya Memorandum of understanding, 2017

Joey Ayoub (@joeyayoub) (2020, June 2) "To the Lebanese who are suddenly passionate about black lives I don't have that many words for you that won't be full of anger so all I'll say is that you should start looking at the widespread institutionalised racism and slavery in Lebanon that is called the kafala system." (tweet) https://twitter.com/joeyayoub/status/1267842072435986432

Jureidini, R., & Hassan, S. F. (2020). *The Islamic Principle of Kafala as Applied to Migrant Workers: Traditional Continuity and Reform*. In: *Migration and Islamic Ethics*, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004417342_007

King E. (2020, June 10) *Europe seeks own response to Black Lives Matter*. https://www.politico.eu/article/us-style-civil-rights-protests-come-to-europe-george-floyd-black-lives-matter/

Kirchgaessener et al., (2018, June 11) *Italian minister declares victory as Spain accepts rescue boat*. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/11/un-calls-for-migrant-ship-to-be-allowed-to-dock-in-italian-port Kerr P.H. (1916). *Political relations between advanced and backward peoples*. Macmillan and Co., London.

Kloß S. T. (2017). The Global South as Subversive Practice: Challenges and Potentials of a Heuristic Concept. *The Global South*, 11(2), 1. https://doi.org/10.2979/globalsouth.11.2.01

Krishna S. (2006). *Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations*. In Jones G. B. *Decolonizing International Relations* (2006). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers

La Repubblica (2020, July 13) *"Human Black Migrant Lives Matter": la scritta antirazzista in piazza Gramsci a Milano*. https://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2020/07/13/foto/black_lives_matter_milano_scritta_piazza_gramsci_sardine-261803888/1/

Laube, L. (2019). The relational dimension of externalizing border control: Selective visa policies in migration and border diplomacy. *Comparative Migration Studies*, *7*(1), 29. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-019-0130-x

Lenard, P. T., & Straehle, C. (2010). Temporary labour migration: Exploitation, tool of development, or both? *Policy and Society*, *29*(4), 283–294. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2010.09.006

Lentin, A. (2004). *Racism and anti-racism in Europe*. Pluto Press.

Lentin, A. (2005). Replacing 'race', historicizing 'culture' in multiculturalism. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 39(4), 379–396. https://doi.org/10.1080/00313220500347832

Léonard, S. (2010). EU border security and migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and securitisation through practices. *European Security*, *19*(2), 231–254. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2010.526937

Lighthouse reports, (2021, April 29) *Frontex in the Central Mediterranean.* https://www.lighthousereports.nl/investigation/frontex-in-the-central-mediterranean/

Lloyd, C. (2002). *Anti-racism, social movements, and civil society*, in Editors F. Anthias & C. Lloyd, *Rethinking Anti-racisms: from theory to practice,* Routledge

Long D., & Schmidt, B. C. (2005). *Imperialism and internationalism in the discipline of international relations*. State University of New York Press.

Marchetti S. & Di Bartolomeo (2021). in Carmel, E., Lenner, K., & Paul, R. (2021). *Handbook on the Governance and Politics of Migration*. Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788117234

Mbembe, A. (2003). Necropolitics. *Public Culture 15(1): 11-40*. Duke University Press.

McCabe D. (2019). Kant was a racist. Now what? *American Philosophical Association*. Vol. 18, No. 2, Spring 2019

McMahon, S., & Sigona, N. (2018). Navigating the Central Mediterranean in a Time of 'Crisis': Disentangling Migration Governance and Migrant Journeys. *Sociology*, *52*(3), 497–514. https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038518762082

Medecins sans frontiers, (2022, February 2) *Italy-Libya agreement: five years of EU-sponsored abuse in Libya at the central Mediterranean.* https://www.msf.org/italy-libya-agreement-five-years-eu-sponsored-abuse-libya-and-central-mediterranean

Messina, A. M. (2007). *The Logics and Politics of Post-WWII Migration to Western Europe*. Cambridge University Press

Middle East Monitor (2020, June 8) *Lebanon cancels BLM protest due to security concerns.* https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200608-lebanon-cancels-blm-protest-due-to-security-concerns/

Mignolo W. & Levander C. (2011). The Global South and World Dis/Order. *The Global South*, 5(1), pp. 1-11

Miles, R. (1987). Recent Marxist Theories of Nationalism and the Issue of Racism. *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 24-43. https://doi.org/10.2307/590577

Mills C. W. (1999). *The Racial Contract*. Cornell University Press

Milman, N., & Ajayi, F. (2021). *Black Lives Matter in Europe: Transnational Diffusion, Local Translation and Resonance of Anti-Racist Protest in Germany, Italy, Denmark, and Poland*. DeZIM Research Notes

Montenegro, M., Pujol, J., & Posocco, S. (2017). Bordering, exclusions and necropolitics. *Qualitative Research Journal*, *17*(3), 142–154. https://doi.org/10.1108/QRJ-08-2017-089

Moreno-Lax, V. (2012). The Politics of International Migration Management. Edited by Martin Geiger and Antoine Pecoud. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, *25*(1), 166–167. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fer060

Müller, C. (2021). Anti-Racism in Europe: An Intersectional Approach to the Discourse on Empowerment through the EU Anti-Racism Action Plan 2020–2025. *Social Sciences*, *10*(4), 137. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci10040137

Nisancioglu, K. (2020). Racial sovereignty. *European Journal of International Relations*, *26*, 39–63. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066119882991

Official Journal of the European Union, *Treaty on European Union*, 1999

Ohanes, G. (2020, April 30) *Lebanon's Anti-Racism Movement a lifeline for vulnerable migrant workers*. https://english.alaraby.co.uk/features/lebanons-anti-racism-movement-lifeline-vulnerable-migrant-workers

Pallister-Wilkins P.
- (2017). Humanitarian Rescue Sovereign Capture and the Policing of Possible Responses to. *Global Policy*, Vol. 8(1), February 2017. Doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12401
- (2015). The Humanitarian Politics of European Border Policing: Frontex and Border Police in Evros. *International Political Sociology*, *9*(1), 53–69. https://doi.org/10.1111/ips.12076

Pande, A. (2013). "The Paper that you Have in Your Hand is My Freedom": Migrant Domestic Work and the Sponsorship (Kafala) System in Lebanon. *International Migration Review*, *47*(2), 414–441. https://doi.org/10.1111/imre.12025

Pozzi L. (2020) *Black Lives Matter and the Removal of Indro Montanelli's Statue.* https://keywordsechoes.com/laura-pozzi-black-lives-matter-and-the-removal-of-indro-montanellis-statue/

Project on Middle East Political Science (2021, September 16) *The Kafala System as Racialized Servitude*. https://pomeps.org/the-kafala-system-as-racialized-servitude

Rajaram, P. K., & Grundy-Warr, C. (2004). The Irregular Migrant as Homo Sacer: Migration and Detention in Australia, Malaysia, and Thailand. *International Migration*, *42*(1), 33–64. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-7985.2004.00273.x

Rasmussen S. E. (2020, September 2) *'They Called Me 'Slave': Beirut Blast Exposes Migrant Workers' Plight in Mideast*. https://www.wsj.com/articles/they-called-me-slave-beirut-blast-exposes-migrant-workers-plight-in-mideast-11599048000

Ray, R., & Fuentes G. (2020). *Formulating a theory in anti-racism activism*, in Editors J. Solomos,

Routledge International Handbook of Contemporary Racisms, Routledge

Reda & Proudfoot (2020). Against Abandonment Activist-Humanitarian Responses to LGBT Refugees in Athens and Beirut. *Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 0, No. 0*. Oxford University press. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fez114

Renzi M. (2015, 22 April) *Matteo Renzi: Helping the Migrants is Everyone's Duty.* https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/23/opinion/matteo-renzi-helping-the-migrants-is-everyones-duty.html

Reuters. (2020, June 8) *Race protests spark calls for Arab states to end «exploitative» migrant worker system.* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-workers-rights-trfn-idUSKBN23F2IY

Ringrose, P., & Stubberud, E. (2019). The Emotional Politics of Representations of Migrant Domestic Work in Lebanon. *Middle East Critique*, *28*(4), 405–424. https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2019.1664798

Rootslabglobal, (2017) *EngnaLegna*. http://rootslabglobal.org/lobanon/blogDetails/id=19&lang=en

Sabaratnam, M. (2020). Is IR Theory White? Racialised Subject-Positioning in Three Canonical Texts. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, *49*(1), 3–31. https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829820971687

Said E. (2003). *Orientalism*. Penguin Random House, UK

Sea-Watch Org (2022, April 28) *Sea Watch takes Frontex to court.* https://sea-watch.org/en/sea-watch-takes-frontex-to-court/

Seckin B, (2021, November 5) *European NGOs rescue over 1.000 irregular migrants in the Mediterranean.* https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/european-ngos-rescue-over-1-000-irregular-migrants-in-mediterranean/2412435

Silverstein A. P. (2005). Immigrant Racialisation and the New Savage Slot: Race, Migration and Immigration in the New Europe. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 2005. 34:363-84. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.anthro.34.081804.120338

Sky News (2020, July 16) *Escaping modern slavery in Lebanon.* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hKsr4RodDAw

Sousa, M. A., João. (2022) *Abandoned migrant women left homeless amid Lebanon's crisis.* https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/1/21/i-wanted-to-die-abused-migrant-women-in-lebanon-face-detention

Spijkerboer, T. (2018). The Global Mobility Infrastructure: Reconceptualising the Externalisation of Migration Control. *European Journal of Migration and Law*, *20*(4), 452–469. https://doi.org/10.1163/15718166-12340038

Squire, V. (2020). Migration and the politics of 'the human': Confronting the privileged subjects of

IR. *International Relations*, *34*(3), 290–308. https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117820946380

Stachowitsch, S., & Sachseder, J. (2019). The gendered and racialized politics of risk analysis. The case of Frontex. *Critical Studies on Security*, *7*(2), 107–123. https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2019.1644050

Stock, I., Üstübici, A., & Schultz, S. U. (2019). Externalization at work: Responses to migration policies from the Global South. *Comparative Migration Studies*, *7*(1), 48, s40878-019-0157-z. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-019-0157-z

Stop Border Violence. https://www.stopborderviolence.org/

The Evans Foundation. (2005). *Europe's New Racism: Causes, manifestations, and solutions*. Berghahn

This Is Lebanon. https://thisislebanon.work/

This is Lebanon (@thisislebanonLB) Twitter
- a(2020, May 29) "Lebanon is the largest slave prison on earth." (tweet) https://twitter.com/ThisIsLebanonLB/status/1266225362658181120
- b(2020, June 2) "Do black lives matter in Lebanon? Two domestic workers die every week. All black and disposable. Faustina: "I'm very weak, I feel so weak. My body is swollen, I can barely stand for five minutes. I don't want to die." (image attached) (tweet) (https://twitter.com/ThisIsLebanonLB/status/1267680574577143808
- c(2020, June 7) "Lebanon has 500.000 George Floyds. None of them have legal visibility. All of them can be murdered with no consequences." (image attached) (tweet) https://twitter.com/ThisIsLebanonLB/status/1269551947234721793

This is Lebanon (@thisislebanon) Instagram
- (2022, May 2) "There is so much about this story that is wrong - the illegal confiscation of Rachel's passport, the non-payment of salary, the humiliating names ("animal"), and making her sign a waiver to her rights at gunpoint." (Photo) https://www.instagram.com/p/CdDc2NeM97z/

Thomas-Johnson A. (2020, April 23) *Nigerian woman rescued in Lebanon after being posted for sale on Facebook.* https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/nigerian-woman-rescued-lebanon-after-being-posted-sale-facebook

Thompson, E. (2000). *Colonial Citizens: republic rights, paternal privilege, and gender in French Syria and Lebanon.* Colombia University Press

Tilly, C. (1993-1994). Social Movements as Historically Specific Clusters of Political Performances. *Berkely Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 38, pp. 1-30

Tondo L.

- (2019, June 26) *Migrant rescue ship defies Salvini's ban to enter Italian port.* https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/26/ngo-boat-carrying-migrants-defies-matteo-salvini-veto-lampedusa-italy

- (2021, June 18) *EU 'has blood on its hands', say activists calling for border agency's abolition.* https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/jun/18/eu-has-blood-on-its-hands-say-activists-calling-for-frontex-border-agencys-abolition

- (5 May 2021) *Revealed: 2.000 refugee deaths linked to illegal EU pushbacks.* https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/may/05/revealed-2000-refugee-deaths-linked-to-eu-pushbacks

Van Dijk, T. A. (2021). *Antiracist Discourse: Theory and History of a Macromovement*-Cambridge University Press. EPUB.

Vaughan-Williams, N. (2009). *Border politics: The limits of sovereign power*. Edinburgh University Press.

VICE News. (2020, September 24) *Migrant Workers in Lebanon Are Trapped in a Racist System*. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yFEui9JhMFI

Visa Policy, Migration and Home Affairs https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/schengen-borders-and-visa/visa-policy_en

Vitalis R. (2005). *The Birth of a Discipline*. In Long D. & Schmidt C. B. *Imperialism and Internationalism in the discipline of International Relations (*2005). State University of New York Press

Xchange (no date found) *Libyan detention centres: a legal analysis* http://xchange.org/map/Libya_DC.html